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EPIGRAPH
A system of  consequences, however absurd, acutely and justly drawn from a 
few principles, in very abstract matters, is of  real utility in science, and may 
be made subservient to real knowledge. This merit MR HUME’s 
metaphysical writings have in a great degree. 
Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of  Man, II.12
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ABSTRACT
In his Treatise of  Human Nature, David Hume sought to revolutionize the science of  the 
human mind in the same fashion that Isaac Newton had revolutionized physical science, 
attempting to explain the mechanisms of  human thought and behavior in terms of  just a 
few principles sharing the same sort of  simplicity and elegance as Newton’s basic laws. A 
major component of  this project was to provide reductive analyses of  all acts of  human 
cognition in terms of  acts of  simple conception or apprehension of  an object.  I term this 
act objectual conception, and characterize Hume as seeking to reduce other acts of  the 
understanding—such as acts of  judgment and of  reasoning—to it.  Given Hume’s 
systematic approach to philosophy, these views about the understanding shape his views in a 
broad array of  areas.  While Hume’s theory of  cognition has been a major focus for Hume 
scholars, the limitations arising from Hume’s Newtonian aspirations have routinely led them 
to the conclusion that Hume’s explanatory resources are utterly inadequate to his needs.
In my dissertation, I defend Hume from these doubts by investigating an array of  
objections offered against him by his contemporary Thomas Reid and echoed by more 
recent scholars.  While I argue that Hume’s system evades Reid’s objections, the concerns 
raised by Reid are nonetheless quite valuable, insofar as they help to reveal some of  the core 
philosophical demands on a theory of  cognition.
In the first chapter of  the dissertation, I present Hume’s framework for analyzing mental 
states: the basic elements of  his mental ontology, including the range of  interactions there 
are among those elements.  Merely considering a certain object—or, equivalently for Hume, 
imagining that object—is nothing more than (presently) possessing an idea of  it.  Here, 
Hume’s account is relatively orthodox.  His radical divergence from the orthodoxy of  the 
day comes in his view that all other acts of  the understanding—acts of  judgment, inference, 
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and reasoning—can be analyzed in terms of  acts of  objectual conception with varying 
degrees of  force and vivacity.  In order to best understand Hume’s goals in offering such 
analyses, I also investigate his views on explanation.  The result of  my discussion is an 
outline of  Hume’s aims and resources, which provides a basis for some general interpretive 
strategies that I employ throughout the dissertation.  In the four remaining chapters, I 
defend Hume from a number of  concerns raised by Reid, showing how these concerns arise 
from underestimations or misunderstandings of  Hume’s views.
In the second chapter, I present Hume’s account of  existential belief, and Reid’s 
objection that this account conflates differences in kind with differences of  degree.  Hume’s 
view is that that merely imagining an object differs from believing that it exists only by the 
force/vivacity with which the idea of  the object is present to the mind.  The force of  Reid’s 
objection can be brought out by observing that, on Hume’s view, a truth-apt state like 
believing that the sun exists has the same content as, and involves the same activity as, the 
decidedly not truth-apt state of  imagining the sun.  The two states differ only in degree of  
attendant strength or vivacity.  While there is a real challenge here (i.e. explaining the 
differences between the two acts), I argue that Hume’s differences of  degree are sufficient to 
answer that challenge.  On the resulting interpretation, Hume’s fundamental attitude of  
cognitive commitment is belief  in (in the sense of, for example, believing in ghosts) rather 
than belief  that.
In the third chapter, I present Reid’s objection that Hume’s system precludes states of  
denial.  Reid’s concern is that, for a given content, Hume can only distinguish between the 
states of  affirmation and uncertainty, with no room to account for states of  denial.  In the 
course of  presenting a similar objection, Barry Stroud points out that there are two ways one 
can approach the issue of  relating affirmation and denial.  One can maintain that they are 
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related a) by being opposite activities with the same content, or b) by being the same activity 
with opposite contents.  I show that powerful objections offered by Reid and Stroud only 
succeed against views which adopt the first understanding of  the relationship, and argue that 
Hume avoids the concerns, since, on a careful reading of  the text, he is properly understood 
as adopting the latter understanding of  the relationship.
The remaining two chapters concern Reid’s four objections against the principle that 
conceivability implies possibility.  As Hume’s adoption of  this principle places some severe 
constraints on his system — especially as regards judgments of  possibility and impossibility, 
as well as for an account of  mathematical/demonstrative reasoning — answering these 
objections is central to my defense of  Hume’s account of  judgment and reasoning.
In chapter four, I focus on the first two challenges, one regarding linguistic 
understanding and the other regarding modal thought.  Reid argues that understanding 
sentences which express impossibilities will require the ability to conceive of  impossibilities.  
As Hume does not provide an explicit, systematic theory of  language, I do not attempt to 
offer a specific interpretation of  Hume’s views on that front.  Instead, I demonstrate which 
assumptions about a theory of  language are built in to this linguistic challenge, and argue 
that the objection succeeds against Hume only if  there is good reason to think he would have 
been committed to those assumptions.  The latter challenge concerns thoughts about 
possibility and impossibility.  Here the objection is that we can make the judgment, about 
some impossibility, that it is impossible, which requires conceiving of  that impossibility.  In 
responding to this objection on Hume’s behalf, I develop an account of  modal thought that 
is suggested by Hume’s own comments on possibility and impossibility, showing that it does 
not conflict with Hume’s commitment to the inconceivability of  impossibilities.
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Finally, in chapter five, I turn to Reid’s objections about mathematical and demonstrative 
reasoning.  The first of  the two objections is that Hume’s system legitimizes what I term 
“demonstration by imagination”, which is suspiciously absent from mathematical practice, 
and gets the wrong results.  I argue that Reid’s objection here assumes too weak a notion of  
what it is to imagine something (for Hume’s system), and that, properly understood, such 
demonstrations by imagination would amount to constructive mathematical proofs.  Thus, 
Hume’s system is correct to legitimate them.  The second of  the two is that Hume’s system 
renders demonstration by reductio ad absurdum impossible, which is curious given that its use is 
not only prevalent in mathematics, but also productive and useful.  Reid’s objection here 
depends on Hume accepting that the state of  supposing C cannot occur without an 
accompanying state of  conceiving C.  I argue that Hume has no such commitment, even 
though supposition is to be defined in terms of  conception. I present an interpretation of  
Hume’s account of  supposition that allows for reductio arguments, while respecting Hume’s 
reductive aims, in order to defend Hume’s commitment to the view that conceivability entails 
possibility.
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PREFACE
Being a Hume scholar in your late twenties is a good way to keep your ego in check. The 
Scottish philosopher David Hume was born in 1711, and published the three books of  his 
Treatise of  Human Nature in 1739 and 1740.  The Treatise—unquestionably one of  the most 
important works of  philosophy ever written—was composed before Hume was 28 years old, 
and published before he turned 30.  To this day, some 235 years after his death, Hume’s 
influence is still felt in virtually every area of  philosophy.
The full title of  Hume’s masterwork is “A Treatise Human Nature: Being An Attempt to 
Introduce the Experimental Method of  Reasoning Into Moral Subjects”.  By “Moral 
Subjects” here, Hume has in mind the sciences concerned with human nature: human 
reasoning (logic), human tastes and sentiments (morals and criticism), and human society 
(politics).  The first book of  the Treatise focuses on logic, understood as the science of  
human reasoning. This means that his project in this book rests at the intersection of  three 
different subjects: a) what we what we would now think of  as psychology and cognitive 
science, b) the philosophy of  mind and language, and c) epistemology (or the philosophical 
investigation of  knowledge).  Hume’s approach to this is to start with direct observations 
about the workings of  the human mind, and systematize these observations.  The 
“experimental method” Hume seeks to apply does not go beyond the observations that are 
directly produced by experience.  Hume is thus limited to the immediate deliverances of  
sense perception and the imagination’s ability to rearrange parts as the only basic elements of 
his theory of  human mental activity.  In a sense, Hume’s constraints, in relation to the 
magnitude of  his project, would be akin to someone hoping to build a fully-functional 
spaceship using only twigs and vine.
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My Project
The following dissertation is a work of  historical philosophy.  My aim is to defend 
Hume’s views about thought, judgment and reasoning from criticisms that were offered by 
his contemporary Thomas Reid and echoed by more recent scholars.  I do this despite the 
fact that I think Hume’s views are largely misguided (a point I will come back to later).
In Hume’s posthumously published autobiography he reveals that he consciously 
resolved to avoid responding to his critics, and also that he was able to inflexibly abide by 
this resolution (Hume [1805]).  Hume’s concern was that if  he responded to some of  his 
critics, and not others, the ones he didn’t respond to would think that this was because he 
had nothing to say in response to them.  By abstaining from any responses whatsoever, no 
one would be in a position to think that he was failing to respond simply because he had 
nothing to say.  Whether or not we think this is a sensible plan, it means that when, for 
example, Thomas Reid, offered any number of  objections to Hume’s views, we nowhere 
have Hume’s official statement of  where he thinks Reid’s objections go wrong.  Given that 
several of  Reid’s objections have a lot of  intuitive pull, many of  these objections have long 
survived and have recurred in discussions by contemporary scholars.
My project then, in this dissertation is not to ask, “Are Hume’s views on the structure of  
mental activity correct?”, but rather, to ask, “Does Hume’s system give him enough 
resources to answer Reid’s worries?”.  I argue that none of  the (roughly) seven to ten 
objections from Reid that I consider actually make trouble for Hume’s views.
Hume’s Philosophical Virtues
Given that I think Hume’s approach is pretty misguided, and that his views are all pretty 
likely to be false, what is the point of  engaging in this defense?  To answer this question, I 
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need to (briefly) explain my view of  what I am doing when I do historical philosophy.  
People who work on historical philosophy are often categorized (by others or by themselves) 
in terms of  where their work falls on the spectrum between pure historical inquiry (that 
happens to be about philosophers) and pure philosophical inquiry (that happens to mention 
figures from the past).  In my experience, most of  us doing historical philosophy are 
somewhere in the middle, but with a pretty clear sense of  which side of  the mid-point we 
are on.  When it comes to the question of  which projects are valuable, the reality is that 
there are valuable projects to pursue at pretty much any point on the spectrum, but I am 
personally most interested in the project of  studying the philosophical positions of  historical 
figures to help make progress on contemporary debates.  Far from answering the initial 
question, this should actually bring the worry behind it home:  I am skeptical of  Hume’s 
approach to theorizing about the structure of  human mental activity and pretty doubtful of  
his views.  So, how can studying Hume help make progress in the ongoing philosophical 
debates about the structure of  human mental activity?
First, it helps that Hume was a genius.  It is likely that, in spite of  the drawbacks to his 
approach, and implausibility of  his views, he still produced some sharp insights that are 
directly relevant to the contemporary debates.  Second, it helps that Hume was very good at 
sticking to his system, and understood his system well.  It is likely that, if  his starting 
assumptions force him to say one thing rather than another about some topic he discusses, 
that he recognized both which thing he was forced to say, and which of  his assumptions 
were forcing him to say it.
Third, it helps that Hume adopted strong/strict constraints.  This limits his options, 
which makes it much easier to tell when they have all been exhausted.  Fourth, it helps that 
his system appears to be absurdly inadequate.  This makes it easier to identify things his 
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system needs to do in order to be viable that there is reason to doubt that it can do, which, in 
turn, makes it easier to figure out how to go about investigating the adequacy of  his system.
Except the first of  these items, each of  these goes to explaining why we can expect to 
have success at learning about Hume’s system.  In fact, they combine to suggest that it 
should be easy to learn what Hume’s system can and cannot do as well as why it can or cannot.  
And this is where I think we gain a great deal of  value for contemporary debates by 
examining Hume’s system.  If  we can learn exactly what we want to be able to do that 
Hume’s system can’t do, and why Hume’s system can’t do it, we’ll have learned something 
important about what a system has to look like in order to do that thing.
To offer a crude analogy: if  I can figure out that some particular recipe for soufflé is bad 
because it is gives the wrong instruction on how much to beat the eggs, then, I’ve gotten 
myself  pretty close to having a good soufflé recipe.  This, roughly, is how I take historical 
philosophy (as I pursue it) to contribute to the project of  contemporary philosophical 
inquiry.
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CHAPTER 1: HUME’S RESOURCES
Introduction
The project of  this dissertation is to investigate the prospects for David Hume’s 
systematic theory of  human cognition, as that theory is presented in Hume’s Treatise of  
Human Nature.  The first steps in our investigation are to articulate Hume’s aims and 
methods, as well as to catalog the fundamental resources of  Hume’s system.  In the process 
of  carrying out these tasks, I will also have an opportunity to outline some of  the 
interpretive strategies that I will employ throughout the dissertation, and show how Hume’s 
own conception of  his project lends support to the interpretive strategies I will pursue.
Before getting into the details of  Hume’s system, it will be helpful to sketch the key 
elements of  the system and present a ‘big picture’ take on Hume’s project.  Hume was a self-
consciously systematic philosopher, and Hume’s views on the proper limits of  explanation 
play a large role in shaping his theory of  the human mind.  
Hume’s approach to explaining mental phenomena was to seek after broad 
generalizations based in observable commonalities among the diverse particular mental 
phenomena.  This process would ultimately conclude when no further generalizations could 
be offered, leaving the system to rest on some ultimate principles which are not themselves 
subject to explanation.  It is a crucial feature of  Hume’s approach that the ultimate principles 
of  this theory are not hypotheses or theoretical postulates, but rather, unifying 
generalizations verified by the data.  It is in this sense that Hume’s views on explanation echo 
Isaac Newton’s use of  gravity as a fundamental principle and the view he so famously 
expressed with the latin hypothesis non fingo.1
So, Hume’s aim is to pursue unifying generalizations about our mental lives that are as 
broad and simple as possible, but which are nonetheless validated by the concrete particular 
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occurrences we are taking as data.  And this is the stopping point for our explanations.  Just 
as Newton did not seek to attribute a cause to the force of  gravity, Hume will not seek to 
produce an account that explains why these tendencies, rather than some others, are the 
most general associative tendencies of  the human mind.
Hume’s method of  data collection is, loosely put, introspective.  The principle 
determinant of  what counts as the data to be explained is Hume’s awareness of  his own 
mental life.  Insofar as the theory Hume propounds was generated in such a manner, it 
seems proper to take Hume’s claims about the nature of  his mental life as prima facie reliable, 
at least for purposes of  extrapolating details of  the theory from the various specific things 
we are told about it.  Hume may be completely wrong about the introspective character of  
his own mental life (or of  human mental life in general), but the theory he proposes is based 
on his assessment, and our method should take account of  that.
A second parallel to Newton emerges when we look at the resulting theory.  Newtonian 
physics is distinguished by the relatively small stock of  primitive elements it requires to 
accommodate the rich variety of  physical interactions among bodies (both celestial and 
terrestrial).  His theory contains a small set of  laws describing the behavior of  particles 
based on the mass and velocity of  those particles.  With this elegant system, Newton was 
able to account for an enormous range of  physical behavior.  Hume’s system is similarly 
spartan in its fundamental resources.  Mental activities, for Hume, can be analyzed in terms 
of  perceptions (Hume’s basic mental entities), which generally possess some sort of  content 
or, more neutrally, some sort of  intrinsic character, as well as an extrinsic feature that Hume 
terms “force” and “vivacity” (among other things).  In combination with a small set of  
principles describing associative tendencies among perceptions, Hume hopes to have a 
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system that does for the science of  the human mind what Newtonian mechanics did for 
physical science.
The shape of  Hume’s system is the product of  two things: a) a modest conception of  
the aims of  explanation, and b) a relatively austere set of  resources with which to analyze/
explain mental phenomena.  Both are consequences of  Hume’s empiricist methodology and 
commitment to systematic philosophy.  With this overview in place, we are now in a position 
to attend to the details of  Hume’s methods, aims, and fundamental resources.
Section 1.  Humean Explanation
Hume tells us that, for his project in the Treatise, he “proposes to anatomize human 
nature in a regular manner, and promises to draw no conclusions but where he is authorized 
by experience” (T, p. 646).2  Hume’s introspective access to his own mental life clearly plays a 
role in determining what he judges to be “authorized by experience”.  I should note here 
that my methods do not involve a direct comparison between the claimed or implied 
qualitative character of  Hume’s experiences and the apparent qualitative character of  my 
own experiences.  One reason not to attempt such comparisons is that it is not always clear 
how to understand the terminology Hume uses in characterizing his experiences.  An 
example is Hume’s use of  the terms “force” and “vivacity”.  It is not clear that we can 
separate the question of  what such terms are intended to suggest about the character of  
Hume’s experiences from other interpretive questions in order to directly ask whether it is 
true that our impressions are more vivacious than our ideas.  Simply put, a far more 
productive approach to investigating Hume’s views is what I term “interpretive algebra”.  To 
the best of  our ability, we should treat terms like these as Hume’s technical labels for some 
as-yet-unknown feature of  experience, examine what would have to be true of  some feature 
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of  experience in order for it to do the work that Hume requires of  it, and then see if  there is 
any feature of  our experience that meets those demands (or, at least, very nearly meets 
them).
The most important thing to keep in mind regarding Hume’s explanatory aims in the 
Treatise is that Hume explicitly regards explanation as (eventually) giving out.  Though I don’t 
take this observation about the limits of  Humean explanation to be especially controversial, 
it is worth going through a couple of  passages in which this point is starkly illustrated.
And tho’ we must endeavor to render all our principles as 
universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the 
utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and 
fewest causes, ‘tis still certain we cannot go beyond 
experience; and any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the 
ultimate original of  qualities of  human nature, ought at first 
to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical.
I do not think a philosopher, who would apply himself  so 
earnestly to the explaining the ultimate principles of  the soul, 
would show himself  a great master in that very science of  
human nature, which he pretends to explain, or very knowing 
in what is naturally satisfactory to the mind of  man.
T, p. xvii-xviii
This quote seems, to me, an absolutely clear statement of  the view that explanation gives 
out at the limits of  experience, that attempts to go beyond such limits produce pretend 
explanations, at least as far as the science of  human nature is concerned.  Shortly after this 
passage, of  course, Hume makes it clear that this follows from principles about science and 
explanation in general:
But if  this impossibility of  explaining ultimate principles 
should be esteemed a defect in the science of  man, I will 
venture to affirm, that ‘tis a defect common to it with all the 
sciences, and all the arts, in which we can employ ourselves, 
whether they be such as are cultivated in the schools of  the 
philosophers, or practiced in the shops of  the meanest 
artizans. None of  them can go beyond experience, or 
establish any principles which are not founded on that 
authority.
T, p. xviii
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Again, Hume’s position in this passage strikes me as sufficiently clear that paraphrase 
would be unnecessary.  What is worth noting, however, about this pair of  passages, is that, 
besides making it clear that explanations stop at the bounds of  experience, Hume also makes 
it clear to us that the explanations he is looking for are the most parsimonious unifying 
generalizations directly confirmed or validated by the data.  To give a toy example, we might 
consider the observations that lions hunt prey, that tigers hunt prey, that leopards hunt prey, 
etc.  A potential explanation of  this fact, for Hume, is simply the broader generalization that 
great cats hunt prey.  Note that this generalization is not a hypothesis, posited to explain the 
behavior of  lions; rather, it is a generalization that unifies a number of  other observations.  
Of  course, our ideal goal would be to find the broadest group G about whom our 
experiences directly confirm the claim that members of  G hunt prey.  Supposing we 
determine what group that is.  For Hume, the ultimate explanation we can give of  the prey-
hunting behavior of  lions (or of  an individual lion) is simply that lions (or that lion) are 
members of  G, and members of  G hunt prey.  We move into the realm of  pretend 
explanations if  we propose that there is an underlying nature to the members of  G one of  
the elements of  which is an occult quality like predatory spirit.  Or, as Hume eloquently puts 
it:
Nothing is more requisite for a true philosopher, than to 
restrain the intemperate desire of  searching into causes, and 
having established any doctrine upon a sufficient number of  
experiments, rest contented with that, when he sees a farther 
examination would lead him into obscure and uncertain 
speculations. In that case his enquiry wou'd be much better 
employ'd in examining the effects than the causes of  his 
principle.
T 1.1.5, p. 13
Again, I don’t take this to be especially controversial as a matter of  Hume interpretation, 
but it is worth noting, so that we are better able to see, as we proceed, which explanatory 
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burdens Hume takes to be within the scope of  his project, and which explanatory burdens 
Hume takes to be beyond the scope of  any project.
Section 2. The Humean Theory of  Mental States and Transitions
I have found it helpful, in thinking about Hume’s system, to adapt the contrast between 
statics and dynamics.  As I’ll be using this distinction, it is intended to differentiate questions 
about the state of  a mind at a time, and questions about that state (such as, questions about 
the fundamental elements from which that state is composed, and their synchronic, or 
“snapshot” features) from questions about transitions between states, and the rules 
governing such transitions.
The way Hume presents the different components of  his system not only suggests such 
an analysis, but is cleaved in precisely the correct place for pursuing such an analysis.  Hume 
gives us a theory of  ideas (or, more properly, a theory of  perceptions), and a separate theory 
of  the associations among ideas, which combine to describe, for us, the states a mind can be 
in, and the various tendencies which combine in the mind’s transition from one state to 
another.  In what follows, I will simply ignore some complications that arise for passions, 
though much of  what I say applies to Hume’s account of  emotions and the will as well as to 
his account of  cognition and the understanding. 
The Humean Theory of  Perceptions (HTP)
Hume’s broadest term for the particular mental occurrences he is concerned to 
investigate is “perception”.  Perceptions can vary in the strength of  their attendant “force” 
or “vivacity” or “liveliness” (with the stronger class being designated “impressions” and the 
weaker class being designated “ideas”).  This is an extrinsic feature.  Perceptions possess 
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qualitative characters (in the case of  impressions of  sensation, these are related directly to 
the way the perceptions look/feel/taste/etc.).  This is an intrinsic feature.  Pretty much 
everything about this picture is outlined clearly in the first pages of  the main body of  Book 
1 of  the Treatise, which I will not reproduce here.  To individuate perception-types in the 
most basic manner relevant to the science of  human nature, we need only these two features: 
an intrinsic character, C, and an extrinsic vivacity, V. 
Thus, we can represent the types of  perceptions, for our most basic theoretical purposes, 
as ordered pairs <C,V>.  The content of  a perception—i.e. what it is a perception of—is a 
function of  its intrinsic character.  Thus, for any two perceptions, P1 and P2, P1 and P2 have 
the same content only if  P1 and P2 share the same value for C.  Similarly, any change in 
intrinsic character will change their content.  Thus, for any two perceptions, P1 and P2, if  P1 
and P2 have the same content, then P1 and P2 have the same value for C.  Given both of  
these results, we can use intrinsic character as a basis for sorting perceptions into equivalence 
classes of  sameness of  content.  In essence, perceptions can be treated as pairings of  a 
content with an attendant vivacity.
The only other feature relevant to this way of  individuating perceptions is their attendant 
vivacity.3  While Hume’s hodge-podge collection of  terms to reference this feature are 
suggestive of  very different things, it is a consistent feature of  Hume’s discussion of  vivacity 
that it comes in degrees of  strength.  Thus, regardless of  what else we accept about vivacity, 
the values for V can be organized by degree, such that, for any two values, v1 and v2, exactly 
one of  the following relations obtains: 
i)  v1 > v2 
ii) v2 > v1 
iii)  v1 = v2
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As noted above, one way of  subdividing perceptions, perhaps the most significant, is 
into the types impressions and ideas.  According to Hume’s discussion of  the difference 
between impressions and ideas, it turns out that there is some threshold such that 
perceptions in which the value for V is greater than that threshhold are impressions, while 
perceptions in which the value for V is less than that threshold are ideas.4  For convenience, 
I will use ‘H’ to indicate the range of  values higher than t, and ‘L’ to indicate the range of  
values lower than t.
This provides us with a good opportunity to outline the method I alluded to earlier as 
“interpretive algebra” as well as to articulate the reasons why I will not be wading into the 
interpretive debate about what vivacity is.  Above, we have outlined a formal feature (the 
ability for individual values to be organized along a scale of  strengths by way of  these 
pairwise comparisons), which could be possessed by any number of  aspects of  our 
experiences.  We could organize perceptions by the amount of  resistance they give, taken as 
a strength, to our willful attempts to dismiss them. Alternately, we could organize them by 
the phenomenological intensity of  their “colors” (literal with visual impressions, and 
metaphorical with those of  other senses), taken as strengths.  Or, if  we desired, we could 
organize them by the degree to which they demand our attention, taken as strengths, or by 
the ease of  calling them to mind, taken as degrees of  strength.  The reason I canvas this 
handful of  options, stressing that each one would license us to arrange the perceptions on a 
scale of  strengths, is that each of  these is at least a moderately plausible way of  taking one of 
the words that Hume uses to indicate this feature of  a perception.  Hume’s list includes, 
“force”, “vivacity”, “liveliness”, “steadiness”, “solidity”, “power”, “firmness”, and 
“intensity”.  Since this list of  terms varies greatly in meaning, it seems hopeless to choose a 
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single sense of  a single term from the list, and declare it to be the one that Hume had in 
mind.  Particularly since Hume tells us not to do that:
This variety of  terms, which may seem so unphilosophical, is 
intended only to express that act of  the mind, which renders 
realities more present to us than fictions, causes them to 
weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior 
influence on the passions and imagination. Provided we agree 
about the thing, ‘tis needless to dispute about the term.
T p. 629
As we will see in Chapter 2, a refusal to prematurely assign an interpretation to Hume’s 
use of  “vivacity” will help us when we seek to understand Hume’s analyses of  different 
mental operations.  These mental operations are typically differentiated in terms of  
differences in their degrees of  vivacity, and consequently, the quickest way to misinterpret 
Hume’s proposed analyses is to rush to judgment on the nature of  vivacity.
Another way of  subdividing perceptions, also crucial for Hume’s framework, is into the 
types complex and simple.  Regardless of  what else we accept about the relevant notion of  
simplicity, the values for C can be organized compositionally, so that, for some privileged set 
of  values for C—the “simple” values—every value for C is either among that set, or is to be 
analyzed as an arrangement of  values from that set.  Any perception whose value for C is in 
that set is a simple perception, any perception whose value for C is a non-trivial arrangement 
of  values from that set, is a complex perception.  For convenience, I will sometimes 
represent complex values in terms of  an arrangement, An(....), and a set of  elements so-
arranged.  However, except when a restriction is indicated, my use of  character/content 
variables (c1, c2, ... cn) will range over both simple values and complex ones. 
In principle (and, for that matter, in Hume’s actual view), these distinctions can crosscut, 
producing a four way division of  perceptions: simple impressions, simple ideas, complex 
impressions, complex ideas.
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On this way of  formalizing Hume’s framework, we have a reasonably succinct way of  
making precise the substance of  Hume’s central maxims in the opening sections of  the  
Treatise.  The first maxim, Hume’s infamous copy principle, is the claim that every simple 
idea, in its first appearance, is derived from a simple impression, which is exactly 
correspondent to it, and which it exactly represents. Or, in terms of  this formalism:  For any 
simple content c1, if  there is an occurrence of  the perception <c1, L> at some time (in a 
given mind), then, there was an occurrence of  the perception <c1, H>, at a prior time (in 
that mind).
I will call the second maxim, which is the subject of  far less discussion, the 
“recombination principle.”  Hume puts this principle forward after observing that, in 
presenting ideas copied from impressions to the mind, “the imagination is not restrain’d to 
the same order and form with the original impressions” (T 1.1.3, p. 9).  This observation 
leads Hume to present his “second principle, of  the liberty of  the imagination to transpose and 
change its ideas”, elaborating thus:
The fables we meet with in poems and romances put this 
entirely out of  question. Nature there is totally confounded, 
and nothing mentioned but winged horses, fiery dragons, and 
monstrous giants. Nor will this liberty of  the fancy appear 
strange, when we consider that all our ideas are copy’d from 
our impressions, and that there are not any two impressions 
which are perfectly inseparable. Not to mention that this is an 
evident consequence of  the division of  ideas into simple and 
complex.  Where-ever the imagination perceives a difference 
among ideas, it can easily produce a separation.
T 1.1.3, p. 10 
There is quite a bit packed into this brief  discussion of  the second principle.  What is 
absolutely clear from the discussion is that Hume takes this principle to explain how we can 
have ideas of  fantasy beings we have never encountered.  Additionally, the principle is 
alleged to be a consequence of  simple/complex distinction as applied to ideas.  It is not 
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immediately obvious, from the text, exactly what this freedom to “transpose and change” 
ideas is supposed to amount to (though some very natural interpretations spring to mind).  
The most natural interpretation that accords with use of  “transpose” in the statement of  the 
principle would tell us that one can produce new complex ideas which differ from existing 
complex ideas by replacing component simple ideas with different component simple ideas.  
More formally: for any simple idea <c1, L> and any complex idea <A1(c2...cn), L> 
(possessed by a given mind), the imagination has the power to produce a complex idea which 
differs from <A1(c2...cn), L> by the substitution of  c1 for one of  its component simple 
ideas.5  However, this is likely an overly simplistic interpretation of  the principle, as, it 
produces odd results when one considers replacing simple ideas from one sense modality 
with simple ideas of  other sense modalities (what would it be to have an idea that is identical 
to my mental picture of  a rose, but which replaces one of  the simple colored component 
ideas with a flavor?).  As the point of  the present exercise is to illustrate how we might 
employ the formalism to encode Humean principles, I will simply note that I do not endorse 
the foregoing interpretation of  the recombination principle, rather than engaging in a 
tangential attempt to revise the formal version of  this principle so that it avoids such 
oddities.  One thing worth noting before moving on, however, is that the end of  this 
passage, as well as other discussions, suggest that Hume conceives of  this productive power 
in terms of  the mind’s capacity to break down complex ideas coupled with the mind’s 
capacity to freely combine simple ideas.  Thus, the power to transpose ideas might be more 
accurately thought of  as the joint powers of  assembly and disassembly.6
It is worth pausing to ask, at this point, whether we gain much advantage from using this 
ordered n-tuple formalism, introduced above.  For many purposes (including a fair number 
of  my purposes), the answer is “no, or at least not much”, and consequently, I will often 
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refrain from actually recasting particular elements of  Hume’s account in this manner.  I hope 
that spelling things out this way has helped clarify how I am conceiving of  perceptions, and 
so one possible benefit was to serve as illustration, if  nothing else.  However, for some 
purposes, it is extremely useful to have a formal representation of  Hume’s framework.  In 
chapter 3, for instance, it will be much easier to draw out the force of  Thomas Reid’s 
objection to Hume about states of  denial, as well as to see what is needed to resolve it, by 
framing the objection in terms of  this formalism.  Mostly, however, the formalism will 
remain in the background.
I haven’t explained why this way of  individuating perceptions is the appropriate one.  For 
instance, the principle I just spelled out references the times of  occurrences of  these 
perceptions.  Why not individuate perceptions in terms of  a character, a vivacity, and a time 
index? (Or: ...and a spatio-temporal index?, etc.).  When we turn our attention to the 
Humean Theory of  Association, it will be clear why this manner of  individuating is 
preferable.  Associative links and invariant relations will obtain between perceptions 
individuated in the manner I have just described.  Treating them as 3- or 4-tuples, would 
simply require us to add a lot of  distracting quantification over the third and fourth values 
when describing the associative tendencies.
There is still an important element of  the statics of  Hume’s theory that we have not yet 
addressed.  Setting aside difficult questions about what it is that grounds the fact, for a pair 
of  perceptions, that they co-occur to a single mind, rather than that they are experienced by 
separate consciousnesses, it is important to note that the state of  a mind, at a time, is not 
given by a single perception, but rather, by the set of  all that mind’s perceptions at that time.  
So, to specify the state of  a mind M at a time, we would use a set of  perceptions, P1...Pn, 
(potentially coded for some principle of  organization among these perceptions, e.g. spatial or 
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temporal).  And with that, we are in a position to sketch Hume’s account of  mental 
dynamics, embodied in his theory of  association.
The Humean Theory of  Associations (HTA)
Hume’s associationism is introduced in Treatise 1.1.4, “Of  the connexion or association of  
ideas.”  Hume notes that, given his recombination principle, nothing has yet been said to 
explain the regularity with which a single mind behaves over time:
Were ideas entirely loose and unconnected, chance alone 
would join them; and ‘tis impossible that the same simple 
ideas should fall regularly into complex ones (as they 
commonly do) without some bond of  union among them, 
some associating quality by which one idea naturally 
introduces another.  This uniting principle among ideas is not 
to be consider’d as an inseparable connexion, for that has 
already been excluded from the imagination: nor yet are we to 
conclude that without it the mind cannot join two ideas; for 
nothing is more free than that faculty: but we are only to 
regard it as a gentle force, which commonly prevails, and is 
the cause why, among other things, languages so nearly 
correspond to each other; nature in a manner pointing out to 
every one those simple ideas, which are most proper to be 
united into a complex one. The qualities, from which this 
association arises, and by which the mind is after this manner 
convey’d from one idea to another, are three, vis. 
RESEMBLANCE, CONTIGUITY in time or place, and 
CAUSE and EFFECT.
T 1.1.4, p. 10-11 
Two phenomena have been identified as explanatory targets for HTA.  One is that HTP 
alone cannot explain the prevalence of  some complex ideas over others.  And I think Hume 
is certainly correct about this.  Insofar as HTP predicts anything about the relative 
prevalance of  various complex ideas, we might be able to extrapolate something like a higher 
proportion of  complex ideas that were preceded by directly correspondent complex 
impressions (since those complex ideas are possessed without exercising any voluntary 
power of  the mind), but we certainly wouldn’t have any explanation of  why similar 
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adventitious complex ideas re-occur (either over time or between agents).  The second 
phenomenon to be explained is the manner of  the mind’s transition between ideas (as 
distinguished from the production/construction of  new ideas).  In a sense, we could fold the 
former phenomenon into the latter, as idea construction is a process by which one moves 
from a state of  conceiving several simple ideas to a state of  conceiving a complex idea; but 
there is good reason not to conflate the two phenomena.  The former issue is generally 
concerned with the introduction of  new contents; an expansion of  the class of  things we 
can think about, whereas the latter is principally concerned with the movements of  the mind 
between various thoughts already in its repertoire.  This isn’t to say that the two phenomena 
have no interplay whatsoever, but it is worthwhile to maintain some distinction between the 
two things to be explained, as the former is addressed, relatively compactly, in Hume’s 
discussion of  relations, modes, substances, and abstract ideas (T 1.1.5-7) while the other is 
not really centrally explored until part 3 of  book 1, when Hume endeavors to explain belief  
in matters of  fact and the process of  causal inference.
It would not be fruitful to go through all the details of  Hume’s views of  philosophical 
relations at present, but there are some important aspects of  them to briefly highlight.  
When introducing his discussion of  relations as a category of  complex idea, Hume distinguishes 
between a philosophical use of  the term “relation” which encompasses any circumstance in 
which we might wish to compare a pair of  ideas, and a common use of  the term “relation” 
which encompasses only those pairs of  ideas that are naturally united in some substantive 
way.  The former sort are termed “philosophical relations”, and are a subset of  our complex 
ideas.  The latter sort are termed “natural relations” and are the elements of  Hume’s system 
which have been suggested as the basis for the theory of  association.  It is crucial for us not 
to overlook this distinction, as natural relations are intended to explain the prevalence of  
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some complex ideas over others, while philosophical relations are a class of  complex ideas 
(meaning that the relative prevalence of  some philosophical relations over others is one of  
the things Hume intends to explain by appealing to natural relations).  In other words, the 
passage above clearly refers to resemblance, spatio-temporal contiguity, and cause/effect 
relationships as natural relations.
HTA generally tells us that if  a set of  ideas is strongly resembling, it is more likely to 
form a complex idea, that if  a set of  ideas is closely distributed in space or time. it is more 
likely to form a complex idea, and that if  a set of  ideas is causally networked, it is more likely 
to form a complex idea.  This would be a sketch of  the story Hume has to offer about the 
phenomena of  complex idea construction.  Additionally, HTA tells us that the flow of  our 
thoughts—our movement from one idea to another—is governed by the same principles of  
association.  And this is, particularly for our project, the vastly more interesting aspect of  
HTA.  Not only does it bear on which ideas lead to which, it also determines the 
transference of  vivacity from one idea to another.  This should allow us to see why it makes 
sense to individuate perceptions as content/vivacity pairings:  associations are sensitive to 
the intrinsic character/content of  the perception, and govern transfers of  force and vivacity. 
The Moving Parts of  Hume’s Model of  the Mind
Suppose we wished to program a computer model of  Hume’s theory of  the 
understanding.  HTP is a sort of  guide for how to encode the most basic components of  the 
total states a mind could be in (all the sets {P1...Pn}, roughly).  That does not yet give us the 
whole field of  possible total states of  an understanding at a time, however.  Hume 
recognizes that you could have two individuals with the same occurrent perceptions, but 
who differ in what those perceptions will lead them to expect. For instance, A and B may be 
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presented with qualitatively identical visual experiences of  a room filled with smoke, with 
this experience leading A, but not B, to expect fire.  At the moment A and B first have the 
visual experience of  the smokey room, they may have qualitatively identical snap-shots of  
the occurrent components of  their states of  mind, but they clearly differ in their total state 
of  mind at that moment.  For our computer model of  these Humean minds to capture the 
total state of  a mind at a time, it would need to record the occurrent mental operations and 
the mind’s associative tendencies at that moment.7  I’ll use “AT” (with some numerical index) 
to indicate the different associative tendencies a mind could have, and thus, the total state of  
a mind at a time would be given by a pair <{P1...Pn}, AT1>.  So that is one way in which 
our system would need to keep track of  elements of  HTA.  But, as we observed, not all 
minds have the same associative tendency, and in fact, individual minds generally don’t have 
exactly the same associative tendencies over time. This is because, while some of  the 
grounds of  associative tendencies are stable (relations of  resemblance), others are, on 
Hume’s view, dynamically modified by one’s experiences over time (this is the case with both 
spatiotemporal and causal associations).  Thus, if  we want our computer model to capture 
HTA, it would have to tell us how to get from pairs <{P1...Pn}, A1> to a new total state of  
the mind at a time (i.e. to another pair, <{Px...Py}, A2>).
This picture still omits some crucial components in the evolution of  a Humean mind.8  
Before launching into this complication, I need to apologize for taking so much time on the 
very nitty-gritty details of  this “computer-model” analogy.  By laying out the integral features 
of  HTA in this fashion, I believe we will reveal some extremely important features of  the 
Humean system, but I recognize that the particular method of  presentation can easily 
become somewhat tiresome.
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So, the slight complication that was omitted is that the present model is only adequate if  
the only source of  transition between mental states was due to the associative function itself, 
or the associative function plus some constant rules (e.g. a rule governing the degradation of 
vivacity in a given perception over time).
This leaves out the continual influx of  new high vivacity perceptions in the form of  
sense impressions.  Thus, the model described would, given a starting mental state which is 
somehow populated by perceptions, really only give us something like the inertial projection 
of  that mind, on the assumption that no further impressions are introduced.  To really 
model things, we’d want the computer to take the total state of  a mind at a time (understood 
as above), combine it with the new sensory experiences of  the subsequent moment 
(modeled as a set of  impressions), and take us to a new total state of  the mind.  Put in terms 
of  the notation I’ve been using, the basic idea would be to encode a function that takes both 
<{P1...Pn}, A1> and a set {Px...Py}, and maps them to some pair <{Pw...Pz}, A2>.  
To see how the foregoing reveals what is fundamentally interesting about the structure of 
the Humean mind, it will be helpful to re-state the end-point of  this discussion in ways that 
are less perspicuous with respect to the structures of  the parts within the model. At the most 
general, the models produced by Hume’s system can be described as representing how the 
total state of  a mind at one time combines with new experiences to determine the total state 
of  the mind at subsequent times.  We could bring slightly more of  the structure into view by 
noting that Hume’s system represents the mind’s total state at a time as the conjunction of  
its occurrent perceptions at that time with its associative tendency at that time.  At this stage, 
we could simply re-write what we had above like this: <occurrent-state-at-t1, associative-
inclinations-at-t1> and <experiences-at-t2> jointly determine <occurrent-state-at-t2 , 
associative-inclinations-at-t2>. I don’t know whether this way of  thinking about Hume’s 
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system is especially controversial, but, if  it is correct, then Hume treats the mind as a 
machine whose computational capacity is essentially that of  a finite state machine.  This tells 
us something important about the structural versatility of  Hume’s system, independent of  
the plausibility of  the more substantive claims he is committed to about the realization of  
these structures.
Section 3. The Humean Theory of  Cognition
For all that has been said so far, Hume’s science of  the mind could get off  the ground 
without reference or regard to the traditional categories of  mind.  “Impression”, “Idea”, etc. 
could be treated as merely technical terms in a theory of  mind that isn’t concerned with 
mapping onto our traditional ways of  describing mental activities.  This is due to the fact 
that HTP and HTA are the foundational elements of  Hume’s philosophy.  The specification 
of  the reductive base for analyzing all mental activities.  As such, they need to be a 
“vocabulary” sufficient to express every possible way a mind could be.  But, that leaves open 
the question of  whether it is possible (or feasible, or useful) to analyze the traditional 
categories of  mind in this new vocabulary.  It would be drastic oversimplification to 
consider, as the only possibilities for Hume’s system, full-blooded vindication of  those 
categories or full-blooded elimination of  those categories, because of  the obvious omission 
of  moderate vindication/moderate elimination.  And this isn’t just a question of  what 
percentage of  the traditional categories are vindicated or eliminated.  Rather, especially for 
Hume, there is also the question of  which categories we should be attempting to vindicate.  
Notions like “ideas of  substance”, “abstract ideas”, or “the idea of  existence” might be 
regarded by some philosophers as equally “traditional” with, for instance, color and sound 
ideas.  Hume’s project involves both an adjudication between legitimate traditional categories 
and illegitimate traditional categories, along with an attempt to (in general) vindicate the 
former and eliminate the latter.  This issue of  how to classify Hume’s nuanced position with 
respect to vindication and elimination is important for making sense of  some central 
elements of  Hume’s project (e.g. the discussion of  vulgar and philosophical accounts of  
externality/distinctness/independence of  sensation in T 1.4.2), but is not generally germane 
to the questions I will be investigating, and, so, I will not return to it in this work.
Hume’s theory of  perceptions, and his associative principles, are intended to tell us the 
composition/structure of  our mental operations.  Specifically, Hume hopes to provide 
HTP/HTA analyses of  the operations of  the understanding, which include conception, 
judgment, and reasoning.  Hume offers an entirely orthodox account of  conception.  The 
important things to observe about Hume’s account of  this state are a) that the account 
reduces conception of  some object to possession of  an idea of  the object, b) that, in large 
part because of  Hume’s views on the origins of  ideas of  the understanding in sense 
impressions, Hume equates conceiving of  some object with imagining it.  I use the term 
“objectual conception” for this operation in Hume, because the analysis in terms of  the 
theory of  ideas only directly tells us how to analyze the act of  conceiving of  some object, or 
the act of  apprehending some object (as opposed to also telling us what it would be to 
conceive/apprehend a proposition).  The theory of  perceptions/ideas doesn’t include an 
explicit independent commitment to propositions or an explicit account of  how to analyze 
propositions in terms of  ideas.  Thus, the analysis of  propositional conception is a 
substantive question for Hume (or perhaps better described as a substantive challenge for 
Hume’s system).  The most important thing to note about objectual conception is that the 
connection to HTP is so straightforward/simple that it can be easily overlooked as an 
independent element of  Hume’s theory.  Strictly speaking, however, it makes a great deal of  
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sense to view Hume’s reductions as occurring in two (or more) stages.  Operations of  the 
understanding (other than conception) are to be analyzed in terms of  conception, and 
conception is to be analyzed in terms of  the theory of  ideas.  Even though Hume often slips 
between giving analyses of  operations in terms of  states of  conception and in terms of  
ideas, I will try to observe the distinction, as many of  the analyses are more easily followed if 
we do not try to immediately make sense of  the HTP level analysis, but instead, see how the 
intermediate levels of  analysis bridge this gap. 
Conclusion 
We now have enough of  Hume’s system in place for me to preview one of  the 
dissertation’s overarching themes.  There is a very natural, very appealing view about the 
relationship between the structures realized in language and thought, which I call “The 
Mirror Thesis”:
MT: Language and thought share a set of  parallel structures, and, in general, 
one can assume a certain degree of  structural mirroring between the 
structures of  psychological states and the structures of  the bits of  
language used to describe or express those states.
As noted, MT is a natural and appealing view.  If  one accepts it, it winds up sensibly 
playing a guiding role for all sorts of  subsequent theorizing about the nature and structure of 
our various mental states.  However, if  one thing is clear about Hume’s theory of  mind, it is 
that he does not accept the Mirror Thesis.  And my contention is that many of  the objections 
to Hume’s theory that have held sway over the past three hundred years, are predicated on 
the Mirror Thesis.  Now, we can distinguish theory-internal challenges for Hume from 
theory-external challenges.  A single challenge or argument, even, can be understood in 
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either of  these two ways.  The theory-internal understanding treats the argument as 
purporting to show that things that would count as problems by Hume’s lights follow from 
premises Hume would accept.  The theory-external understanding treats the argument as 
purporting to show that things which are in fact problematic follow from a combination of  
premises which Hume would accept and premises which are simply true.  In general, I think 
philosophical inquiry is far more fruitful when conducted in a theory-internal fashion.  To 
decide whether Hume is defeated by the theory external versions of  the challenges in 
question, we’d need to know whether MT is true.  But one important method for trying to 
figure out whether MT is true is to find out what a theory that rejects MT can and cannot 
accomplish.  So, we might want to investigate theory-internal challenges for a whole host of  
theories that reject MT before we’d be in a position to adjudicate on a theory external 
challenge which depends on MT, because that’s how we find out what you can or can’t do if  
you reject MT.
Hume’s project is to use his primitive resources to offer a reductive theory of  mind in 
terms of  HTP and HTA.  This means that I’ll be thinking of  objections as presenting tasks 
for the Humean theory of  mind, alleging that Hume’s system cannot perform those tasks.  
And I will take it as a victory for Hume if  the challenge either relies on a misunderstanding 
of  the elements of  Hume’s system, or if  it underestimates the versatility of  Hume’s system in 
the way relevant to the task in question.  By approaching the challenges in this fashion, we 
will learn quite a bit about what Hume’s system can or cannot do, without distracting 
ourselves by the question of  whether we the way Hume’s system does any particular thing is 
the same as the way we happen to think that particular thing is really done.
What we can already see, even without having a specific challenge in front of  us, is how a 
background assumption of  MT could appear to cause troubles for Hume.  Hume’s 
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underlying mental machinery pretty much exclusively involves manipulations and transitions 
of  objectual contents.  Language, however, appears to be thoroughly saturated with 
predicative structures.  Hume’s simplest contents correspond to individual particulate sense-
impressions, but the simplest meaningful bits of  language usually don’t.  There is the clear 
appearance of  a mismatch, and thus, plenty of  room for a tacit assumption of  MT to 
generate concern.  I think that these concerns are misplaced (at least, from a Humean 
perspective).
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CHAPTER 1 ENDNOTES
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1 Compare to Newton [2004], p. 92.  Also of  interest for comparison is Condillac [1982], who similarly rejects 
supposition and hypotheses in favor of  the empiricist philosophical system.  For a much more nuanced and 
complete discussion of  Hume’s relationship to Newton, see Schliesser [2008].
2 All citations from Hume’s Treatise of  Human Nature are to the Selby-Bigge/Nidditch edition (Hume [1978]), 
and will be cited in the text with “T [section], p. n” (where section references are omitted when deemed 
unnecessary). 
3 I have arbitrarily chosen a single term to use, ‘vivacity’, to reference this feature, whatever it is supposed to be.
4 There is a temptation to read Hume’s initial statements about the difference in vivacity as providing a 
restriction on the relative vivacities of  particular ideas and the impressions from which they are copied, 
however, the various ways in which vivacity distinctions are deployed for Hume, as well as the fact that not all 
complex ideas require a prior corresponding complex impression, render such a reading unsuitable.  See Govier 
[1972] for an interpreter who agrees with my assessment of  the text, but takes that to be a bad result for Hume.
5 This formulation allows only for single component transposition (as opposed to whole-sale swapping), but, 
excluding cases of  infinite complexity, there is no difference between the ideas one can produce via repeated 
application of  this principle and the ideas one could produce via a principle which allows for multi-component 
transition.
6 Note how similar this is to the description of  the powers of  the mind with respect to its ideas in Locke [1975]
(sections 2.2.2 and 2.12.1).  Interestingly, Hume’s discussion of  the mind’s power to separate ideas is fairly 
evocative of  Locke’s discussion of  abstraction, despite Hume’s purported rejection of  Lockean abstract ideas.
7 I am setting aside the interesting, but thoroughly tangential question of  whether the associative tendencies 
would be best modeled as holistic functions (from sets of  perceptions to sets of  perceptions) or as 
compositional collections of  functions from individual perceptions to individual perceptions).
8 For an important discussion of  a discussion which takes Hume’s resources to be importantly richer than I am 
granting here, see Loeb [2002].  Loeb takes Hume to have, in essence a pair of  scalar strength features for 
perceptions, one corresponding to volatility/stability, the other corresponding to intensity.  For my purposes, it 
is useful not to avail ourselves of  such a separation, as we learn more about the versatility of  Hume’s system by 
erring on the side of  positing fewer resources. 
CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTION AND BELIEF
Introduction
In this chapter, I present and explain David Hume’s account of  belief, and examine an 
important criticism against this account offered by Thomas Reid.  In rough outline, Hume’s 
account makes belief  a species of  conception, distinguished principally by its degree of  
liveliness, and Reid’s criticism is that Hume’s account fails because it conflates the clear 
difference in kind between belief  and mere conception with a difference of  degree.  I argue 
that Reid’s objection is only threatening to the extent that there are particular features of  
belief  (as compared to mere conception) that are not adequately captured by the difference 
of  degree Hume uses in his analysis.  I then defend Hume’s account from this objection by 
showing how the posited difference of  degree can account for some central differences 
between belief  and conception.
In the abstract to his Treatise of  Human Nature, David Hume introduces the question of  
how to account for belief  with the following passage:
When I see a billiard-ball moving towards another, my mind is 
immediately carried by habit to the usual effect, and anticipates my sight 
by conceiving the second ball in motion.  But is this all?  Do I 
nothing but CONCEIVE the motion of  the second ball? No 
surely. I also BELIEVE that it will move. What then is this 
belief?  And how does it differ from the simple conception of  
any thing?  Here is a new question unthought of  by 
philosophers. 
T, p. 652
Setting aside the strangeness of  Hume’s proclamation to have discovered a “new 
question unthought of  by philosophers”, the discussion is relatively straightforward: there is 
a difference between merely conceiving the motion of  a ball, and judging or believing that 
the ball will move.1  Hume’s concern is with giving an account of  what more there is to 
belief  than occurs in mere conception.  In the first section, I present Hume’s account of  
24
belief, and explain how it relates to the framework articulated in the previous chapter.  In the 
second section, I present Thomas Reid’s objection that Hume conflates differences of  kind 
and differences of  degree, and outline what an adequate reply to that objection would need 
to look like. In the third section, I present and defend an interpretation of  Hume’s views on 
which he is able to adequately reply to Reid’s objections.  In the concluding section, I explain 
how this interpretation allows us to reframe Hume’s account of  belief, providing some 
considerations in favor of  the comprehensibility and viability of  Hume’s project.
Section 1. Hume’s Account of  Belief
Consistently throughout the Treatise, including the appendix as well as the Abstract, 
Hume identifies belief  as a species of  conception, differing from mere conception in 
manner alone.2  For illustration, consider the following six passages in which this view of  
belief  is articulated:
Thus it appears, that the belief or assent, which always attends 
the memory and senses, is nothing but the vivacity of  those 
perceptions they present ; and that this alone distinguishes 
them from the imagination. To believe is in this case to feel 
an immediate impression of  the senses, or a repetition of  that 
impression in the memory. ‘Tis merely the force and liveliness 
of  the perception which constitutes the first act of  the 
judgment, and lays the foundation of  that reasoning, which 
we build upon it, when we trace the relation of  cause and 
effect.
T 1.3.5, p. 86
But I go farther; and not content with asserting, that the 
conception of  the existence of  any object is no addition to 
the simple conception of  it, I likewise maintain, that the 
belief  of  the existence joins no new ideas to those which 
compose the idea of  the object. When I think of  God, when 
I think of  him as existent, and when I believe him to be 
existent, my idea of  him neither encreases nor diminishes.' 
But as ‘tis certain there is a great difference betwixt the 
simple conception of  the existence of  an object, and the 
belief  of  it, and as this difference lies not in the parts or 
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composition of  the idea, which we conceive; it follows, that it 
must lie in the manner, in which we conceive it.
T 1.3.7, p. 94
So that as a belief  does nothing but vary the manner, in 
which we conceive any object, it can only bestow on our ideas 
an additional force and vivacity. An opinion, therefore, or 
belief  may be most accurately defin’d, A LIVELY IDEA 
RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT 
IMPRESSION.
T 1.3.7, p. 96
Whether we consider a single object, or several; whether we 
dwell on these objects, or run from them to others, and in 
whatever form or order we survey them, the act of  the mind 
exceeds not a simple conception, and the only remarkable 
difference, which occurs on this occasion, is, when we join 
belief  to the conception, and are perswaded of  the truth of  
what we conceive.  This act of  the mind has yet to be 
explain’d by any philosopher; and therefore I am at liberty to 
propose my hypothesis concerning it; which is, that ‘tis only a 
strong and steady conception of  any idea, and such as 
approaches in some measure to an immediate impression. 
T 1.3.7, p. 97fn
When we are convinc’d of  any matter of  fact, we do nothing 
but conceive it, along with a certain feeling, different from 
what attends the mere reveries of  the imagination. [...]
This, therefore, being regarded as an undoubted truth, that 
belief  is nothing but a peculiar feeling, different from the simple 
conception, the next question that naturally occurs is, what is the 
nature of  this feeling, or sentiment, and whether it be analogous to any 
other sentiment of  the human mind?
T Appendix, p. 624
Since therefore belief  implies a conception, and yet is 
something more ; and since it adds no new idea to the 
conception ; it follows, that it is a different MANNER of  
conceiving an object; something that is distinguishable to the 
feeling, and depends not upon our will, as all our ideas do.[...] 
Belief, therefore, in all matters of  fact, arises only from 
custom, and is an idea conceived in a peculiar manner.
T Abstract, p. 653-4
On Hume’s view, belief  is a species of  conception, differentiated from the more basic 
species of  conception —!mere conception — by its superior vivacity.  Note that many of  
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the times Hume states the view, there is nothing more to assent or belief  than it being a 
conception whose manner more closely approximates the vivacity of  one’s impressions.  The 
exception to this—the passage from page 96—includes the requirement that it be related to 
a present impression.  Given that Hume’s discussion of  belief  in Treatise 1.3.7 focuses on 
belief  in as-yet-unobserved matters of  fact—i.e. the result of  causal inference—it is easy to 
see why that condition is not present in Hume’s statement of  the belief  that attends memory 
or sensation—Treatise 1.3.5—or most of  the other statements of  the view.  This does not 
mean the condition is unimportant in the case of  beliefs resulting from causal inference, but 
only that there is a single account of  what it is to believe, in general, which encompasses 
more than the specific case of  judgments resulting from causal inference.3  Interestingly, 
given the claim Hume makes about belief  attending the senses, the overall view is easier to 
state without reference to the division of  perceptions into impressions and ideas: there is 
some cut-off  X, such that, for any sensory perception <C, V>, if  the value for V is greater 
than X, then <C, V> is a belief.  Since belief  attends sensory impressions, as well as the 
ideas of  memory and the output of  causal inference, we know that X is a lower degree of  
vivacity than the degree at the cut-off  between ideas and impressions.4  Belief  as a category, 
is interesting to Hume because it is not limited to impressions, and includes some, but not all, 
of  our ideas.  Beliefs that result from causal inference are explanatory targets both for the 
question of  their origins (which Hume hopes to do via associative mechanisms, and which I 
will not be discussing), as well as because they are part of  a broader class—call this the class 
of  “sub-impressional” beliefs—which attend some, but not all, conceptions, raising the 
question of  the difference between the conceptions they do attend and those that they do 
not.  It is this latter aspect that Hume purports to explain by appeal to vivacity.5
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Section 2. Objection: Differences of  Kind and Differences of  Degree
The first objection from Thomas Reid that we will consider is Reid’s most direct 
challenge to Hume’s account of  belief, which was presented both in Reid’s early work, An 
Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of  Common Sense, as well as in Reid’s magnum opus, 
Essays on the Intellectual Powers of  Man.6  The framing for the objection is similar between the 
two works.  In the Inquiry, Reid asserts that it is a serious error to attempt to define belief:
But what is this belief  or knowledge which accompanies 
sensation and memory? Every man knows what it is, but no 
man can define it. Does any man pretend to define sensation, 
or to define consciousness? It is happy indeed that no man 
does. And if  no philosopher had endeavored to define and 
explain belief, some paradoxes in philosophy, more incredible 
than ever were brought forth by the most abject superstition, 
or the most frantic enthusiasm, had never seen the light. Of  
this kind surely is that modern discovery of  the ideal 
philosophy, that sensation, memory, belief, and imagination, 
when they have the same object, are only different degrees of 
strength and vivacity in the idea.
Inq 2.5, p. 30
It is interesting to note that Reid’s primary concern is with the belief  that attends the 
senses and memory.  Reid makes no mention of  belief  that is the result of  causal inference 
(though, as will be apparent, we can make the most sense of  Reid by taking his concerns to 
be about belief  in general (the broad notion I indicated above, rather than some restricted 
subset of  our judgments).  This aspect of  Reid’s framing is even clearer in the Essays, where 
the discussion occurs in the fourth essay, “Of  Memory”:
[I]t may still be asked, How it comes to pass that perception 
and memory are accompanied with belief, while bare 
imagination is not? Though this belief  cannot be justified 
upon his system, it ought to be accounted for as a 
phaenomenon of  human nature.
This [Hume] has done, by giving us a new theory of  belief  in 
general; a theory which suits very well with that of  ideas, and 
seems to be a natural consequence of  it[.] [...]
What then is this belief ? It must either be an idea, or some 
modification of  an idea; we conceive many things which we 
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do not believe.  The idea of  an object is the same whether we 
believe it to exist, or barely conceive it. The belief  adds no 
new idea to the conception; it is therefore nothing but a 
modification of  the idea of  the thing believed, or a different 
manner of  conceiving it.
EIP 3.7, p. 290
Here, it should be even more evident that Reid, like me, takes Hume’s account of  belief  
to range over more than just the output of  causal inference; it is supposed to be an account 
of  assent or conviction for any claim (i.e an account of  belief  in general).7  After all, this 
discussion is being presented in the essay on memory, and Reid explicitly frames the matter 
in terms of  the beliefs attending both memory and the senses.  In fact, Reid doesn’t even 
take note of  the fact that the passage from the Treatise he quotes as a presentation of  Hume’s 
view of  belief  is the one that cannot apply to cases of  belief  attending memory (as it includes 
the requirement of  some relationship to a present impression).  Reid, like me, sees Hume as 
offering a unified account of  what belief  is across the senses, memory, and instances of  
causal inference.
Also worth noting about Reid’s presentation here is that it highlights the significance of  
accounting for the difference between conceptions which are attended by belief  and those 
which are not.  As I indicated above, this is what presents an interesting explanatory 
challenge for Hume, given that his underlying notion of  explanation involves grouping 
phenomena by similarities and/or analogies in appearance/behavior.  We get an explanation 
of  the phenomenon of  belief, for Hume, by seeing how beliefs form a set, and seeing how 
that set is similar or analogous to other sets of  mental states.
I have been stressing the ways in which Reid and I align in our interpretation of  Hume’s 
account of  belief  not just because the alignment of  our interpretations makes it more likely 
that Reid’s objection targets the view I attribute to Hume, but also to make it clear why many 
of  the details of  Hume’s views on causally inferred belief  will be irrelevant to discussion of  
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this objection.  Reid and I both attribute to Hume an account of  belief  (or assent, or 
conviction, etc.) that is meant to apply to the beliefs that attend sensory impressions and 
ideas of  memory (as well as the output of  causal inference).  Nothing specific to the account 
of  causal inference (such as the relationship to a present impression, or the role of  
habituated association in enlivening the idea) will help Hume avoid the objection, since those 
resources aren’t involved in the beliefs attending sensory impressions or memory.  
In the Inquiry, shortly after the passage quoted above, Reid describes his reason for 
finding Hume’s view of  belief  so problematic.8  Returning our attention to the Inquiry, we 
get a clear and succinct statement of  his worry about Hume’s account of  belief:
The same arguments that are used to prove that belief  implies 
only a stronger idea of  the object than simple apprehension, 
might as well be used to prove that love implies only a 
stronger idea of  the object than indifference.[...] If  it should 
be said, that in love, there is something more than an idea, to 
wit, an affection of  the mind, may it not be said with equal 
reason, that in belief  there is something more than an idea, to 
wit, an assent or persuasion of  the mind?
But perhaps it may be thought as ridiculous to argue against 
this strange opinion, as to maintain it.  Indeed, if  a man 
should maintain, that a square, and a triangle, differ only in 
magnitude, and not in figure, I believe he would find nobody 
disposed either to believe him or to argue against him; and 
yet I do not think it less shocking to common sense, to 
maintain, that sensation, memory, and imagination, differ only 
in degree, and not in kind.
Inq, 2.5, p. 30
The analogy to love and indifference here can serve to clarify Reid’s concern, but before 
we can use it to help us understand the objection, there is a bad reading of  the analogy that 
we need to dispense with.  Since Hume’s view is that belief  is simply a strong variety of  
conception, one might take Reid to be suggesting an analogy with the view that love is a 
strong degree of  indifference.  However, if  that were what Reid had in mind, the proposed 
analogy would obviously fail: believing something entails conceiving it — a point agreed on 
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by both Hume and Reid — loving something, on the other hand, entails not being indifferent 
to it.  So, there is nothing in Hume’s view corresponding to the absurdity of  treating love as 
a variety of  indifference.
As I noted, however, this is a bad understanding of  the analogy.  Reid’s point is about the 
state of  “simple apprehension” (which I’ve been calling “simple conception”) as it relates to 
belief.  The terminology here makes the issue seem trickier than it is.  Reid is thinking of  
simple apprehension/conception as the state of  entertaining something without having an 
opinion on it.  Reid regards Hume as analyzing that state in terms of  possessing a weak idea.  
Thus, he thinks that Hume is committed to treating the state of  lacking an opinion on 
something as differing from the state of  believing it only by a difference in strength.  This, 
then, is analogous to the view that indifference towards something differs from loving that 
thing only in strength.  And Reid thinks that one has not explained the relationship between 
the two states on such an analysis.  Note that this understanding of  the objection accords 
well with the way the objetion is given in the Essays.  After quoting Hume’s statement of  the 
view, and observing how central the account is for Hume’s overall system of  the mind, Reid’s 
tone becomes explicitly critical, and he presents what is, effectively, the same objection: 
The belief  of  a proposition is an operation of  mind of  which 
every man is conscious, and what it is he understands 
perfectly, though, on account of  its simplicity, he cannot give 
a logical definition of  it. If  he compares it with strength or 
vivacity of  his ideas, or with any modification of  ideas, they 
are so far from appearing to be one and the same, that they 
have not the least similitude.
That a strong belief  and a weak belief  differ only in degree, I 
can easily comprehend: but that belief  and no belief  should 
differ only in degree, no man can believe who understands 
what he speaks: For this is in reality to say that something and 
nothing differ only in degree, or that nothing is a degree of  
something.
EIP, 3.7, p. 291-2
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I find it easiest to understand Reid’s objection here by considering sliding dimmer 
switches for lights.  The position would be that it makes sense to think of  various settings of 
the light as differing in degree: when the slider is all the way up, this is the highest degree of  
brightness.  When it is one third of  the way up, this is a relatively low degree of  brightness.  
This is an adequate explanation of  the difference between those two settings.  However, 
when the slider is all the way down, it isn’t right to think of  this as simply a different degree 
of  brightness.
While this analogy is helpful for understanding the worry, it does not convey the full 
strength of  Reid’s case, all by itself.  It may make the objection more compelling when we 
observe that, unlike the dimmer switch, which has only one “off ” setting, Hume’s 
perceptions exhibit numerous degrees of  strength below the cut-off  for belief.  There isn’t just a 
single “unopinionated” state; there is an entire range of  such states, which differ from each 
other in the exact same way that they differ from the states of  belief.
In order to drive this point home, it will help to make the plausible assumption that the 
scale of  strength for perceptions is linear, and, for simplicity’s sake, to pretend that there are 
just ten different degrees of  strength.  On this assumption, the strength difference between 
the first and the third degree is the same as the strength difference between the fifth and the 
seventh.  So, if  the cut-off  for belief  were between, say, degrees three and four, a conception 
of  degree three would differ from a conception of  degree two the same way, and in the same 
amount that it would differ from a conception of  degree four.  But, somehow, that same 
difference would produce a significant difference between conceptions of  degree three and 
four, but not between conceptions of  degree two and three (or four and five, for that 
matter).9
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While there is no indication that considerations like that are part of  the underlying basis 
for Reid’s worry, I still consider this to be a version of  his challenge, as it is driven by the 
notion that it is inadequate to invoke only differences of  degree, and, as it gives us additional 
reason to question the adequacy of  thinking about the “off ” setting as a degree of  
brightness in the slider case (which is structurally analogous to the worry Reid explicitly 
presents for Hume’s view).
Another way to emphasize the force of  this objection is to think about the basis for 
treating the belief  and conception as different kinds of  mental states.  Some plausible 
candidate differences between imagining something and believing it would be: differences in 
the influence they have on our actions, differences in our ability to enter the state electively, 
different norms on when it is permissible to be in the states, etc.  To illustrate the first case, 
when I write a check to pay a bill, I make it out for the amount I believe I owe, which is not 
the case for the various amounts I sometimes imagine owing.  To illustrate the second, I can 
ask you to imagine that you own a purple dog, and if  you want, you can simply comply with 
my request, but this is not the case if  I ask you to believe that you own a purple dog.  Lastly, 
it seems to make sense (at least sometimes) to criticize someone for believing something on 
the basis of  too little evidence, but it would be odd to criticize someone for imagining 
something on the basis of  too little evidence.
But if  the account offered by Hume maintains that believing is exactly like imagining, 
different only by possessing more of  some feature imagination already possesses, it is hard 
to see how it could possibly explain all these differences.  It doesn’t seem like imagination is 
weakly regulated by evidential norms, or that imagining provides some (but not quite enough) 
push towards influencing our behavior.  And, if  the various particular differences between 
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imagining and believing aren’t differences of  degree, how can the difference between 
imagining and believing be a difference of  degree?
The point from above, regarding the change in strength between adjacent degrees of  
vivacity, is really just a way of  drawing out this point.  If  the difference between a pair of  
mere conceptions can be the same as the difference between a mere conception and a belief, 
and the latter difference is meant to explain why beliefs influence our behavior, why they are 
subject to evidential norms, and why acquiring them is involuntary (rather than elective), 
there should be similar effects when it comes to the pair of  mere conceptions (since they 
differ in the same way).  The objection, thus understood, is this:
R1-1. Some differences between belief  and mere conception involve a feature 
being wholly absent from conception, while being present (to various 
positive degrees) in belief. 
R1-2. If  a difference between belief  and mere conception involves some 
feature being wholly absent from conception, while being present (to 
various positive degrees) in belief, that difference is not explicable as a 
consequence of  a difference in vivacity.
R1-3. If  belief  and mere conception differ only by degree of  vivacity, then 
for any difference between belief  and mere conception, that difference 
is explicable as a consequence of  the difference in vivacity. 
R1-4. So, it is not the case that belief  and mere conception differ only by 
degree of  vivacity.
While I find Reid’s objection compelling, especially when understood in terms of  the 
explanatory burdens on Hume’s account of  belief, Hume has the resources to resist the 
objection.  The form of  the worry is that some of  the things to be explained by a difference 
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of  degree are not themselves differences of  degree, and that no such explanation is possible.  
Given this way of  thinking about the worry,  I do not think it makes sense to challenge R1-1. 
It is, essentially, the claim that some of  the differences between belief  and mere conception 
aren’t differences of  degree.  Likewise, R1-3 should not be challenged, as it is simply a 
statement that Hume’s account is tasked with explaining the differences between the two 
states.  While there are some explanatory questions which Hume regards as unanswerable 
(or, at least, outside the purview of  his theories), this is a principled position, and not some 
dodge to be arbitrarily invoked on Hume’s behalf; by giving an account of  the nature of  
belief  and its relationship to mere conception, Hume has taken on the burden of  explaining 
the differences between them.  The only remaining way to avoid the objection, then, is to 
reject R1-2—the claim that a difference in degrees of  vivacity cannot explain explain the 
non-degree differences between belief  and mere conception.  Fortunately for Hume, there 
are good reasons to reject R1-2.
To see that differences in degree can provide explanations for differences that are not 
themselves differences in degree, we can consider a large set of  different slot machines, 
which are programmed to hit payouts at differing frequencies (frequencies of  the form: 
payout exactly N times every M pulls).  If  we assume a constant prize for individual payouts, 
and constant cost for pulls, some of  the machines will be profitable, and some will not be 
profitable.10  However, the only relevant difference between these machines will be a 
difference in degree: the frequency of  payout.
We can also consider the following cases involving people pushing on a large boulder.  In 
the first case, there are three people pushing on the boulder, and it does not move.  In the 
second case, there are four people pushing on the boulder, and it does not move.  In the 
third case, there are five people pushing on the boulder, and it does move.  To simplify 
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things, we will assume that each individual is equally strong and pushes equally hard as well 
as that any physical details other than the mass of  the boulder and the total amount of  force 
exerted by people pushing — such as the shape of  the boulder or the positioning of  the 
people pushing — are irrelevant.  It seems clear that reasons we would have for denying that 
the “off ” setting for the light is a degree of  brightness are also good reasons for denying 
that the “stationary” state of  the boulder is a degree of  movement.  Further, the magnitude 
of  the change in force on the boulder between the first two cases is the same as the 
magnitude of  the change in force on the boulder between the second and third case.  So, the 
differences among the cases are all differences of  degree, and yet, the cases differ between 
some movement (case three) and no movement (cases one and two).  And if  we considered 
cases with more than five people, there would be further differences in the nature of  the 
movement (such as differences in speed), also explained by these same differences in degree.
Both of  these cases were designed to illustrate how a non-degree change can result from 
crossing a non-arbitrary threshold of  degree in another feature.  If  a slot machine pays out 
the $X prize less often than it takes in $X in payment for pulls, it is profitable.  Otherwise, it 
is not.  The boulder case is similar, but with the additional benefit of  better mirroring the 
structure present for the more challenging differences between mere conception and belief.  
With the case of  profitability, one could resist the view that not being profitable is 
sufficiently like the light being in the “off ” state, since we would be comfortable thinking of  
it in terms of  something’s having a positive net effect on wealth, rather than a neutral or 
negative net effect.  One might think of  “profitable” as simply being a non-degree label for a 
specific range of  degrees.  It is harder to see a basis for resisting the adequacy of  the boulder 
case, however.  The degree of  force increases by a fixed amount with the addition of  each 
new person, with no impact on the degree of  movement until some threshold is reached, at 
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which point the boulder moves, and additional force beyond the threshold produces 
differences of  degree in features of  the movement (like speed).
So, it is not in general the case that differences of  degree are inadequate to produce or 
explain differences of  the sort Reid would be inclined to think of  as not being themselves 
differences of  degree.  This is crucial, since the main reason for accepting R1-2 would be the 
acceptance of  a more general claim about these types of  differences.  As I have indicated in 
the previous chapter, I am not privileging an antecedent understanding of  vivacity, and will 
favor whichever interpretation satisfies best the demands placed on vivacity by Hume’s use 
of  it.  Thus, in my view, it bodes well for Hume that there are cases in which differences of  
degree explain on/off  differences of  the general sort that Reid is concerned about.  At the 
same time, it is not enough to just undermine the assumed basis for accepting R1-2 (which 
says that such explanations are not to be had when it comes to belief  and conception), 
rather, we will need to make sure that the particular differences between belief  and 
conception can be accounted for in this sort of  way.
The easiest one of  the three features mentioned earlier to account for is the difference in 
influence on action.  And this is because sometimes things we don’t believe do have some 
influence on our actions, albeit a weaker influence than that of  our beliefs.  So, if  I am 
waiting for someone to arrive, and they are running late, and I haven’t heard from them, I 
may start to imagine that he or she got into a car accident.  I don’t believe that they have 
gotten into a car accident, but this act of  imagining clearly does influence my behavior.  I 
may begin to pace nervously, I may check my cell phone for a message more frequently, etc.  
So, while there is a difference in the way that imagining and believing influence my behavior, 
it seems easier to account for that difference in terms of  the magnitude of  the influence.  
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Were that the only difference between the two states, the foregoing discussion would have 
been largely superfluous.
On the other hand,  the differences in norms for and voluntariness of  the states seem to 
be more of  what Reid would have in mind (though, as we saw, Reid’s discussion does not 
contain specific description of  the differences to be accounted for).  The voluntariness issue 
is something that we have decently good grounds to think Hume would have wanted to 
capture.  In fact, some of  the arguments he offers against alternative accounts of  belief  
depend on a difference in voluntariness between belief  and mere conception.11  The issue of 
norms on belief  is more complicated.  While such norms seem to provide a striking 
difference, it is dialectically awkward to present Hume with the challenge of  capturing them,  
given the complex set of  interpretive questions surrounding Hume’s substantive views on 
normative epistemology.  At the same time, accounting for the normative difference in terms 
of  variations in strength is really the more difficult challenge, and so, when discussing it, I 
will set aside the question of  whether Hume would reject the challenge itself, and instead, 
focus on whether the challenge, can, in principle, be met.
Difference in Voluntariness 
Imagination is voluntary in a way that belief  isn’t.12 The question we are concerned with 
is whether this fact can be explained by appeal to a difference in their respective degrees of  
vivacity.  One element of  the difference in voluntariness is that we can (often) stop 
imagining something at will, but we cannot simply stop believing something at will.  Let’s 
adapt the boulder analogy from above, so that we are comparing cases of  a single person 
pushing boulders of  different masses.  If  the boulder had a sufficiently low mass, the person 
would be able to push it, while, if  it had a high mass, the person would be unable to push it.  
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So, the person has an ability with respect to one boulder that they lack with respect to the 
other.  So, if  the vivacity of  an idea, whatever it ultimately winds up being, is relevantly 
analogous to the mass of  a boulder, we could see how the difference in voluntariness 
between dismissing a mere conception and dismissing a belief  could be explained by the 
difference in vivacity.  What this really requires is a background ability to “push” ideas away, 
and an account of  vivacity on which higher vivacity makes ideas more resistant to being 
“pushed”.
Another element of  the difference in voluntariness is that we can commence imagining 
things at will, but are not able to commence believing things at will.  The analogy of  pushing 
away a boulder is slightly less applicable here, but the same basic point can be made.  If  we 
complicate the case by imagining that there is a circular region marked off  near the person, 
we can then distinguish between pushing boulders out of  the circle, and pushing boulders 
into the circle.  This would render the boulder case more closely analogous to a story about 
the mind on which it has the power to summon mental states as well as dismiss them.  And, 
conveniently, no new constraints are put on vivacity through this tweak.13  It would simply 
be a feature such that, the more of  it some idea has, the more difficult that idea is for us to 
“move”.
My discussion so far has been highly metaphorical, and one may be worried that no 
account of  vivacity can successfully cash out these metaphors and really explain how 
differing in vivacity can effect voluntariness.  I think this challenge goes beyond Hume’s 
explanatory ambitions in important ways.  Hume’s project is to produce an account that has 
minimized the number of  general principles and maximized their breadth of  applicability, 
while encompassing all (or almost all) of  the phenomena in question.  I have discussed this 
understanding of  the explanatory burdens in the previous chapter, but it is important to 
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stress it again here.  If  the feature Hume means by ‘vivacity’ is such that when a mental state 
has less of  it, our control over that state is greater, and vice versa, and there is no broader 
generalization about mental states that could subsume that generalization, then Hume will be 
content that he has explained as much as he can.  Any request for a further story about why a 
state’s vivacity is conversely correlated with our ability to control that state, will be a request 
for something Hume had no intention of  offering.  Thus, my metaphors and analogies are 
intended purely to illustrate why to think that there can be features of  an object that exhibit 
the sort of  inverse relationship with the existence and extent of  our ability to control that 
object as needed to answer Reid’s challenge.
Norms on Belief
Belief  is subject to norms of  evidence in a way that imagination is not.  The question we 
are concerned with is whether this can be explained by a difference in their respective 
degrees of  vivacity.  As noted, I am bracketing the issue of  whether Hume would have any 
interest in responding to this challenge and/or accepting its presupposition that belief  is 
subject to such norms.  I am simply going to investigate whether there is some way, in 
principle, to employ Hume’s resources towards this task.  I will also attempt to be brief, since 
many of  the details will be irrelevant to my actual interpretive concerns.
Evidential norms on belief  are norms that we violate when our evidence, on balance, 
requires/recommends believing P, and we do not believe P, or when our evidence requires/
recommends not believing P, and we do believe P.  There are difficult questions about when 
a body of  evidence generates such recommendations or requirements, but we can set those 
questions aside.  Suppose Joe believes P, but Joe’s body of  evidence requires him not to 
believe that P.  It seems clear that Joe is not enjoined to refrain from imagining P, or from 
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merely contemplating P.  Were he to do either of  those instead of  believing, we wouldn’t be 
doing just a little bit better at obeying the evidential norm against believing P, he’d be 
satisfying it completely.  How could this be explained if  belief  is just like conception, except 
stronger in its degree of  vivacity?
A useful analogy to explain how this can occur would be to consider speed limits.  On a 
highway with a speed limit of  65 miles per hour, there is a legal norm that one violates by 
traveling faster than 65 miles per hour, and which is not violated at lower speeds.  Violations 
of  the norm can even be ranked as lesser or greater based on how much the speed of  travel 
exceeds the speed limit.  But, traveling at 70 miles per hour clearly differs from traveling at 
60 miles per hour only by degree.  While it may be the case that speed limits were instituted 
to promote the safety on the road, and further, that, in general, someone traveling at 55 
miles per hour does more than someone traveling 65 miles per hour to promote safety on 
the roads, the driver traveling at 55 miles per hour is not doing any better, legally speaking, at 
obeying the speed limit.  Put another way, we can make perfect sense of  a norm against 
traveling too fast, while recognizing degrees of  severity for violations of  the norm, and without the 
need to posit multiple degrees of  compliance for cases of  obedience to the norm.  So, turning to 
the case of  belief, it appears that we can make perfect sense of  the idea that there is a norm 
against having too much vivacity in a conception, even if  we want to avoid normatively 
distinguishing among the various degrees of  vivacity below that limit.  And, we do all of  that 
while normatively distinguishing among degrees of  vivacity above the limit.
One thing I have been taking for granted in this discussion is that the norms in question 
apply to belief, and don’t apply to anything less than belief.  For those familiar with Hume’s 
discussion of  probability, or with the strands of  epistemology that use the probability 
calculus to model credences, it may well seem that this is a drastic oversimplification of  the 
41
issue.  And, it is.  Fortunately, acknowledging this simplification strengthens Hume’s hand.  
There are a range of  vivacities below the threshold for all-out belief  which would be 
candidates for evaluation relative to evidential norms.14  It was still worth demonstrating that 
Hume has the resources to tackle this challenge, however, as it shows us how Hume’s 
resources allow for a treatment of  merely conceiving something that would fall below the 
threshold of  the evidential norm, even if  that evidential norm applies to “partial” beliefs or 
credences.  The crucial lesson to draw is that, it is in pretty easy to understand how there 
could be norms that apply to beliefs (or credences) but which, as a rule, couldn’t be violated 
by simple imagination/mere conception, even if  the two states differ only by degree.  In a 
sense, this places constraints on the account of  the norms that can be given, but, the 
constraint is merely that such norms need to be translated into the terms of  the analysis of  
belief.  If  the norm is not to believe P when your evidence is such-and-such, the constraint is 
simply that one must accept an analysis of  the norm on which it says not to conceive P with 
too much vivacity when your evidence is such-and-such.  As noted above, I am not taking a 
stance on whether or not Hume adopts any such norms, merely pointing out that his 
resources could, in principle, be used to explain such a normative difference.
While I think that Reid’s worry about differences of  kind vs. differences of  degree 
ultimately fails, it is important to see why it fails, as there is something highly appealing about 
the thought that Hume hasn’t really captured the distinction between belief  and 
imagination.15  However, when we attempt to enumerate the particular differences that 
Hume’s story doesn’t capture (or isn’t able to capture), we see that Hume’s limited resources 
are a lot more powerful than they seem at first.
42
Section 3. Another Reid Objection: The Objects of  Belief
I will now consider another objection from Reid, before turning (in section 4) to my 
discussion of  what Hume actually has to say about the differences between conception and 
belief.  This objection from Reid concerns the contents of  belief, rather than the use of  
vivacity to account for the difference in activity.  So far, I have been giving examples that 
employ beliefs (and conceptions) with propositional or predicative contents.  But, I have also 
identified Hume’s project as an attempt to reduce all cognitive activities to states of  objectual 
conception: i.e., acts of  imagining or conceiving of  objects.  And this is where Reid’s other 
objection comes in.
In the sixth essay—“Of  Judgment”—Reid criticizes Locke and Hume, claiming they are 
both unable to account for one of  his “first principles of  contingent truths” (specifically, the 
existence of  the objects of  consciousness).  The criticism of  Hume concerns both a worry 
about whether we judge all our own mental operations as existing (which I will not discuss 
here) as well as the objection we will focus on, concerning the contents of  belief:
Neither can I reconcile [this first principle] with Mr HUME’s 
theory, that to believe the existence of  any thing, is nothing 
else than to have a strong and lively conception of  it; or, at 
most, that belief  is only some modification of  the idea which 
is the object of  belief.  For not to mention, that propositions, 
not ideas, are the objects of  belief; in all that variety of  
thoughts and passions, of  which we are conscious, we believe 
the existence of  the weak as well as of  the strong, the faint as 
well as the lively. No modification of  the operations of  our 
minds disposes us to the least doubt of  their real existence.
EIP 6.5, p. 471
I will not address Reid’s complaint that Hume’s system fails to produce belief  in the 
existence of  our own conceptions.16  The aside, however, regarding the contents of  belief, is 
worth discussing, as it is a particularly salient example of  the sort of  worry that faces 
Hume’s account.  Let us set aside the issue of  whether, on Hume’s view, it is ideas that wind 
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up being the objects of  belief, and, instead, focus on the fact that propositions do not appear 
to be the objects of  belief.  While Reid is no doubt worried that Hume involves mental 
particulars (ideas) in his account of  belief, there is a larger worry for Hume here.  Beliefs are 
truth-evaluable.  On a typical account, beliefs are assessable as true or false derivative on the 
truth or falsity of  their objects.  This is the standard contemporary picture of  belief  as a 
propositional attitude.  This precise picture was not as prevalent in Hume’s day, but even 
among those figures who didn’t treat belief  or judgment as a propositional attitude embraced 
the view that ideas are not assessable as true or false.17  Here is a first attempt at spelling out 
this objection from Reid:
R2-1. The objects of  conception are not assessable as true or false.
R2-2. So, if  belief  differs from conception only by degree, then the objects of  
belief  are not assessable as true or false.
R2-3. The objects of  belief  are assessable as true or false.
R2-4. So, it is not the case that belief  differs from conception only by degree. 
The argument is straightforward enough, understood in this fashion, but other passages 
from Reid make it quite clear that this cannot be the objection he has in mind.  Elsewhere in 
the Essays, Reid makes it clear that the objects of  belief—propositions—can also be the 
objects of  mere conception/apprehension:
Yet it may be observed that even a proposition may be simply 
apprehended without forming any judgment of  its truth or 
falsehood: For it is one thing to conceive the meaning of  a 
proposition; it is another thing to judge it to be true or false.
EIP 1.1, p. 25
As we can see from this quote, Reid’s concern is not adequately captured by argument 
R2.  However, mere paragraphs earlier, Reid clearly maintains the point that conception—
taken “in the proper sense”—is “an act of  the mind by which nothing is affirmed or denied, 
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and which therefore can neither be true nor false” (EIP 1.1, p. 11).  This both suggests a 
needed amendment to the view I earlier described as the “standard contemporary picture” as 
well as a better understanding of  Reid’s argument.
The view outlined above indicated that an operation of  mind is truth assessable in virtue 
of  being a propositional attitude.  The passages just quoted from Reid don’t undermine the 
basic idea behind this picture, but do highlight the need for a complication.  We don’t call 
conceptions true or false, even when we, with Reid, allow them to have propositional 
objects.  So, if  the picture above is taken to be the view that a mental state M is true (false) if 
and only if  the object of  M is a proposition that is true (false), we’d get the bad result that 
various acts of  conception are true or false.  And similarly for a variety of  popular views 
about desires, hopes, and intentions.  The real thrust of  the picture can be retained, however, 
if  we take it to simply provide a necessary condition on whether a mental state is truth 
assessable:  A mental state M is truth assessable only if  the object of  M is a proposition.
I noted that this observation will also permit us to recast the objection in a form that 
Reid could intelligibly offer:
R2’-1. Acts of  mind are truth assessable only if  the object of  the act is a 
proposition.
R2’-2. If  two acts of  mind differ only by degree, then the object of  one is a 
proposition if  and only if  the object of  the other is a proposition.
R2’-3. The object of  the act of  conceiving of  the sun is not a proposition.
R2’-4. So, if  the belief  that the sun exists differs only by degree from the act 
of  conceiving of  the sun  the belief  that the sun exists is not truth 
assessable.
R2’-5. The belief  that the sun exists is truth assessable.
45
R2’-6. So, it is not the case that the belief  that the sun exists differs only by 
degree from the act of  conceiving of  the sun.
Taking (2) and (5) for granted, the substantive premises in the argument are (1) and (3).  
To deny (1) is to allow non-propositional acts to be truth assessable, whereas to deny (3) is 
to regard objectual conception as a propositional act.  One produces a fundamentally similar 
view either way, but it is important not to cloud the issues that are in play.  For this reason, I 
will explain Hume’s position as a denial of  (1), though there are ways to understand this view 
on which it amounts to a denial of  (3), instead.
On the view that I’ve been calling the “standard contemporary picture”, a subset of  our 
mental states are truth assessable because they have propositions as objects. As noted, this 
cannot be the whole story, however, as the standard contemporary picture does not maintain 
that every mental state whose object is a proposition can be assessed as true or false.  So, 
there is some further condition on mental states—besides having to have the right kind of  
object—that helps explain why they can be assessed for truth.  The picture is still 
straightforward: mental states that are truth assessable wind up inheriting their truth/falsity 
from the truth/falsity of  their objects, provided they have this additional feature.  A naive 
take on this additional feature could be something like the act itself  having representational 
purport.  But, the more propositional attitudes we allow for that don’t get assessed as true or 
false, the less clear it is how much work is being done by the object of  the act being of  the 
right sort.  Suppose we allow for believing, imagining, desiring, intending, hoping, and 
fearing as propositional attitudes.  It is clear that, of  these, belief  is a special case, insofar as 
we can ask whether Tom’s belief  that P is true, but we can’t ask whether Tom’s desire that P 
is true, or whether his hope that P is true, etc.  The more acts we have to account for which 
have propositions as objects, but which are not truth assessable, the more more our 
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explanation will depend on the second factor.  The thesis of  propositionalism (i.e. the view 
that the object of  every mental act is a proposition) draws this out nicely: if  every mental act 
can be analyzed as a propositional attitude, we have said nothing interesting towards 
explaining the ability to assess acts of  belief  for truth and falsity when we identify belief  as a 
propositional attitude.
My aim is not to disparage the view that belief  is a propositional attitude, or that only 
propositional attitudes are truth assessable.  Rather, my goal is to help us see how premise 
(1) could plausibly be challenged.  The less work premise (1) is doing in the standard 
contemporary picture, the more appealing it should be to consider views which abandon it.
We saw above that, on Hume’s view, the belief  that the sun exists is of  a kind with the 
conception of  the sun.  In fact, the view is that the belief  that the sun exists just is a lively 
instance of  the conception of  the sun.  In order to explain what makes these lively 
conceptions of  the sun truth assessable, we will need to appeal to something in the object 
(i.e. the sun, or the idea of  the sun), and something in the act (e.g. the liveliness of  the 
conception).  Note, however, that this is the same structure of  explanation that we need to 
offer on the standard contemporary picture: part of  the explanation comes from the object 
(i.e. the proposition that the sun exists), and part of  the explanation comes from the nature 
of  the act (i.e. the representative purport of  belief).  Considering the issue in this way, the 
problem is not the non-propositional nature of  existential belief, for Hume.  Rather, it is the 
apparent shallowness of  a difference in liveliness as an explanation of  the marked difference 
in the act itself.
It is worth noting that propositions possess truth-conditions, and this could be helpful, if  
nothing else, in providing the proponent of  propositional objects with an account of  the 
truth-assessibility of  certain mental activities.  Of  course, there is nothing to stop Hume 
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from assigning truth-conditions to ideas.  In fact, it is an ongoing challenge for theories of  
propositions to explain why the entities that are propositions possess the truth-conditions 
they do.18  It would be interesting to explore whether these challenges are compounded for 
Hume’s case, or perhaps even lessened, but to carefully evaluate the force of  these challenges 
for defenders of  ordinary propositions would take us somewhat far afield of  our present 
interests.
Nevertheless, it remains the case that one of  the most striking features of  Hume’s 
account of  belief  is the fundamentally non-predicative nature of  the contents of  judgments.  
In order to mitigate the pessimism that arises from this feature, we should note that not all 
beliefs are expressed predicatively.
While the most familiar locutions for describing judgments involve “that”-clauses with 
their own subject-predicate structure in the grammar, usually taken to indicate a similar 
subject-predicate structure to the mental state expressed or described, it is a fact (useful for 
Hume) that we also possess ways of  talking about judgments that do not involve predicative 
structure.  Specifically, we have locutions like “Tom believes in ghosts”, which seem to say 
the same thing as corresponding locutions like “Tom believes that ghosts exist”.19  The 
contemporary response to this pair of  locutions is to treat the former as abbreviating the 
latter.  The “belief-that” locution is taken to be more fundamental, or to better reflect the 
underlying structure of  the mental state in question.  Such a strategy makes sense if  one 
thinks that anything which can be said with “belief  in” locutions can also be said with “belief 
that” locutions, but not vice versa.  In principle, though, one could reverse the proposal, and 
reduce belief  that o exists to belief  in o.
Since Hume is insistent that for central cases of  judgment (in fact, the only cases for 
which we are given the explicit account of  the content), there is nothing like a predicative 
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structure to be found, and in fact, Hume’s specific proposal is that the content of  an 
existential belief  is exhausted by the idea of  the thing believed to exist, the proposal just 
described precisely embodies Hume’s view.  A conception of  o, when suitably vivacious, 
becomes a belief  in o.  Of  course, for this story to be plausible, we’d need to think that every 
belief  whatsoever can be understood in terms of  believing in some object or objects.  Here’s 
one reason to think that this proposal has potential: most subject-predicate sentences can be 
rephrased in a superficially existential form:  For example, “Fido is happy” would become 
“Fido’s happiness exists”.  The locution is odd-sounding, but it seems to preserve the truth-
conditions.  If  such rephrasings are generally available, then we would have a procedure for 
converting beliefs-that to beliefs-in (i.e. first, rephrase the belief-that as an existential belief, 
then rephrase the existential belief  as a belief-in).  I say that this is a reason to think the 
proposal has potential, and it is important to note that we haven’t done the work yet of  
showing that the proposal is viable.  For instance, the strategy looks like it commits us to 
believing in entities like Fido’s happiness, and there may be good reasons to worry about 
commitment to such entities.
The important upshots of  this observation about “belief  in” are that a) it provides us 
with a framework for making sense of  non-propositional judgment in the first place, and b) 
it tells us what Hume needs, in order to account for the range of  belief-ascriptions we make: 
he needs to provide plausible “belief  in” variants which appropriately correspond to the 
various “belief  that” ascriptions we want to endorse.
One final note to make about “belief  in” is that it draws out something interesting about 
truth-assessability.  Suppose, as is plausible, that “Tom believes in ghosts” and “Tom believes 
that ghosts exist” are equivalent.  It seems that we can also make sense of  the phrase “Tom’s 
belief  in ghosts” and “Tom’s belief  that ghosts exist”, and that those two descriptions 
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should designate the same belief.  But, “Tom’s belief  in ghosts is true” sounds distinctively 
off, while “Tom’s belief  that ghosts exist is true” does not.  This gives us good reason not to 
worry too much about the fact that ideas of  objects aren’t the sorts of  things that can be 
called true or false, since the appropriateness of  calling a belief  true depends on whether it is 
described predicatively or nominatively.  Rather than a deep fact about the structure of  the 
belief, it would appear that this is a fact about which sorts of  grammatical expressions can be 
joined with the predicate “is true”.
Conclusion
Belief, on Hume’s view, is a medium between sensation and mere imagining.  
Importantly, it is not merely a medium with respect to its share of  vivacity, but also with 
respect to a number of  other features.  For instance, memorial beliefs provide a temporal 
medium between the occurrence of  sensations and the possession of  mere imaginings.  
More importantly, beliefs provide a medium between those two extremes in terms of  impact 
on one’s behavior.  If  I am afraid of  tigers, and I see a tiger, my inclination to run away will 
be stronger than if  I believe that there is a tiger about, which would in turn provide a 
stronger inclination to run than if  I merely suspected that a tiger was about, or (at the far 
extreme) merely imagined that a tiger was about.
What explains the larger share of  influence on behavior for belief ?  Well, on Hume’s 
view, this would result from the ways in which beliefs are more like sensation than mere 
imaginings are.  In other words, we can generalize about perceptions simpliciter, that the 
degree of  influence on behavior (when the content is relevant) is in proportion to the 
attendant vivacity.  This is exactly the sort of  explanatory principle that Hume is after (cf. 
chapter 1).  It is as general as possible (it ranges over all perceptions, and all degrees of  
50
vivacity), is validated by the experiences of  seeing, believing, and imagining.  To explain why 
vivacity has this effect would require us to postulate something about the nature of  vivacity; 
something forbidden by Hume’s methodology.  So, we get the following explanatory chain: 
We explain why beliefs (imaginings, sensings) have the influence on behavior that they do by 
reference to their vivacity (or lack thereof, in the case of  mere imaginings).  This fact about 
belief  is explained by a more general fact about perceptions.  The fact about perceptions is 
inexplicable, for Hume.
One thing that is worth noting about this account is that, divorced from specific 
phenomenological predictions about the introspective experience of  vivacity, it is actually a 
somewhat promising approach for explaining the nature of  belief.  Belief  has a cluster of  
behaviors that situate it in between mere imagination and outright sensation, and the 
explanation is that some one feature controls for these behaviors, and the effects occur in 
proportion to the intensity with which this feature is possessed.  We might challenge the 
claim that beliefs have behaviors with such a relative situation, but, methodologically, if  
Hume thinks that beliefs do have a cluster of  such behaviors, it is a perfect deployment of  
his method to invoke this unifying generalization as an explanation.
Or, as Hume puts the point:
An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea, that 
the fancy alone presents to us: And this different feeling I 
endeavor to explain by calling it a superior force, or vivacity, or 
solidity, or firmness, or steadiness.  This variety of  terms, which 
may seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to express that 
act of  the mind, which renders realities more present to us 
than fictions, causes them to weigh more heavily in the 
thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions 
and  imagination.[...] I confess, that ‘tis impossible to explain 
perfectly this feeling or manner of  conception.  We may make 
use of  words, that express something near it. But its true and 
proper name is belief, which is a term that every one 
sufficiently understands in common life. And in philosophy 
we can go no farther, than assert, that it is something felt by 
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the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of  the judgment from 
the fictions of  the imagination. It gives them more force and 
influence; makes them appear of  greater importance; infixes 
them in the mind; and renders them the governing principles 
of  all our actions.
T, p. 629
Though the normative element discussed earlier isn’t among the features mentioned 
here, it should be clear that the various features produced by a higher vivacity can, in 
principle, be evaluated along normative dimensions.  For instance, if  higher vivacity renders 
one idea more influential than another, we can ask whether that idea should be more 
influential.  I don’t mean to suggest any particular account of  the norms in play, but simply 
to point out that the commitments Hume has regarding vivacity clearly leave room for a 
proposal regarding the normative evaluation of  belief.
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CHAPTER 2 ENDNOTES
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1 For more extensive discussion of  the oddity of  this question, see Owen [2002] and Smalligan Marusic 
[manuscript].
2 One element of  the view that does seem to shift, is the role of  vivacity in differentiating the manner.  In the 
Appendix, in particular, Hume seems to back away from a commitment to changes in vivacity as the only 
survivable variations for a given impression/idea.  For reasons explained in the previous chapter, I set aside 
Hume’s apparent reversal about this issue.
3 It is easier to understand the significance of  this condition if  we think about static/synchronic questions 
about mental states separately from dynamic/diachronic questions. What makes a conception count as belief  or 
opinion is a matter of  its present vivacity; a static issue.  If, on the other hand, we want to know how such high 
vivacity conceptions are produced — a question of  mental dynamics — then we need to invoke associative 
propensities of  the mind, as Hume does in explaining our causally inferred beliefs.
4 My restriction here to impressions and ideas of  sensation (excluding impressions and ideas of  reflection), is 
not because I definitively take a stand that this account does not apply to impressions and ideas of  reflection, 
but rather as an attempt to remain neutral on whether the account applies across the board.  The question of  
whether anything said here applies to the passions is an interesting one, but not one that can be adequately 
addressed and resolved in my dissertation.
5 Though I do not spend much time in this work discussing Hume’s associative mechanics, it should be noted 
that it is a central element of  Hume’s account of  the mind, and represents the fundamental resources available 
to Hume for explaining all, or nearly all, transitions between mental states. 
6 All citations from Reid’s Inquiry and Essays are from Reid [2003] and [2002] respectively, and will be cited in a 
manner parallel to the citations from Hume’s Treatise (with “Inq” and “EIP” in the place of  “T”).
7 Intuitable and demonstrable contents provide a possible exception/complication here, as the sorts of  belief  
mentioned by Hume and Reid concern belief  arising from the senses, memory, and/or probably inference.  
The question of  belief  for demonstrable/intuitive contents is raised explicitly in chapter 5, and my discussion 
here can be taken as implicitly restricted to beliefs with contingent/empirical contents, in light of  this.
8 Reid presents a different objection in between the passage already quoted and the objection I am investigating 
here.  The objection that I am omitting discussion of  here concerns Hume’s ability to account for the mental 
state of  denial, and the objection (which, in modified form, is also present in the Essays) is the principal focus 
of  chapter 2. 
9 Note that to make sense of  a non-linear scale (e.g. a scale where the change in strength between ‘adjacent’ 
degrees increases as one ascends the scale), one would need both a) an underlying notion of  strength that is 
linear, just to make sense of  the foregoing description of  the scale, and b) an explanation of  the absence of  the 
degrees of  vivacity that would produce, instead, a linear scale.
10 I am also abstracting away from considerations of  whether a sufficient number of  customers would purchase 
pulls, and whether or not the rate of  payout would influence decisions about which slot machine to play.
11 See Hume’s objection to the view that belief  involves the addition of  new ideas, articulated in both the 
Appendix (T p. 623-4) and in the Abstract (T p. 653).
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12 Two notes: 1) The difference required here is intended to be one that would not automatically rule out 
doxastic voluntarism, though it would rule out views suggesting that our ability to believe (or not) at will is on a 
par with our ability to raise an arm (or not) at will.  2) There is some room to argue that imagination is not fully 
voluntary, in that we sometimes imagine unbidden, and cannot always stop ourselves from imagining 
something.  If  one accepts this, the difference in voluntariness, much like the difference in influence on action, 
will appear to be much more readily explained as a difference of  degree.
13 The model I just described may seem to require that any such account requires that we can dismiss a mental 
state we have iff  we could summon it when it is not present.  However, there are various additional tweaks one 
can propose, that would allow for differences in the ease of  summoning and dismissing mental states.
14 My earlier discussion of  worrying about a possible car accident is relevant here as well.
15 Also for the distinction between sensing and thinking.  Much of  this discussion could be recast in terms of  
the distinction between impressions and ideas.  Note that the points in Hume’s favor would carry over.
16 Reid’s point here involves a misreading of  Hume, even on the assumption that Hume is a skeptical anti-
realist.  At the outset of  the Treatise, Hume posits a category of  ideas (“secondary ideas”), which would be 
relevant to judgments about the existence of  our mental operations, contra Reid’s interpretation on which 
Hume regards our mental operations as self-referential (T 1.1.1, p. 6).
17 On some natural interpretations of  Locke [1975], and Arnauld and Nicole [1996], beliefs are truth-assessable 
in virtue of  being a mental act of  affirmation (or denial) relating two ideas, not in virtue of  being a mental act 
with a proposition as its object.  However, Locke, with Reid, regards ideas themselves as not assessable for 
truth or falsity.  Locke outright declares to us that ideas are, strictly speaking, neither true nor false (Locke 
[1975], 2.32).
18 See, for example, King [2007] and Soames [2010], among many others.
19 There are other uses of  the “belief  in” locution, such as “Tom believes in honesty” and “Tom believes in his 
brother” which seem to express e.g. dedication to an ideal or trust/faith in an individual, but these uses can be 
set aside for our purposes.
CHAPTER 3: BELIEF AND DENIAL
Introduction
Pessimism about Hume’s theory of  belief  has persisted long past Reid’s original 
complaints.  For instance, Donald Davidson offers a striking example of  the pessimism 
surrounding David Hume’s theory of  belief, when, in the middle of  a paper on Hume’s 
theory of  pride, he remarks without explanation or argument that Hume’s official solution to 
a puzzle is “necessarily inadequate because his psychological apparatus cannot yield a serious 
account of  judgment or belief ” (Davidson [1976]).  Since providing a serious account of  
judgment and belief  in terms of  his version of  the theory of  ideas is one of  Hume’s central 
aims in the Treatise of  Human Nature, this is a a bold charge.  However, we can make sense of 
this pessimism in light of  the constraints on theorizing that Hume adopted (cf. Chapter 1).  
While we have already seen that some of  these worries can be mitigated (cf. Chapter 2), 
there is an important worry about Hume’s view that has stuck around for 300 years.  In this 
chapter, we will examine a pair of  objections (revolving around a single worry) from Hume’s 
contemporary Thomas Reid, as well as a closely related objection presented more recently by 
Barry Stroud.  All three objections argue that the account of  belief  Hume offers is 
incompatible with an adequate treatment of  denial.  My three-fold goal in this chapter is to 
argue i) that there is a position which offers a way for Hume to avoid this objection, ii) that 
such a position is compatible with Hume’s other views, and iii) that Hume in fact held this 
position.
In the first section of  the chapter, I briefly recapitulate Hume’s account of  belief  as a 
lively species of  conception and present Reid’s objection that this account permits Hume to 
distinguish only two states for a given content (belief  and suspension of  judgment), missing 
a crucial third state (denial).1  There I argue that there are two ways one might respond to 
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the challenge—one appealing to additional ways of  mentally interacting with contents, the 
other appealing to additional contents to mentally interact with—each of  which has the 
prima facie appearance of  defusing Reid’s objection.
In the second section of  the chapter, I develop one of  the concerns underlying the other 
objection from Reid, and the objection from Stroud, both of  which rest on the premise that 
Hume’s position is to avoid the original worry by appealing to additional activities.  There I 
argue that Reid and Stroud are correct to think that an appeal to additional ways of  
interacting with contents fails.
In the third section of  this chapter, I examine potential concerns about whether the 
other strategy—appealing to additional contents—is open to Hume, given his other 
commitments and constraints.  There I argue that none of  Hume’s commitments or 
constraints prevent him from positing the additional contents needed to adopt this strategy.
In the fourth section of  the chapter, I defend the interpretation of  Hume on which he 
did, in fact, posit such additional contents.  There I use a variety of  textual evidence from 
the Treatise to provide clear textual support for this interpretation, support which is 
strengthened by the philosophical superiority of  this reply to Reid.
Though this chapter addresses only one element of  the pessimism surrounding Hume’s 
theory of  judgment, the element it does address is a natural first step towards a more robust 
defense of  Hume’s views.  By showing that Hume can explain what it is for a pair of  beliefs 
to be contradictory, we are in a much better position to appreciate the prospects for him to 
capture the full range of  logical relationships among beliefs.  One issue not addressed in this 
chapter (or, indeed, in the dissertation itself) is the problem of  ordinary predicative belief  for 
Hume.  It is worth highlighting that this is an intentional omission, not an oversight.  Given 
Hume’s resources for dealing with abstract representation, it is important for us to first get 
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clear on the logical relations among the non-abstract ideas, before attempting to assess 
Hume’s best options for modeling predicative (i.e. non-existential) judgments.
Section 1. Hume’s Account, Reid’s Challenge, and Stroud’s Dilemma
I’ve previously argued that a central goal of  the first book of  the Treatise is to provide an 
account of  that portion of  the mind concerned with thinking, judging, and reasoning—i.e. 
what Hume and other early modern philosophers called “the understanding”.  The account 
takes the form of  a reductive analysis of  the acts of  the understanding in terms of  
perceptions, Hume’s fundamental mental entities.
Hume is also constrained by a commitment with respect to the way in which aspects of  
ideational states can figure in explanations of  the various mental states.  For instance, Hume 
commits himself  to using the ideational composition of  the state only in the role of  fixing/
explaining the content of  the state, while the other element of  ideational states, attendant 
degree of  force and vivacity, must do all of  the work to distinguish among different mental 
states with a common content.2  Hume is aware of  and embraces these constraints, as can be 
seen in the discussions of  the difference between conception and belief  that were previously 
examined.  Essentially, Hume accepts that conceiving that Julius Caesar exists has the same 
content as believing that Julius Caeser exists, and concludes (as is required by his system) that 
the states can only differ with respect to their attendant force and vivacity.  Hume’s 
considered position is that belief  is a lively species of  conception, or in other words, that 
states of  believing a given content are a particular lively subset of  states of  conceiving that 
content.
With this understanding of  Hume’s account of  belief  and the fundamental constraints 
that arise from the commitments of  his theory of  ideas, we are in a position to introduce 
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and consider an objection to Hume’s account offered by Thomas Reid in his Inquiry into the 
Human Mind on the Principles of  Common Sense:
And if  no philosopher had endeavored to define and explain 
belief, some paradoxes in philosophy, more incredible than 
ever were brought forth by the most abject superstition, or 
the most frantic enthusiasm, had never seen the light. Of  this 
kind surely is that modern discovery of  the ideal philosophy, 
that sensation, memory, belief, and imagination, when they 
have the same object, are only different degrees of  strength 
and vivacity in the idea. Suppose the idea to be that of  a 
future state after death; one man believes it firmly; this means 
no more than that he hath a strong and lively idea of  it: 
Another neither believes nor disbelieves; that is, he has a 
weak and faint idea.  Suppose now a third person believes 
firmly that there is no such thing; I am at a loss to know 
whether his idea be faint or lively: If  it is faint, then there may 
be a firm belief  where the idea is faint; if  the idea is lively, 
then the belief  of  a future state and the belief  of  no future 
state must be one and the same. 
Inq, p. 30
Though Reid uses the terms “belief ” and “disbelief ”, I will, as noted above, refer to the 
states in question as “affirmation” and “denial” in my discussion.  It seems as though Reid’s 
objection can most naturally be understood as an attempt to show that the different mental 
states Hume must account for outnumber the different ideational states his theory allows:
R1-1.  For any content C, in Hume’s system, the range of  ideational states 
with content C are exhausted by those assigned to affirming C and 
those assigned to suspending judgment with respect to C. 
R1-2.  For any content C, the states of  affirming C, denying C, and 
suspending judgment with respect to C are distinct states with the same 
content.
R1-3. If  (1) and (2), then Hume’s system cannot account for denying C.
R1-4. So, Hume’s system cannot account for denying C.
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Supposing that we intend to accept 3 (as I think we should), there are two ways to 
challenge this argument on behalf  of  Hume: deny premise 1, or deny premise 2.3  Denying 
premise 1 involves arguing that some subset of  the ideational states with content C are 
assigned to the state of  denial.  Further, it requires explaining the conflict between belief  and 
cognitive denial in terms of  some contrariety in the ranges of  force and vivacity assigned to 
the contrary states.  Premise 2 may be denied in a number of  ways, but the most natural and 
straightforward is to claim that the state of  denying C does not have C as content, despite the 
grammatical form of  this particular description of  the state.  We can better understand what 
these options amount to in light of  a discussion from Barry Stroud of  Hume’s account of  
belief.  Stroud criticizes Hume for failing to treat the full range of  manners of  conceiving a 
given content, stating that “[o]ne ‘manner of  conceiving’ an idea that Hume should have 
considered is denial”.  He continues:
Although he speaks of  disagreement, disbelief, and dissent, 
he never tries to say what they are, perhaps because he thinks 
his theory of  belief, such as it is, accounts for them. But that 
is not so.
If  assent or belief  is just a matter of  having a lively idea 
before the mind, what is dissent or denial? It would seem to 
be either a matter of  having that idea before the mind in 
some different ‘manner’, or else assenting to or believing the 
opposite of  the original idea.  
Stroud [1977], p. 75
Stroud goes on to suggest that neither horn of  the dilemma is a viable option for Hume, 
but all we need to observe for the time being is that the two horns of  Stroud’s dilemma map 
neatly onto the options we saw for resisting Reid’s objection: we can either interpret Hume 
as maintaining that believing and denying involve contrary activities toward a common 
content, or that believing and disbelieving involve occurrences of  the same activity toward 
contrary contents.  Approaches of  the first sort can be understood as Act-Contrary (AC) 
approaches, while those of  the second sort are Content-Contrary (CC) approaches.4  One 
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way to understand what is at stake in the choice between the two accounts is this: Given that, 
for any content C, the state of  denying C is equivalent to the state of  affirming the negation 
of  C, which description of  the state is a better reflection of  the underlying psychological 
facts?
To draw this out with a crude analogy, the AC account posits something akin to a 
cognitive thumbs-up and something akin to a cognitive thumbs-down.  If  I believe C and 
you disagree with me, I mentally give C the thumbs-up, and you mentally give C the thumbs-
down.  On the CC account, there are not two basic mental activities, there is only the mental 
thumbs up, but in addition to C, there is a further content, opposed to C, and while I give C 
the thumbs up, you do not, and instead you give C’s opposite the thumbs up.  The crucial 
theoretical commitment of  the AC account is that the denial cannot be reduced to 
affirmation of  the contrary; the theory requires both affirmation and denial, while the 
crucial theoretical commitment of  the CC account is that contents themselves exhibit logical 
relationships like inconsistency or contrariness (which can then be inherited by states of  
assenting to those contents).
In the next section of  this chapter, I will endeavor to show that, insofar as Reid and 
Stroud are concerned to argue against the viability of  AC accounts, they are correct; such 
accounts are untenable in general (and especially so for Hume).
Section 2.  Hume Should Endorse Contrary Contents
The goal for the present section is to argue that AC accounts are not viable in general, 
and especially not for Hume.  Consequently, in light of  Stroud’s dilemma, Hume should 
endorse a CC account.  I begin by demonstrating some very general issues that arise on any 
AC account, arguing that they are sufficiently problematic so as to render AC accounts 
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largely untenable.  Then, by considering a second objection from Reid, and the objection 
from Stroud, I will show how the prospects for the AC interpretation of  Hume are even less 
viable.
The original form of  our worry was that, for a given content C, there are three mental 
states that need to be distinguished: affirming C, suspending judgment as to whether C, and denying 
C.  The AC approach to resolving the worry involves positing a distinct way of  engaging 
with C, denial, which cannot be reduced to an affirmation.  In other words, this approach 
requires that denial and affirmation are equally fundamental/basic.5  One could then define 
suspension of  judgment as the state of  having conceived of  C, but neither affirming nor 
denying it.  We can say that such a system has two basic acts of  cognitive commitment.
If  the main complaint against the Act-Contrary account was that it has two basic acts of  
cognitive commitment instead of  one, it would not be in much trouble.  After all, merely 
positing two basic acts of  cognitive commitment is, if  anything, a more parsimonious 
maneuver than doubling the number of  contents (i.e. adding a contrary content for each 
positive content, as on the Content-Contrary approach).  The main complaint against Act-
Contrary accounts is that they are saddled with (far) more than two basic acts of  cognitive 
commitment.  Let’s start by considering four different mental states:
&1. The belief  that God and Satan exist.
&2. The belief  that God exists and Satan does not.
&3. The belief  that God does not exist and Satan does.
&4. The belief  that God and Satan do not exist.
Just as the belief  that God exists and the belief  that God does not exist share the same 
content on the AC approach, these four beliefs share their contents. If  one accepts a 
plausible principle of  compositionality for conjunctive contents (i.e. if  one accepts that the 
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content of  a conjunctive belief  is a function of  the contents of  the conjuncts), it follows 
that since the first conjunct of  each of  &1-&4 has the idea of  God as the content of  one 
conjunct, and the idea of  Satan as the content of  the other conjunct, that such a principle 
would require each conjunctive belief  to have the same content.6  At best, one of  the four 
can be subsumed under the original act of  affirmation (presumably &1) and one of  the four 
can be subsumed under the original act of  denial (presumably &4).  This leaves two further 
states to account for.  The worry is that doing so will require the postulation of  two 
additional mental activities, which are each equally basic with affirmation and denial.
In this case, it is not entirely implausible to suggest that the result can be avoided by 
denying that the states exhibit genuine logical complexity.7  Suppose I deny that there is 
genuinely conjunctive belief.  Instead, I wish to offer the following account of  apparently 
conjunctive beliefs:
&B: Someone believes C and C’ iff  i) she believes C and ii) she believes C’.
First, note that this analysis has the somewhat strong commitment that belief  is closed 
under conjunction.  Just to illustrate how this eliminates substantive positions: consider the 
difference between maintaining that no one ever believes a contradiction, and the view that 
everyone’s beliefs are always consistent.  The former view states that no individual belief  o 
mine is every contradictory, but the latter places a global consistency constraint on my 
beliefs.  Even though Hume notoriously maintains both that contradictions are inconceivable 
(and thus, unbelievable) as well as that no one can have contradictory beliefs, the view is still 
worse for not permitting us to distinguish the positions.8  While this may not be an 
additional cost of  the view as a matter of  Hume interpretation, it is an additional cost of  the 
view as a matter of  fact.
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Second, there is a much larger problem with the view, which is that the analogous 
strategies simply can’t be employed for other logically complex beliefs.  Consider:
v1. The belief  that either God or Satan exists.
v2. The belief  that either God exists or Satan doesn’t.
v3. The belief  that either God doesn’t exist or Satan does.
v4. The belief  that either God or Satan doesn’t exist.
Assuming a similar principle of  compositionality for disjunction, we are forced to treat 
each of  v1-v4 as having the same content.9  And, though we might have allowed that 
believing C&C’ just is believing C and believing C’, it is indisputable that believing a 
disjunction is distinct from simply believing either of  the conjuncts.  There is simply no 
hope to eliminate these disjunctive beliefs as disjunctions of  more basic states of  affirmation 
and denial.
Is there another plausible way to construct the disjunctive beliefs out of  affirmations or 
denials?  It is safe to say that we cannot.  Affirming a disjunctive content does not require 
affirming or denying any more basic content at all.  There is something equivalent to 
affirming a disjunction, but this state would be the denial of  a conjunction of  negations.  
Since a conjunction of  negations, on the present approach, is simply being analyzed as a pair 
of  negative beliefs, there is no content whose denial is equivalent to the affirmation of  a 
disjunction.  
The revised challenge—in light of  v1-v4—is that there are at least 4 states to account 
for, given any two basic contents.  To avoid the postulation of  further basic acts of  cognitive 
commitment, we would need to somehow assemble the already postulated basic acts into 
complex arrangements.  There is not really any sense to be made of  spatial arrangements of  
said acts, and temporal arrangements will fail for other reasons.10  Insofar as one can have 
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simultaneous non-spatial arrangements of  basic acts, one would need to invoke the view that 
they are “arranged” with respect to the content, but this view differs little from the treatment 
proposed for &1-&4, which, as noted, cannot be adapted for affirming a disjunction, since 
affirming a disjunction is not analyzable into multiple component acts of  affirmations and 
denials.
We would need to post additional basic mental activities, which can only be described as 
things like disjoining-the-affirmation-of-the-first-with-the-denial-of-the-second (or something else equally 
cumbersome).  It does matter, for the plausibility of  this view, that we don’t tend to think 
about this as a discrete mental activity taken towards a pair of  contents, and instead, would 
think of  the states it purports to describe as affirming a disjunction.
The initial challenge (to Hume) was that there are more basic states of  cognitive 
commitment to account for than can be distinguished in his framework (two times as many, 
in fact).  By positing a second basic act of  cognitive commitment, the advocate of  AC has 
doubled the available number of  basic states of  the understanding, thus producing a view 
that meets the demands of  the initial challenge.  To make it especially clear why this further 
worry targets the same aspect of  the view, we need only consider the beliefs that directly 
contradict v1-v4.  None of  v1-v4 contradict each other.  But, our original account of  denial 
is simply inapplicable to v1-v4.  So, to employ the same strategy of  response as we did when 
facing the original challenge, we would need to introduce an additional opposing act for each 
of  the acts introduced to account for v1-v4.
At this juncture, it is worth briefly noting why there is not a similar problem for Content-
Contrary approaches.  On CC approaches, there is a single act of  cognitive commitment, 
affirmation, whose objects stand in logical relations.  Provided one accepts that, in general, 
for every content C there is a contrary content, ~C, and for any two contents C and C’ there 
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is a conjunctive content C&C’, one can a) distinguish the contents of  &1-&4 — G&S, 
G&~S, ~G&S, and ~G&~S — and  also distinguish the contents of  v1-v4 without further 
augmenting the range of  contents — in general, the disjunction of  C and C’ is equivalent to 
~(~C&~C’) so negation and conjunction are sufficient to account for disjunction.  Similar 
points can be made for the material conditional (both as criticisms of  the Act-Contrary 
account and as benefits of  the Content-Contrary account).
So, no one embracing an AC account will simply be positing two basic acts of  cognitive 
commitment, if  they are to account for logically complex beliefs. As we have seen, they will 
need to posit at least four such acts.  The sheer increase in number of  posited acts is a 
concern, but the real problems for the view are that a) these acts are supposed to be on a 
part with affirmation and denial as basic acts of  cognitive commitment, but do not seem to 
be, and b) this is not the end of  act multiplication.  Considering disjunctions with three 
disjuncts, or disjunctions of  conjunctions, etc., suggests that the problem will recur.  
Limiting our attention to disjunctions alone, to treat a construction of  complexity n (where n 
is the number of  logically simple disjuncts permitted), the account will require, at minimum, 
2n basic acts of  cognitive commitment.
So, AC involves a multitude of  acts, each of  which needs to be basic, but whose 
basicness is suspect at best, and, now, AC, which did not originally seem worse off  than CC 
with respect to considerations of  parsimony, actually has to posit exponentially more basic 
attitudes in order to account for ordinary logically complex beliefs (that is, beliefs with 
logical complexity, not beliefs about logical complexity).11  Last, and perhaps most 
importantly, the account does not successfully explain the nature of  denial.  It explains, at 
best, denials of  logically atomic contents.  It will simply be a primitive fact about the acts of  
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disjoining-the-affirmation-of-the-first-with-the-denial-of-the-second, that it is incompatible with denying 
the first and affirming the second.12
Still, one might hope to mitigate some of  these concerns.13  Or one might suspect that 
some of  this trouble is illusory, since the objection only demonstrates that the plethora of  
additional states are basic relative to affirmation and denial. One might think that someone 
who aims to reduce all of  these states in some further manner—Hume, perhaps—could 
avoid the trouble.
However, examining Humean versions of  this approach reveal that, if  anything, the 
trouble is worse on a Humean reduction than if  one were to simply stop the story here. 
First, Hume’s sole resource for distinguishing these basic acts of  cognitive commitment as 
different species of  conception is in terms of  their degree of  force and vivacity, meaning 
that a Humean version of  this approach would posit a huge number of  species of  
conception, all differentiated by degree of  strength.14  Second, as Reid and Stroud point out, 
the nature of  the differences between these species of  conception do not predict or explain 
the nature of  the differences between the acts in question.  In what follows I will present the 
basic model of  a Humean Act-Contrary account, and show how it runs into trouble with 
both the number of  theoretically significant distinctions it predicts as well as with the 
predictions and explanations it offers for the relationships among the states.
As noted, to treat constructions of  complexity n, the view requires us to have at least 2n 
basic acts, which means, if  we are offering a reduction, 2n significant distinctions among 
underlying states.  Initially, it appeared that Hume’s states could be modeled as ordered pairs 
<i,s> where i is an idea, and s is a degree of  strength.  In order to capture conjunctions of  
complexity four, we would require the ability to distinguish among at least 16 different 
degrees of  vivacity.  While there may be a limit to the complexity of  contents we can, as a 
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matter of  psychological fact, engage with, it does not seem as though we have particular 
trouble entertaining contents that would be factored into five or six different disjuncts.  
However, such states require 32 to 64 different theoretically significant distinctions among 
degrees of  vivacity.15  It seems clear then that invoking Hume’s underlying mechanisms do 
not assist us in mitigating the problematic multiplication of  basic cognitive acts, as Hume’s 
view would require 32 to 64 different levels of  vivacity at which the nature of  the state 
switches in such a way as to shift whether the embodied judgment is positive or negative 
with respect to a given component of  the content.
There is an even larger problem looming however, which can be brought out by 
consideration of  the second objection Reid offered against Hume’s account, and Stroud’s 
discussion of  a similar point.  Though Reid was satisfied, in the Inquiry, that he had refuted 
Hume’s account of  belief, in his later Essays On the Intellectual Powers of  Man, he seems to have 
modified his understanding of  Hume’s position, and reworked his objection as one that 
specifically targets the Act Contrary approach to accounting for Cognitive Denial:
Every proposition that may be the object of  belief, has a 
contrary proposition that may be the object of  a contrary 
belief. The ideas of  both, according to Mr. HUME, are the 
same, and differ only in degrees of  vivacity. That is, contraries 
differ only in degree; and so pleasure may be a degree of  
pain, and hatred a degree of  love.! But it is to no purpose to 
trace the absurdities that follow from this doctrine, for none 
of  them can be more absurd than the doctrine itself. 
EIP, p. 291-216
Unlike Reid, I think there is some purpose in tracing the absurdities that follow from this 
doctrine before dismissing it as hopeless.  To begin, Reid’s analogy to the view about hatred 
and love is misplaced: The proposed Act-Contrary interpretation of  Hume’s view does not 
say that denial is a degree of  affirmation, but rather, that denial and affirmation are both 
degrees of  (the strength of) conception.  This is more analogous to the view that love and 
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hatred are both degrees of, for instance, concern.  Whether or not that is an appealing view, 
it is not patently absurd.  To further see that this is not a generally problematic position, 
consider what one might say about heat and coldness.  There is a relatively large difference 
between the view that heat is a degree of  coldness (or vice versa) and the view that heat and 
coldness are degrees of  temperature.
However, there is something importantly correct about Reid’s objection, and again this 
can be brought out by turning our attention to an illuminating discussion offered by Barry 
Stroud. Here is Stroud’s framing of  the Act-Contrary account:
On [the Act-Contrary] view we have only the one idea, that 
of  God, or of  God as existing, and we can conceive it either 
by assenting and thereby believing that God exists, or by 
denying, and there by believing that God does not exist.! And 
both of  those ‘attitudes’ are to be distinguished from simple 
conception, in which one need not have an opinion one way 
or another.
Stroud [1977], p. 75
Recognizing that Hume has very few basic resources for distinguishing mental states, and 
specifically that the only resource available for Hume to use in distinguishing among states 
with the same content is the attendant degree of  vivacity, Stroud explains the only position 
he takes to be available to Hume:
But if  denial is to be a completely different ‘manner of  
conceiving’ from both belief  and mere conception, and if  all 
differences among ‘manners of  conceiving’ are just 
differences in degrees of  force and vivacity, then denial will 
be just a matter of  having an idea before the mind with yet a 
third degree of  force and vivacity.  Will [denial] be stronger, 
or weaker, than belief ? And how will it differ from a belief  
held with less than the highest degree of  conviction? Will 
there be no difference between an atheist and a man who 
fairly strongly believes that God exists?
Stroud [1977], p. 75
It will help to frame the basis for Stroud’s worry   While the initial objection (i.e. Reid’s 
Inquiry objection) was framed as a problem about the number of  different states, there is 
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more to the challenge than simply producing the correct number of  distinctions on one’s 
view.  The view should also get the right relationships among the states.  For instance, 
suppose we only have to worry about the acts of  commitment underlying v1-v4:
v1. The belief  that either God or Satan exists.
v2. The belief  that either God exists or Satan doesn’t.
v3. The belief  that either God doesn’t exist or Satan does.
v4. The belief  that either God or Satan doesn’t exist.
The underlying states in question can all be modeled as pairs <GOD!SATAN,s>, where 
‘...!...’ stands in for whatever function on basic contents takes us to a disjunctive content.17  
For any two distinct such states, Hume’s framework requires that either the former will be 
stronger than the latter, or that the latter will be stronger than the former.  But consider the 
states underlying v2 and v3.  Neither state seems to be, in general, stronger or weaker than 
the other.18  Even if  we were tempted to consider affirmation to be stronger than denial or 
vice versa, the ‘mixed’ states are clearly on a par with each other. But, Hume has only one 
axis along which the different ideational states for a single content can vary, and, 
consequently, all variations are variations in strength.  Ultimately, insofar as acts of  denial or 
assent can be weak or strong, it seems like the same range of  strengths seems to be available 
to each.  Can this problem be at all addressed?
The best one can do to avoid this charge of  arbitrariness involves getting rid of  the 
commitment to distinguish acts of  cognitive commitment by ordering them along a scale of  
strength.  And the best way to accomplish this involves two changes to the view:  The first is 
to make finer grained distinctions among ideational states of  with a given content of  a given 
strength.  To illustrate it may be helpful to think about flavors.  A peppermint tea may have 
the same intensity of  flavor as a nutmeg tea, but are obviously still different flavors.  If  the 
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element of  vivacity that was relevant to whether the act was cognitively committing was 
intensity, but we allowed for multiple “flavors” of  equally intense acts, we could avoid the 
initial arbitrariness worry.  For example, let’s say the flavors are peppermint and nutmeg, and 
signify them by ‘p’ and ‘n’ respectively.19  Now, if  strength comes in values ranging from 0 to 
1, then, where we had previously only had a single ideational state, <GOD, .6>, we would 
now have two, <GOD, .6p> and <GOD, .6n>.  Strength itself  would then be the distance 
from some zero point, while the ‘flavor’ of  the state would distinguish the positive from the 
negative.  This addresses the fundamental arbitrariness worry, but runs into a separate 
problem dealing with the complex states.  Can the of  believing that God exists and Satan 
does not have more than one flavor?  If  not, it would, barring revision of  the view, have to 
be either a peppermint state or a nutmeg flavored state.  This too could be fixed by getting 
rid of  the assumption that complex ideas have a single degree of  force and vivacity, and 
instead adopting a model on which a complex idea has (or can have) a complex arrangement 
of  force and vivacity, such that some parts may have a strength of  .4p and some may have a 
strength of  .8n.  Perhaps the best version of  this view would be one that required the entire 
state to have the same degree of  intensity, but permitted variation of  flavor for different 
simple parts.
This, I think, is (structurally) the best version of  a Act-Contrary account in the 
neighborhood of  Humean views.  However, there is no textual support for attributing such a 
view to Hume himself.  Thus, this is much more likely to be something one would defend as 
a reconstructive project.  Furthermore, while it may begin to address some of  the worries, it 
really doesn’t do anything to tackle the fundamental challenge of  providing a general and 
recursive account of  logical relations among mental states.  Fundamentally, the advantage of  
a CC view is that negation does the same thing everywhere.  Give it a simple content, or a 
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complex content, and its negation is a content which is inconsistent with it, and denying 
some claim is simply believing its negation.  Now, even on the best versions of  the AC view, 
negation is one thing when it comes to simple contents (i.e. the opposite of  believing C is 
for C to have a strong nutmeg flavor instead of  a strong peppermint flavor) and something 
different for conjunctions.  The account cannot be extended to the negation of  a 
conjunction or disjunction.  Shifting all the peppermint flavor of  a positive disjunctive belief 
to nutmeg flavor would produce the disjunction of  denials, not the denial of  a disjunction.  
That is, the same operation used for negation in the basic case, applied to CvC’, would 
produce (~Cv~C’), rather than ~(CvC’). 
So, every version of  the Act-Contrary approach is saddled with a variety of  unwelcome 
and unacceptable consequences, in order just to handle disjunctions.  It does not improve 
the view to couple it with any of  the distinctly Humean commitments regarding the nature 
of  variations in the underlying states.  Consequently, anyone wishing to address cognitive 
denial, and in particular Hume, should address it by embracing a Content-Contary view.  
Which leads us to the question of  whether Hume can endorse such contents.  After all, if  the 
only way to account for denial is with contrary contents, and Hume’s other views preclude 
him from endorsing contrary contents, this would provide us with a strong argument against 
the viability of  Hume’s views on the makeup of  the mind (incidentally, this seems to be the 
stance that Stroud adopts, whereas Reid, as far as I can tell, simply does not consider the 
possibility of  Hume’s taking a Content-Contrary approach). In the next section I will argue 
that Hume can endorse such contents.
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Section 3. Hume Can Endorse Contrary Contents
In this section, I will argue that Hume can consistently endorse a Content-Contrary 
account.  However, the only way to exhaustively demonstrate that contrary contents are 
compatible with the rest of  Hume’s views would require, at the very least, a complete 
enumeration of  Hume’s views.  So, I will instead focus on a set of  features that have, or 
seem to have, the potential to make trouble for contrary contents, and assume that if  
anything makes trouble for Hume in endorsing contrary contents, it is one or more of  the 
obvious potential troublemakers.  Thus, the actual structure of  the section is to demonstrate, 
for each of  these potential troublemakers, that it makes no trouble.  The first troublemaker I 
consider is one invoked by Stroud in his argument that Hume cannot endorse contrary 
contents.  I show how the Stroud objection relies on an incorrect reading of  Hume’s 
principle that thinking of  an object is the same as thinking of  the object as existing, and 
show that Hume’s actual principle does not make any trouble.  This leads into a broader 
discussion of  whether Hume’s allowance of  non-predicative contents for belief  causes any 
trouble. I show that, though it complicates things for Hume somewhat, ultimately, it does 
not preclude him from endorsing contrary contents.  I then consider whether either of  the 
potentially troublesome constraints (previously discussed in chapters 1 and 2) actually make 
trouble.  Specifically, I consider whether  either Hume’s exclusive, exhaustive division of  
ideas into those that are simple and those that are complex or Hume’s commitment to the 
copy principle make trouble for him endorsing contrary contents.  Arguing that none of  
these elements of  Hume’s philosophy preclude contrary contents, I conclude that Hume can 
consistently endorse a Contrary Content view.
As mentioned, Stroud’s diagnosis of  the problem is that Hume rejects a predicative 
model of  belief, referring to the fact that Hume analyzes the state of  believing that God 
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exists, for example, as being a lively conception of  God, rather than as having a lively 
conception with both an idea of  God and a separate idea of  existence.  I can offer qualified 
agreement with Stroud’s point here: Hume does reject predicative structure for the objects of 
existential belief, and this does present him with some additional problems.20  On the other 
hand, I do not agree with Stroud that there is an insurmountable problem raised by this 
aspect of  Hume’s view.  To see what is at stake, and why Stroud thinks it causes such 
problems for Hume, we should look at Stroud’s objection, as he states it.  Limiting his 
discussion to the case of  ‘existential beliefs’, Stroud tells us:
[I]t makes no sense to Hume to talk of  ‘the opposite of  the 
original idea’. If  to think of  God is to think of  God as 
existing, or as He would be if  He existed, then it is not 
possible to have the idea of  God’s not existing. And therefore 
it is not possible to have the idea of  God’s not existing. And 
therefore it is not possible to have the belief  that God does 
not exist by having ‘in the assenting manner’ the idea of  
God’s non-existence.
Stroud, p. 75
The principle of  Hume’s alluded to in this passage, as Hume expresses it, is this: “to 
reflect on any thing simply, and to reflect on it as existent are nothing different from each 
other”.21  Treating “reflecting” and “thinking” as synonymous for present purposes, Stroud’s 
objection looks like this:
S-1. Necessarily, to reflect on God is to reflect on God as existing.
S-2. If  it is possible to have an idea of  God as not existing, then it would be 
possible to reflect on God without reflecting on God as existing.
S-3. So, it is not possible to have an idea of  God as not existing.
The support for S-2 is, presumably, the thought that reflection involving the idea of  God 
as not existing would not be reflection on God as existing, but would still be reflection on 
God.  S-1 precludes this possibility, and thus, precludes the possibility of  the idea of  God as 
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not existing.  Stroud’s diagnosis is that Hume has painted himself  into a corner by endorsing 
S-1 (and thereby precluding a predicative treatment of  belief  as involving a distinct idea of  
existence).  But, as compelling as Stroud’s case may seem, I do not think the objection causes 
problems for Hume.
S-1, as stated, is stronger than Hume’s principle.  Hume’s principle would be:
S-1*. Necessarily, to reflect on God simply is to reflect on God as existing.
This subtle distinction in formulations is the difference between the view that all 
thinking about God is thinking about God as existing, and the view that a thought whose 
sole content is the idea of  God is a thought about God as existing.  S-1*, as stated, does not 
even get us the result that thinking of  God as loving involves thinking of  God as existing. 
And it is important to note that we need a principle with the strength of  S-1 get the 
conclusion. S-1* is not strong enough.
That Hume doesn’t intend the principle to be as strong as Stroud suggests can be seen 
pretty clearly by his arguments for it.  Hume is concerned (both at T. 1.2.6 and T. 1.3.7) to 
deny that existential belief  is predicative.  Hume wants to argue that you don’t need to add 
anything to the idea of  an object to get the idea of  that object as existing.  In other words, 
Hume thinks that imagining o and imagining o as existing (and also imagining the existence of  o) are 
the same state, and further, that the underlying psychological structure of  the state is better 
reflected by the “imagining o” locution than the others, and likewise for conceiving of  o, 
believing in o, remembering o, etc.
If  we are concerned with a state like imagining the non-existence of  o, then the ‘object’ in 
question, would be, not o, but the non-existence of  o: o’s absence.  And the application of  
Hume’s principle would be that imagining o’s absence is the same as imagining the existence 
of  o’s absence.  We would not be forced to think of  the idea of  the non-existence of  God as 
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the idea of  the existence and non-existence of  God (which would be a troublesome idea), 
but instead as the idea of  the existence of  the non-existence of  God.
So, when Hume tells us that “any idea we please to form is the idea of  a being, and the 
idea of  a being is any idea we please to form” (T p. 67), this is equivalent to telling us that 
every idea we have can be understood as the idea of  the existence of  something.22  In other 
words, all ideas are object ideas.  If  we are content to think of  absences as objects (or object-
like in the relevant sense), this causes no problems for Hume’s ability to embrace absences.
What other reasons might we have for thinking Hume is unable to endorse contrary 
contents?  The two largest constraints on what ideas Hume can posit come from his 
commitment regarding the exhaustive, exclusive division of  ideas into those that are 
complex and those that are simple, and his commitment to the copy principle.  I will now 
consider whether these commitments make trouble for Hume’s ability to endorse ideas of  
absences.
For instance, if  the proposal in question was that, in general, the idea of  the absence of  
an object o was composed from the idea of  o and the idea of  absence, one could then object 
that the copy principle would cause problems, since there is no simple impression of  
absence from which the idea of  absence could be copied.  There are actually three specific 
problems for endorsing this particular account:  First, it would require Hume to have (at his 
disposal) a mode of  composing ideas in which the contents of  one could operate on the 
contents of  another as some sort of  function, rather than only permitting composition into 
some conglomeration or amalgam of  the two ideas.23  Second, it would involve an idea of  
absence (full stop), which is, prima facie, an abstract idea.  Hume’s model of  abstract ideas 
requires the possession of  particular instances to precede the possession of  the abstract idea; 
this model reverses that (cf  T 1.1.7).  Third, it would require the possibility of  a lonely 
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absence impression (i.e. of  the idea of  absence all by itself), which is difficult to make sense 
of.  While it would be possible to claim that the idea of  absence is itself  complex to avoid 
this last worry, it is a fair challenge, in Hume’s system, to demand the make-up of  that idea 
as well.
In light of  these problems with treating ideas of  absences as complex, I will concede 
that the idea of, for instance, God’s absence, must be simple, if  Hume’s view is to work.  I 
do not claim to have considered every possible way of  proposing that the idea of  the 
absence of  an object is a complex idea, but I am hard-pressed to see how to give a workable 
account of  complex negative ideas.24  It is worth noting that, if  there are ways to make such 
an account work that I am overlooking, they would only serve to bolster the main thesis of  
this section, rather than undermine it.  From here on out, however, I will simply be assuming 
that if  Hume adopts a CC view, there are simple negative ideas.
Suppose then that Hume must treat all ideas of  absences as simple.  It may then be 
objected that a) it is straightforwardly implausible to regard an idea of  an absence as a simple 
idea, and b) that we do not have simple impressions of  absences from which to copy said 
ideas.  The remainder of  this section takes up this pair of  concerns. 
Concern (a) is that it is implausible to treat the ideas of  absences as simple.  It is 
important, first, to note that, unless we attribute to Hume a very simpleminded view of  the 
workings of  language, the linguistic complexity of  a phrase will not necessarily map directly 
to the complexity of  the ideas involved.  It is also easy to see that we should not attribute 
that sort of  simpleminded view to Hume, since Hume wants “God exists” to designate the 
same idea as “God”.  Hume denies that linguistic structures and mental structures mirror 
each other.  He does not endorse anything like the language of  thought hypothesis, let alone 
a specific version of  LOTH according to which we have a mentalistic language that is always 
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reflected adequately by natural public language.  This is one of  the most important things to 
keep in mind when interpreting Hume, as many of  the basic concerns relate to this 
mismatch between linguistic structure and ideational structures.  For instance, it is evident 
from Hume’s non-predicative treatment of  singular positive existential belief  that 
grammatical structure of  the complement clause (“that Susan B. Anthony exists”) does not 
track ideational structure of  the belief  content (in this case, the idea of  Susan B. Anthony).  
We should thus be careful to avoid objecting to Hume in a way that presupposes such 
mirroring between the two.25  
However, one might offer concern (a) not motivated by the linguistic complexity, but 
simply by considering what it is to think about the absence of  some object, and concluding 
that it does not seem to involve a simple idea.  With respect to this issue, I can offer just the 
following on behalf  of  simple ideas of  absences: absences don’t seem to have parts.  
Contrast this with a small stack of  3 wooden blocks, which we can call ‘Blocky’.  Blocky is 
composed of  three parts (arranged in a certain way).  If  we imagine that Blocky is 
annihilated, then we’d have a situation without Blocky, and without each of  the three parts.  
But Blocky’s absence is not built out of  the three other absences.  It is not part of  Blocky’s 
absence that block 1 is absent, because Blocky could be absent while block 1 was present.  In 
fact, Blocky is absent just in case any of  the three block parts are absent (or perhaps even if  
they are just not arranged appropriately). While Blocky has conjunctive composition (in the 
sense that Blocky is present just in case block 1 and block 2 and block 3 are present), 
Blocky’s absence is disjunctive (in the sense that Blocky is absent just in case block 1 or 
block 2 or block 3 is absent).26
Concern (b) was that we don’t have simple impressions from which to copy these ideas 
of  absences.  However, I think that this concern can be countered as well.  Looking around 
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my room right now, I can see that Pegasus is not here.  The position Hume would need to 
take is not just that Pegasus is not among the things I see; he must say that I can see the 
absence of  Pegasus.  Now, it may be the case that I can only see the absence of  Pegasus 
once I already have the idea of  Pegasus (in which case, someone who has thought of  Pegasus 
can see more in a given room than someone who hasn’t).  I suppose it may be objected that 
absences are not literally seen, but it is pretty clear that there is some room to defend a 
difference between inferring that something is absent from a visual inspection, and a more 
immediate sort of  seeing its absence.27  It may also be objected that the absences are seen 
but are not simple impressions.  While I am not entirely unsympathetic to the view that 
Pegasus’s absence from the room as a whole may be made up of  Pegasus absences at each 
subregion of  the room, this is not a problem for the view under discussion, so long as any 
one of  the proposed Pegasus absences is not complex.
What’s more, it is important to note that these last concerns do not raise consistency 
problems for Hume, but, rather, they are simply objections to the view.  While they 
obviously bear on the question of  whether Hume’s view is correct, they only bear on the 
question of  whether Hume’s view is coherent and/or consistent insofar as they purport to 
show that Hume has conflicting commitments.  I grant that one might have serious doubts 
as to whether this is a good view of  ideas of  absences, but it seems to be logically consistent 
for Hume to adopt the view that ideas of  absences are, all of  them, simple ideas, even 
though our descriptions of  them are usually complex, and that we derive simple negative 
ideas from simple negative impressions.
At this point, I think I have shown that none of  the obvious potential trouble makers 
causes a problem for Hume’s ability to consistently endorse a Content-Contrary account.  All 
Hume needs to do is endorse simple impressions of  absences, and he can have an account 
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of  ideas of  absence that does not run afoul of  the copy principle or the division of  ideas 
into simple and complex.
To consider one final worry: it may be objected that, since ideas of  absences are simple, 
one cannot have the idea of  any absence without first having the impression of  that absence. 
This is in contrast to positive ideas, at least some of  which can be had without a 
corresponding impression (Hume’s example is New Jerusalem).  Note, however, that once 
one has the idea of  New Jerusalem, the present view would make it very easy to come by the 
impression of  its absence.  Everywhere I look, I see the absence of  New Jerusalem.28
So, we have now established that not only is a Content-Contrary account the right way to 
resolve the problem of  Cognitive Denial, it is a way that is in fact available to Hume.  In the 
next section, I will demonstrate that Hume does opt for this approach.
Section 4. Hume Does Endorse Contrary Contents
In the previous sections, I established that the correct resolution to the problem of  
cognitive denial is to embrace a CC account, and I showed that Hume is able to consistently 
endorse such an account.  In this section, I argue that Hume does endorse such an account.  
I start by presenting my positive textual evidence (i.e. the passage from the Treatise in which 
Hume clearly commits himself  to contrary contents).  I then present the neutral textual 
evidence (i.e. the other passages which involve discussion of  denial or disagreement, which 
are compatible with either interpretation).  I then discuss the “negative” textual evidence (i.e. 
I argue that, the relative lack of  discussion of  denial/disagreement counts in favor of  my 
interpretation).  When these considerations are combined with the fact that they support 
interpreting Hume as holding the philosophically superior view, I argue that my 
79
interpretation has very strong support. These considerations, on balance, strongly favor my 
interpretation.
To begin with my positive textual evidence, Hume tells us that contrariety is included 
among the seven types of  philosophical relations among ideas.29  He says:
The relation of  contrariety may at first sight be regarded as an 
exception to the rule, that no relation of  any kind can subsist 
without some degree of  resemblance. But let us consider that no two 
ideas are in themselves contrary except those of  existence 
and non-existence, which are plainly resembling, as implying 
both of  them an idea of  the object; tho the latter excludes 
the object from all times and places, in which it is supposed 
not to exist.
T, p. 15
This is a relatively condensed passage, in the sense that Hume tells us an awful lot about 
contrary ideas in the space of  a few sentences.  For present purposes, though, it is enough to 
note that, given Hume’s views rejecting treating the idea of  existence as a distinct idea, we 
cannot regard the present passage as maintaining that there is a general idea EXISTENCE 
which has, as its contrary, another general idea, NON-EXISTENCE.  Rather, it seems that 
Hume is positing that the only ideas standing in the relation of  contrariety are those of  
particular existents and particular non-existents (i.e. absences).  At face value, the passage is a 
straightforward commitment to contrary contents that includes some further details of  the 
account of  contrary contents Hume has in mind.  I should also note now, that I will (a bit 
later in this section) address the apparent commitment to the complexity negative ideas in 
this passage.
The neutral textual evidence amounts to this:  Apart from this discussion of  contrariety, 
a few paragraphs leading into his account of  belief  in section 1.3.7, “Of  the nature of  the 
idea, or belief ”, and a very brief  mention in the Abstract, the Treatise contains nothing 
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resembling a discussion of  the mechanics of  denial or disagreement.  The passage leading 
into his account of  belief  reads:
Suppose a person present with me, who advances 
propositions to which I do not assent, that Caeser dy’d in his bed, 
that silver is more fusible than lead, or mercury heavier than gold; ‘tis 
evident, that notwithstanding my incredulity, I clearly 
understand his meaning and form all the same ideas, which 
he forms.  My imagination is endow’d with the same powers 
as his ; nor is it possible for him to conceive any idea, which I 
cannot conceive ; or conjoin any, which I cannot conjoin. I 
therefore ask, wherein consists the difference between 
believing and disbelieving any proposition? [...]
‘Twill not be a satisfactory answer to say, that a person who 
does not assent to a proposition you advance; after having 
conceived the idea in the same manner with you ; immediately 
conceives it in a different manner, and has different ideas of  
it. This answer is unsatisfactory ; not because it contains any 
falsehood, but because it discovers not all the truth.  ‘Tis 
confest, that in all cases, wherein we dissent from any person; 
we conceive both sides of  the question ; but as we can believe 
only one, it evidently follows that belief  must make some 
difference betwixt that conception to which we assent, and 
that from which we dissent.
 T, p. 95-6
This passage is, in certain ways, equally compatible with AC or CC interpretations.  In 
fact, in the account of  disagreement that Hume regards as accurate but incomplete, he refers 
to both conceiving the same ideas in a “different manner” and to having “different ideas” of 
the proposition.30  It is also important to note that Hume’s completion of  the account 
simply involves the importance of  invoking belief  in the explanation of  the difference, and 
not simply discussing the acts of  conceiving.  In other words, Hume isn’t really giving his 
account of  disagreement here; he is using disagreement as a way to illustrate the role of  
belief.
As to the ‘negative’ textual evidence:  What does the sparsity of  Hume’s discussion of  
disagreement show?  I maintain that it is support for the Content-Contrary interpretation.  
Here’s why:  In general, Cognitive Denial is nothing special on a CC view.  If  one has an 
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account of  belief, denials are just the subset of  those beliefs with negative contents.  There is 
not much to say about the negative activity (though there may be a fair amount to say about 
the negative contents).  On the other hand, as we saw in section 2, if  Hume has an Act-
Contrary account in mind, there are a lot of  questions to answer about how it works, what 
this contrary activity is, and how it relates to the original activity.  If  that were what Hume 
had in mind, it would be very natural for him to explicitly claim that there are multiple ways 
for the idea of  God to possess belief  levels of  strength, and that those different ways give 
rise to contrary judgments. Instead, Hume’s commitments on the nature and variety of  
ideational states precludes anything like a decently sophisticated version of  the Act-Contrary 
account, and failing to discuss denial would be philosophically delinquent behavior.  This is 
both an uncharitable and unfavorable reading of  Hume’s position.  
So, when we consider that the clearest statement bearing on the matter expresses a 
commitment to a Content-Contrary approach, that Hume’s relative lack of  discussion of  the 
issue is substantially more appropriate if  he endorses CC, and that, as I demonstrated at 
length in section 2, Hume is philosophically much better off  if  he endorses Contrary 
Contents, charity would seem to require us to interpret Hume in accordance with the 
straightforward reading of  the text: he endorses Contrary Contents.
In what remains of  this section, I intend to explain how the CC account I sketched in 
Section 3 is compatible with the positive textual evidence I offered.31  Now, Hume, in the 
definition of  contrariety, tells us that the idea of  a given existent and its contrary existence 
are “plainly resembling, as implying both of  them an idea of  the object” while also noting 
that the negative idea  “excludes the object from all times and places, in which it is supposed 
not to exist”.
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First, it may be thought that the resemblance commitment prevents simplicity of  the 
negative ideas.  But it is evident that two ideas resembling cannot, in and of  itself, require 
complexity of  ideas, since Hume (in laying out the missing shade of  blue case) tells us:
I believe it will readily be allow’d, that the several distinct 
ideas of  colors which enter by the eyes, or those of  sounds, 
which are convey’d by the hearing, are really different from 
each other, tho’ at the same time resembling.
T, p. 5-6
This passage may only seem to commit Hume to the view that different color ideas 
resemble, but given that the context is in setting up the missing shade of  blue 
counterexample to the copy principle — a purported case of  producing a simple idea 
without a correspondent simple impression — Hume’s discussion here is only relevant 
insofar as the ideas of  each specific shade of  blue are a) simple, and b) resembling.  So, 
Hume permits the resemblance of  distinct simple ideas, and thus, the mere fact that he 
describes negative ideas as resembling their positive counterparts does not run afoul of  
interpreting Hume as adopting the section 3 reading.
Second, it may be thought that, for the negative idea to “imply [...] an idea of  the object” 
would require it to be complex.  However, the positive idea also has this feature, and 
presumably may be simple.  So, the objection must be that the positive idea can have this 
feature trivially (by virtue of  being identical to the idea of  the object), but the negative idea 
can only have this feature as a result of  complexity.  This means that, to avoid the worry, one 
is free to postulate a relation which a simple negative idea may stand in to the positive idea, 
provided that the positive idea trivially stands in that relationship to itself.
So, there are at least two options for reading this talk of  “implying [...] an idea of  the 
object”.  Option 1 is to treat the positive idea as a part of  the negative idea.  Option 2 is to 
treat the positive idea as something that must be possessed in order to possess the negative 
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idea.  Since the original text involves a somewhat bizarre use of  “imply”, I think both 
readings seem a little bit strained.  As I’ve already argued that there is no value for Hume in 
adopting the view that negative ideas have their positive correlates as parts (absent a pretty 
drastic revision of  our understanding of  Hume on the nature of  representation), only the 
latter option seems to remain as a candidate interpretation.  The ideas resemble in that 
neither can be had without possession of  the positive idea.32
There are no doubt questions I haven’t answered yet about Hume’s account, but I think 
it is clear from what I have established, that David Hume should, can, and does solve the 
problem of  denial by appealing to negative contents.  In the last section of  the chapter, I will 
discuss some directions for further investigation, and potential upshots of  this discussion.
Conclusion
In one sense, the results of  this investigation are modest: we have seen only a) that 
Hume’s system has the resources to defuse one concern about his theory of  judgment, the 
concern that he cannot provide an account of  denial, and b) that Hume used his resources 
in the very manner required to defuse the objection.  This leaves open any number of  other 
sources of  concern about the adequacy of  Hume’s resources.  In another sense, however, 
these results are quite significant.  Hume’s view, despite its impoverished resources, is able to 
solve this challenge in the same manner as it is solved on leading contemporary theories.  By 
showing that Hume’s account of  this fundamental logical relation is content-driven, we 
know exactly which other logical relations among contents Hume needs to capture in order 
to have a view which is respectable, even by contemporary standards.  And while I have not 
yet argued that Hume’s resources are adequate to address those logical relations, the path for 
further research on this issue is clear.  For instance, if  Hume possesses the resources to 
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handle content conjunction, his logic of  belief  will be demonstrably adequate to the 
standard set by propositional calculus.  At the very least, we have seen that the prospects for 
Hume’s account are substantially better than they are generally taken to be.
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CHAPTER 3 ENDNOTES
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1 For consistency and clarity, I will try to use only the terms “believe”, “affirm”, and “deny” (and their 
cognates), rather than “disbelief ” (which is popular in the texts I quote), or other terms (like “assent”, 
“dissent” etc.). My main reason for avoiding “disbelieve” is the potential confusion between “disbelief ” in the 
sense of  denial, and “disbelief ” understood as skeptical lack of  assent (including both suspension of  judgment 
and full-fledged denial).
2 On this point, as with many, many others, I follow Owen [1999].
3 This interpretation of  the argument may seem to be at odds with Reid’s discussion in 6.24 of  his [2003], in 
which Reid characterizes memory and expectation as involving distinct degrees of  liveliness of  conception, but 
that discussion makes it clear that Reid interprets Hume to treat memory and expectation as involving belief, 
and thus, as further divisions within the category of  belief  rather than as alternatives to it.
4  It is worth noting that one could posit contrariety of  both activities and contents.  However, a) none of  
Hume’s objectors take him to have done so and b) there is no reason to posit both for this particular theoretical 
task.  Since, ultimately, my discussion could be recast simply to show the necessity of  contrary contents, and 
the inadequacy of  contrary activities alone, this possibility need not concern us here.
5  I say “equally fundamental” here since a Humean AC account would attempt to further reduce affirmation 
and denial to different species of  conception.  The important feature, for our purposes, is that denial is not a 
type of  affirmation, nor is affirmation a type of  denial, on the AC account.
6  I note here that I am neutral as to exactly what this content has to be, though obviously, there are severe 
constraints on what ideas it could be, for someone like Hume.
7  In reality, the approach that I am describing as a denial of  logically complex states is really just a deflationary 
analysis of  the logically complex states in terms of  the more basic states, this is because a full-fledged denial of 
the complex states would embrace an absurd error theory with respect to our attributions of  &1-&4 (and 
similar constructions).
8  For one example, Hume invokes the stronger principle in Treatise 1.2.4, when he says: “’Tis in vain to search 
for a contradiction in any thing distinctly conceived by the mind. Did it imply any contradiction, ‘tis impossible 
it coul’d ever be conceiv’d” (T, p. 43).
9  It is worth noting that the principles assumed so far do not require &1-&4 to have the same content as v1-
v4.  This is simply because I did not frame the principles in such a way that the conjunctive content function is 
the same as the disjunctive content function. As a matter of  plausible interpretation, it is hard to see how 
Hume would posit distinct functions here, but this matter need not be taken up here, as the objections will 
work even in the presence of  the weaker assumption.
10 The problems with temporal arrangements of  the acts are as follows: i) what are properly synchronic mental 
states will be classified as diachronic mental states, ii) increasing logical complexity will require increasingly large 
temporal intervals to distinguish the various states, iii) the solution is eminently ad hoc, iv) it is difficult to make 
sense of  the temporal arrangements of  the states without abandoning the original view that the basic state of  
affirmation, combined with content C, is the belief  that C.
11 Some may find this concern underwhelming, since the CC theorist has to posit larger and larger numbers of  
distinct contents.  However, these contents need not generally be basic, and the types of  contents can be 
limited to atomic positive contents, negations, and conjunctions.  At any rate, even if  this concern is not 
particularly moving, the other concerns are still fairly powerful.
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12 For discussion of  how a very similar debate plays out with respect to expressivist views in metaethics, see 
Schroeder [2008].  My thinking about some of  these issues in Hume has been strongly influenced by that paper.
13 This is not the case with Ramsey [1994].  In one paper from that volume, “Facts and Propositions”, Ramsey 
explicitly postulates a pair of  contrary acts of  cognitive commitment, in full recognition of  the complications 
this brings about for contents that appear to be logically complex.  In his discussion, the only nod in the 
direction of  dealing with these issues indicates a plan to substitute a positive attitude towards complex sentences 
instead of  adding additional attitudes towards the original propositions.
14 While I am investigating Hume’s ability to reply to this objection without retreating from this commitment, 
there is some textual evidence that by the time of  the Appendix, Hume had in fact backed away from this 
constraint.
15 The real work here is being done by the fact that the view requires such large numbers of  theoretically 
significant thresholds for vivacity. Hume’s account could posit continuum-many degrees without facing this 
objection (though Hume is actually limited to a finite number of  degrees, given his finitist mathematical views); 
the problem is with having a large number of  cutoffs at which something important about the state drastically 
changes.
16 It is worth noting that Reid is not here alleging that Hume has the view that hate is a degree of  love, but 
rather that Hume’s view on denial is as absurd as the view that hate is a degree of  love.
17 I am here co-opting the use of  all-caps notation as it occurs in contemporary philosophy of  mind, where a 
term occurring in all-caps designates the concept of  the thing designated by ordinary occurrences of  the term.  
In our context, terms occurring in all-caps should be taken to designate ideas rather than concepts (insofar as 
that makes a difference).
18 This could be brought out further if  we consider the states in which the component ideas are reversed.  The 
question arises whether the state which is truth functionally equivalent to v2, but has Satan as the first disjunct 
(and thus, the same order of  affirmation and denial as v3) is the same act (and therefore same degree of  
vivacity) as v2 or as v3.
19 Calling them ‘flavors’ is metaphorical at best, and my choice of  gustatory sensations is for purposes of  
illustration only. Someone seriously advocating such an account would want to give a more plausible account of 
the phenomenology and a more helpful explication of  what such a view amounts to, but that is a separate 
concern from the structural worries discussed here.
20 Since predicates can, more or less effectively, be modeled as sets, negation on a predicate is easily understood 
as an operation taking you from a set to its complement.  Such an option is simply not available to Hume.
21 This formulation, and the surrounding discussion occur in section 1.2.6, “Of  the idea of  existence, and 
external existence” (T, p. 66).
22 Hume’s discussion here makes it evident that he regards being and existing as equivalent, despite the fact that 
this was a controversial issue in his day, just as it is now.
23 Put another way, this maneuver requires us to assume that Hume’s contents represent like linguistic entities, 
not like pictorial entities.  While one can clearly combine “tall” and “cow” to get something linguistic that 
represents tall cows, it is not possible to put ABSENCE with GOD to represent the absence of  God unless 
ABSENCE does the same sort of  representing as “absence”.  Such interpretations of  Hume on the nature of  
ideational representation are controversial, at best.  
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24 An alternative approach to employing abstraction was suggested to me by Don Baxter and Don Garrett in 
response to a conference presentation of  this material. They articulated a view on which certain maximal 
complex ideas exclude o (i.e. as pictures of  the world with no room for o in them), and the idea of  o’s absence 
is to be abstracted from the set of  all such ideas.  It is worth noting that the viability of  such a position 
strengthens the argument of  this section, insofar as it provides for an alternative route to negative contents.  I 
am increasingly sympathetic to the Baxter/Garrett view, but I retain a worry (raised at that same session by 
Martha Bolton) as to whether the Baxter/Garrett line can preserve the appealing isomorphism to logic that my 
official interpretation captures.  Finally, the Baxter/Garrett line substantively involves the account of  
abstraction presented in Garrett [1997]
25 In this context, it is appropriate to note that I have been adopting the useful fiction in this regard, by 
assuming that the idea of  God is simple, for Hume.  Hume’s treatment of  our ideas of  ordinary objects is a 
separate sticky interpretive issue, which I cannot engage with here, and which, fortunately, is orthogonal to the 
question of  logical relations among beliefs about simple objects (whatever those simple objects turn out to be, 
on Hume’s account).
26 I am not claiming that our intuitions about ordinary objects involve this sort of  essentiality of  parthood.  
Right now, I am simply concerned to demonstrate that an object’s complexity need not carry over to the 
absence of  that object.
27 It was brought to my attention that the view I advocate here is similar, in some ways to discussions in Sartre 
[1978] regarding Pierre’s absence from a cafe.  I make no claims to Sartre scholarship, and will not investigate 
any such similarities in the present work.
28 A troubling case remains, however in the situation where someone is presented with a single sensation 
continuously, and thus, cannot acquire an impression of  its absence.  The point is easiest to see with sounds, 
rather than visual sensations.  If  there is a low background hum constantly presented to someone via sensation, 
the present account would not permit them the idea of  the absence of  that hum.  I am somewhat sympathetic 
to the approach of  biting the bullet on this objection, as it is not clear that Hume would have an interest in 
capturing the ability to cognize the absence of  the hum in that scenario. Of  course, if  the hum became 
intermittent, the person would then be able to cognize it, on this account, and think about the absence of  the 
hum, even when faced with its presence.  Thanks to Gary Watson and Gideon Yaffe for raising this concern.
29 I do not mean to conflate philosophical and natural relations of  ideas here, and, in fact, mean to avoid 
discussion of  natural relations of  ideas altogether.  I consider natural relations of  ideas to be employed by 
Hume principally for explaining issues pertaining to dynamic/diachronic issues about the mind, while 
philosophical relations of  ideas are simply one type of  complex idea, employed by Hume in accounting for 
synchronic/static issues about the mind.  Thanks to Eric Schliesser for helping me to see what is at stake with 
this distinction.
30 Insofar as this discussion might weigh in one direction or the other, CC appears to have the advantage: if  
there are two contents, C and #C, then, the parties to the dispute both conceive both C and #C, and differ in 
the manner of  conceiving each.  If  there is only one idea, it is harder to make sense of  this notion of  “having 
different ideas”.
31 I note again, however, that if  there are other positive accounts of  negative ideas on offer, Hume’s position is 
stronger.  In other words, I articulate and defend this view because it is the one I take to suggested by the text, 
but the main point of  this section is to establish that Hume explicitly commits himself  to negative ideas.  
Disputes about whether I have developed the best understanding of  Hume’s negative ideas are, in many ways, 
secondary to the question of  whether Hume offers a view of  the type that avoids the Reid objections.
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32 For what it is worth, if  we consider the closest parallel discussion in Hume [1975], (Hume’s Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding) we find (in a footnote toward the end of  section III): “For instance, contrast or 
contrariety may be considered as a mixture of  Causation and Resemblance. Where two object are contrary, the one 
destroys the other; that is the cause of  its annihilation, and the idea of  the annihilation of  an object implies the 
idea of  its former existence.” (Hume [1975], p. 24).  I don’t think this cross-textual consideration is especially 
strong evidence in support of  my view (since the understanding of  contrariety seems to have shifted in some 
ways, but the phrasing is remarkable similar (down to the perplexing use of  “implies”).
CHAPTER 4: CONCEIVABILITY AND POSSIBILITY (I)
Introduction
In his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of  Man, Thomas Reid offers several objections to the 
principle that conceivability implies possibility.  Though David Hume is not the only target 
of  this assault, he is the main figure that Reid criticizes in presenting these objections.  In 
this chapter, I defend Hume from the first two of  these objections, and briefly indicate how 
my proposed solution to the first pair paves the way for adequate resolution of  the 
remaining pair.  I argue that Reid’s criticisms—insofar as Hume is an intended target—rely 
on an inaccurate reading of  the Humean account of  conception, and conflate issues 
pertaining to Hume’s account of  the understanding with those pertaining to accounts of  the 
workings of  language.  Examining Reid’s objections helps to illuminate some important 
features of  Hume’s account of  conception that, ultimately, bear directly on his account of  
demonstrative reason.
It is to Reid’s credit that he identified an array of  powerful challenges facing defenders of 
the maxim that conceivability implies possibility.  In section one, I present Reid’s first 
objection, which is that we can understand—and can therefore conceive—impossibilities.  I 
distinguish the question of  understanding meaningful linguistic items from the question of  
what conceptions we can have, and argue that Reid’s objection rests on a conflation of  these 
two issues.  To defend Hume, who did not offer a detailed or systematic account of  the 
workings of  language, I isolate the view about linguistic understanding on which the 
objection rests, and show that Hume need not be committed to it.
In section two, I present Reid’s second objection, which is that we can form judgments 
about—and can therefore conceive—impossibilities.  While this objection is more clearly a 
challenge to Hume’s philosophy of  mind, I argue that it too, relies on assumptions about the 
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workings of  language.  In this case, the force of  the objection arises from an assumption 
that the structures and contents of  our judgments mirror the structure and meanings of  
locutions describing those judgments.  Hume, however, has a thoroughgoing denial of  such 
views.  I show how Hume can account for the judgments used by Reid to raise the objection, 
without running afoul of  his commitment to the maxim.
As noted, Reid has targets in mind besides Hume, and offers these objections as 
challenges to the maxim itself, rather than to the specific systems of  those targets.  
Nevertheless, it is worth observing that these objections have special force against Hume, as 
he couples a commitment to the maxim with the view that all activities of  the understanding 
can be analyzed in terms of  conception.1
Section 1.  Understanding Impossibilities
We begin with Reid’s statement of  the first objection:
1. Whatever is said to be possible or impossible is expressed 
by a proposition. Now, What is it to conceive a proposition? I 
think it is no more than to understand distinctly its meaning.  
I know no more that can be meant by simple apprehension or 
conception, when applied to a proposition.  The axiom, 
therefore amounts to this: Every proposition, of  which you 
understand the meaning distinctly, is possible. I am 
persuaded, that I understand as distinctly the meaning of  this 
proposition, Any two sides of  a triangle are together equal to the 
third, as of  this, Any two sides of  a triangle are together greater than 
the third; yet the first of  these is impossible.
EIP 4.3, p. 330
Reid’s thought is that there are some obvious counterexamples to the maxim, and he 
intends the objection to provide a proposition that is conceivable without being possible.2  
More formally, the objection runs:
R1-1. For any proposition P, understanding the meaning of  P is sufficient for 
conceiving P. 
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R1-2. We understand the meaning of  the proposition that any two sides of  a 
triangle are together equal to the third.
R1-3. So, if  conceivability implies possibility, then it is possible that any two 
sides of  a triangle are together equal to the third.
R1-4. It is not possible that any two sides of  a triangle are together equal to 
the third.
R1-5. So, conceivability does not imply possibility.
According to Reid, (1) is a simple consequence of  the only plausible account of  
“conceiving a proposition”.  While it would be possible to challenge (2), this is a rather hefty 
bullet to bite.  Lastly, (4) can be taken for granted, as anyone seriously doubting the truth of  
(4) should substitute some proposition they regard as a genuine impossibility, and consider 
the analogous objection for that proposition.  
So, it is clear that the place to resist the argument, on Hume’s behalf, is premise (1).  Of  
course, defending Hume from the objection requires us to provide a Humean basis for 
denying that premise (or, at the very least, for us to establish that there isn’t sufficient reason 
to regard Hume as committed to it).  It will help to consider a passage in which Hume 
presents the view being Reid is attacking.  Reid, in establishing that Hume is among the 
proponents of  this conceivability maxim, quotes the following passage (though not in its 
entirety):
‘Tis an establish’d maxim in metaphysics, That whatever the mind 
clearly conceives includes the idea of  possible existence, or in other 
words, that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. We can form 
the idea of  a golden mountain, and from thence conclude 
that such a mountain may actually exist. We can form no idea 
of  a mountain without a valley, and therefore regard it as 
impossible.
T 1.2.2., p. 32
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The maxim described here does appear to be that conceivability implies possibility.  It is 
worth observing that Hume treats conception and imagination as equivalent in this passage.  
Even between the two statements of  the maxim, the formulation in terms of  imagination is 
decidedly clearer.  This equivalence is just the sort of  thing we need to see why Hume would 
reject (1).  To get an intuitive grip on the Humean reply I intend to develop, it will be helpful 
for us to compare the following three questions:
Q1. Can you understand the meaning of  the proposition that there is a 
round square?
Q2. Can you imagine that there is a round square?
Q3. Can you imagine a round square?
My own answers to these questions are “yes”, “no”, and “no” (though I feel more 
strongly about Q3 than Q2).3  Reid and Hume clearly diverge on which question they would 
think relevant for determining whether it is conceivable that there is a round square.  Reid 
would clearly think that it is conceivable in the event that one answers yes to Q1, while 
Hume would clearly think that it is conceivable in the even that one answers yes to Q2 (or 
perhaps Q3).  Contemplation of  the questions seems to reveal that our answers to them may 
come apart.  At this point, one may be tempted to view this as a merely verbal disagreement 
between Reid and Hume.  Surely Reid does not think we can mentally depict a round square, 
and surely Hume means to link possibility with mental depiction.  This, however, is not fair 
to Reid, and it misses the substantive force of  his objection.
There is a worry underlying the objection, and this reply doesn’t address that worry.  
Recall that Reid talks about “understand[ing] distinctly the meaning of  a proposition”, and 
also indicates that the bearers of  possibility and impossibility are “expressed” by 
propositions.  When one describes propositions as expressing things and thinks of  them as 
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possessing meanings, especially during the early modern period, it is indicative that they are 
talking about verbal propositions (i.e. something linguistic like a sentence or an utterance).  
There is additional support in the Essays for taking Reid to use “proposition” for something 
linguistic.4  And, since, on Reid’s view, it is the meanings of  propositions (and not the 
propositions themselves) that are principally identified as bearers of  possibility and 
impossibility, it is natural to think that Reid has something “worldly” like states of  affairs or 
situations in mind as the meanings of  these verbal propositions.  I will use the term 
“circumstance” as a label for the meanings of/things expressed by verbal propositions, and I 
will use the term “sentence” in lieu of  “proposition”.  The circumstances expressed by a 
sentence should be the ones that intuitively conform to their truth conditions.5  This allows 
us to reformulate the objection so as to draw out Reid’s underlying worry about 
understanding sentences that express impossible circumstances.
R1’-1. For any sentence S and circumstance C, if  C is expressed by S, then 
understanding S is sufficient for conceiving C. 
R1’- 2. We understand the sentence “Any two sides of  a triangle are together 
equal to the third”. 
R1’- 3. So, if  conceivability implies possibility, then the circumstance expressed 
by the sentence “Any two sides of  a triangle are together equal to the 
third” is possible.
R1’- 4. The circumstance expressed by the sentence “Any two sides of  a 
triangle are together equal to the third” is not possible.
R1’- 5. So, conceivability does not imply possibility.
On this construal of  the worry, the challenge doesn’t depend on Reid’s definition of  
“conceiving a proposition”, but instead relies on the independent (and plausible) view that 
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understanding a sentence requires us to conceive the circumstance of  its truth.  On this view, 
if  we can’t conceive impossible circumstances, we can’t understand the sentences that 
express them.
Premises (2) and (4) are, in my view, unassailable.  Thus, the response I advocate involves 
denying that Hume is  committed to premise (1).  Given that Hume never systematically 
proposes a theory of  language, it is unsurprising that Hume never explicitly formulates 
something like (1) as a an account of  sentential understanding (or even as an element of  
such an account).  So the real question we need to ask, in order to ascertain whether Hume’s 
system commits him to (1),  is whether there is a viable way to analyze sentential 
understanding that avoids commitment to (1).  If  Hume’s system requires him to adopt (1), 
then, Reid’s objection would provide a serious challenge to the conceivability maxim as Hume 
intends it.  Recall that Hume has coupled the conceivability maxim with a commitment to 
reduce all other cognitive operations to acts of  conception.  This objection thus places 
special pressure on Hume, who needs to account for sentence understanding in terms of  
conception.
Fortunately for Hume, his system does not require him to adopt (1).  Now, according to 
(1), a necessary condition for our being able to understand a sentence is our being able to 
conceive or imagine the circumstance of  its truth.  While this is one way to deploy Humean 
conception in a theory of  sentential understanding, it is hardly the only way.  Consider the 
following alternative proposal for a necessary condition on sentential understanding, inspired 
by the thought that a sentence’s meaning is composed from the meanings of  its parts: 
COMP. For any sentence S, if  S consists of  terms T1 through Tn in 
arrangement A, then, one understands S only if  one conceives the 
meanings of  T1 through Tn and understands arrangement A. 
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For simplicity, I have formulated COMP in a way that assumes every term in a sentence 
is meaningful and COMP does not help us distinguish sentences a speaker understands from 
sentences a speaker is merely in a position to understand.  These details aside, COMP is 
adequate for our present purposes.  Crucially, COMP demonstrates a way to reduce 
sentential understanding to an understanding of  individual terms and grammatical 
structures.  Neither COMP nor (1) is actually a reduction of  sentential understanding to the 
resources of  Hume’s system.  This is because each is simply a necessary condition on 
sentential understanding, rather than a proposed analysis of  it.  However, in order to see 
how COMP can help Hume avoid commitment to (1), we need not go through the process 
of  constructing possible analyses.  COMP is a weaker condition on understanding than (1) 
is.  So, various analyses of  sentential understanding can be weakened by replacing (1) with 
COMP.  In other words, rather than adopting an account of  sentential understanding on 
which we would need to conceive a single thing corresponding to the impossible scenario 
described by the sentence, Hume could offer an account that only requires conceiving (the 
meanings of) the parts of  the sentence, and the sentence’s grammatical structure.6  And, as 
noted, COMP-based views can still reduce sentence understanding to conception, provided 
they offer a conception-based analysis of  term-understanding and arrangement-
understanding. 
This discussion has been abstract so far, but my point is easy to illustrate.  I’ll use the 
example of  a phrase occurring within a sentence, for simplicity.  Let’s consider the phrase 
“round square”.  The phrasal analogue of  COMP would make it a necessary condition on 
being able to understand the phrase “round square” is to understand the term “round”, the 
term “square”, and the structure of  the phrase.  Or, in other words, you have to know what 
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“round” means, what “square” means, and what happens when you put a word like “round” 
in front of  a word like “square”.  It does not require us to conceive a round square.
I certainly don’t mean to defend either of  the toy theory I’ve presented, either on its own 
merits or as a matter of  Hume interpretation.  The point is simply this: Hume’s system is 
compatible with a range of  compositional accounts of  sentential understanding, and such 
accounts are compatible with maintaining the maxim while allowing that we understand 
sentences expressing impossibilities.  Reid’s objection concerns a position about linguistic 
understanding that Hume did not explicitly endorse.  The objection presents a threat to 
Hume, however, because it shows how Hume’s commitments eliminate a plausible and 
straightforward way of  accounting for linguistic understanding.  My reply was to show that 
this was not the only plausible or viable account.
I have not argued in favor of  attributing COMP to Hume as a component of  an account 
of  sentence-understanding or sentence-meaning, largely because Hume does not explicitly 
lay out a theory of  language.7  However, insofar as this objection is based on an inability to 
explain how we can understand sentences representing impossibilities, it should suffice to 
demonstrate that substantive assumptions about the form of  Hume’s theory are required in 
order for the objection to work, and that there are perfectly comprehensible views about 
sentence-understanding that deny those assumptions.
Section 2. Beliefs About Impossibilities
Turning to Reid’s second worry, it again appears to be a straightforward counterexample 
to the maxim:
2. Every proposition, that is necessarily true, stands opposed 
to a contradictory proposition that is impossible; and he that 
conceives one, conceives both: Thus, a man who believes that 
two and three necessarily make five, must believe it to be 
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impossible that two and three should not make five.  He 
conceives both propositions when he believes one.
EIP 4.3, p. 331
On the face of  it, this is simply a way to establish that we conceive some impossibilities 
via a general principle about conceiving contradictory propositions.  Here is how the 
objection goes, on that interpretation.
R2-1. For any proposition P, there is a proposition ~P such that one 
conceives P iff  one conceives ~P.
R2-2. For any proposition P, if  P is necessary, then ~P is impossible.
R2-3. So, if  conceivability implies possibility, we don’t conceive any necessary 
propositions.
R2-4. We do conceive some necessary propositions.
R2-5. So, conceivability does not imply possibility.
Obviously, the same issues surrounding the notion of  propositional conception arise 
here as were already discussed, so I will leave those to one side.  Instead, I will consider what 
Reid says by way of  attributing (1) to Hume:
Every proposition carries its contradictory in its bosom, and 
both are conceived at the same time. “It is confessed, says Mr 
HUME, that in all cases where we dissent from any person, 
we conceive both sides of  the question, but we can believe 
only one.”  From this it certainly follows that when we dissent 
from any person about a necessary proposition, we conceive 
one that is impossible; yet I know no Philosopher who has 
made so much use of  the maxim, that whatever we conceive 
is possible, as Mr HUME. A great part of  his peculiar tenets 
is built upon it; and if  it is true, they must be true. But he did 
not perceive, that in the passage now quoted, the truth of  
which is evident, he contradicts it himself.
EIP 4.3, p. 331-2
This occurs immediately after the objection itself, but the quote from Hume is taken out 
of  context, and omits a particularly salient aspect of  Hume’s claim.  The passage Reid quotes 
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from Hume comes in Treatise 1.3.7 (“Of  the nature of  the idea or belief ”), in a discussion 
of  disagreement/dissent/disbelief.  Here is what Hume says, with the portion I consider 
especially crucial underlined:
Suppose a person present with me, who advances 
propositions, to which I do not assent, that Caesar dy'd in his 
bed, that silver is more fusible than lead, or mercury heavier than gold ; 
‘tis evident, that notwithstanding my incredulity, I clearly 
understand his meaning, and form all the same ideas, which 
he forms. My imagination is endow'd with the same powers 
as his ; nor is it possible for him to conceive any idea, which I 
cannot conceive ; or conjoin any, which I cannot conjoin. I 
therefore ask, Wherein consists the difference betwixt 
believing and disbelieving any proposition? The answer is 
easy with regard to propositions, that are prov'd by intuition 
or demonstration. In that case, the person, who assents, not 
only conceives the ideas according to the proposition, but is 
necessarily determined to conceive them in that particular 
manner, either immediately or by the interposition of  other 
ideas. Whatever is absurd is unintelligible; nor is it possible 
for the imagination to conceive any thing contrary to a 
demonstration. But as in reasonings from causation, and 
concerning matters of  fact, this absolute necessity cannot 
take place, and the imagination is free to conceive both sides 
of  the question, I still ask, Wherein consists the deference betwixt 
incredulity and belief ? since in both cases the conception of  the 
idea is equally possible and requisite.
'Twill not be a satisfactory answer to say, that a person, who 
does not assent to a proposition you advance ; after having 
conceiv'd the object in the same manner with you ; 
immediately conceives it in a different manner, and has 
different ideas of  it. This answer is unsatisfactory ; not 
because it contains any falsehood, but because it discovers 
not all the truth. 'Tis confest, that in all cases, wherein we 
dissent from any person, we conceive both sides of  the 
question ; but as we can believe only one, it evidently follows, 
that the belief  must make some difference betwixt that 
conception to which we assent, and that from which we 
dissent.
T 1.3.7, p. 95-6
One reason I quote this is simply to recognize that Reid is wrong (and unfair) to charge 
Hume with contradicting himself  here.  Without a doubt, Hume’s statement about always 
conceiving “both sides of  the question” is restricted to what Hume terms here “matters of  
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fact” (i.e. propositions that are neither demonstrable nor intuitive).  In fact, Hume is 
appealing to this very difference between demonstrable and non-demonstrable propositions 
to illustrate the need for the account of  belief  he is proposing in this section.  Active dissent
—i.e. denial—is not possible with respect to demonstrable propositions, because the 
imagination is determined to conceive them with conviction.  All that can occur is lack of  
belief  in the demonstrable proposition, not belief  in its denial.  This is related to the fact 
that there is no idea corresponding to the denial of  an intuitive or demonstrable proposition. 
So one can lack the idea appropriate for some necessary claim (perhaps because that idea is 
fairly complex and the person has not gone about constructing it), but one cannot have an 
idea appropriate to the impossible claim.
If  this objection simply amounts to the reasoning outlined in R2, not much more would 
need to be said about it.  However, the objection has much more to it than R2 suggests.  In 
fact, there is something curious about Reid’s objection that does not come out in the R2 
formulation.  The propositions invoked by Reid in his example don’t quite fit the format for 
the objection that I gave above. Or, at least, they make the illustration unnecessarily 
complicated, given the R2 formulation.  R2 could work perfectly well with the claim 2+3=5 
and premise (1).  All that R2 requires is that there is a necessary claim, like 2+3=5, where we 
can conceive that claim. Reid’s example, however, is more interesting than this:
[A] man who believes that two and three necessarily make 
five, must believe it to be impossible that two and three 
should not make five.  He conceives both propositions when 
he believes one.
EIP 4.3, p. 331
Reid’s illustration invokes a pair of  non-contradictory beliefs—in fact the beliefs in 
question are logically equivalent—in order to motivate his objection.  The first is the belief  
that two and three necessarily make five, which I will formalize with ‘(2+3=5)’. The 
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second is the belief  that it is impossible that two and three not make five, which I will 
formalize as ¬"(2+3#5).8  Why invoke these beliefs, when conceiving or believing the claim 
that 2+3=5 is already sufficient (with the first premise of  R2) to present the objection?  
Whether or not Reid intended this feature to play an important role in the objection, there is 
a powerful objection to be raised on the basis of  this pair of  beliefs.  While I am inclined to 
credit Reid with the objection I will now present, the important thing is that Reid’s example 
sentences give rise to an especially interesting objection, if  we reformulate things in a way 
that actually involves beliefs like (2+3=5) and ¬"(2+3#5).
What makes Reid’s example particularly interesting is that these beliefs are judgments 
about necessities and impossibilities.  In other words, in addition to their status as modal 
judgments—judgments predicating necessity and impossibility—they appear to have other 
propositions as constituents.  Importantly, the latter seems to have an impossibility as a 
constituent.  It is natural to think that in order to possess a belief, one must conceive of  all 
the constituents of  that belief  (especially if  one defines belief  as a species of  conception, as 
Hume does).  Let’s consider a more formal presentation of  this version of  the objection.  
Note that, unlike the pair of  arguments presented for the first objection, there is no intended 
correlation between the premises of  this formulation and those of  the original R2 argument.
R2’-1. 2+3#5 is a constituent of  the belief  ¬"(2+3#5).
R2’- 2. For any constituent C of  a given belief  B, if  one possesses B, then one 
also conceives C.
R2’- 3. We possess the belief  ¬"(2+3#5).
R2’- 4 So, if  conceivability implies possibility, then it is possible that 2+3#5.
R2’- 5. It is not the case that it is possible that 2+3#5.
R2’- 6. So, conceivability does not imply possibility.
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Let’s define the constituents of  a belief  as the things one needs to conceive in order to 
possess that belief, and render (2) trivially true.  While for some views, this would run the 
risk of  permitting beliefs that have no constituents, Hume’s definition of  belief  as a species 
of  conception guarantees that every belief  has at least one constituent.  (3) is not a 
promising premise to challenge.  It was no part of  the intention in formalizing the 
description of  the belief  to undermine the intuitive appeal of  the ascription.  And it is 
perfectly natural to say that we believe it to be impossible that two and three not equal five.  
Lastly, given that Hume regards the truths of  arithmetic to be demonstrable and necessary, 
we shouldn’t reject (5).  This leaves the rejection of  premise (1) as the only possible avenue 
of  reply, and (1) seems to be pretty appealing.
Something seems sort of  obvious about (1).  If  the claim 2+3#5 isn’t a constituent of  
the judgment that ¬"(2+3#5), it is hard to know what would be.  It seems like the belief  in 
question attributes impossibility to the claim 2+3#5.  It would thus be pretty natural to think 
that this claim—the very one the judgment is about—is a constituent of  the judgment.  How 
could you have a complete thought about something that you can’t even contemplate by 
itself ?
As compelling as this line of  thought is, the ways to avoid it are clear.  We can either take 
the position that aboutness is not a good guide to constituency or we can deny that the 
thought is really about the claim 2+3#5.  I don’t actually see the two replies as substantively 
different, and think the issue is more about what one wishes to build into their use of  
“aboutness”.  As it is easier to clearly articulate the latter approach, I will simply present that 
one, though it should not be hard to see how to recast the basic idea as a version of  the 
former.
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Even after describing the possible strategies, it remains hard to see how we might go 
about rejecting (1).  Partially, this is because I stacked the deck against myself  in my choice 
of  formalization.  I follow Reid in using a natural language locution that involves treating the 
phrase “it is impossible” as operation on “that two plus three does not make five”.  I even 
reflected this in the formalization I chose, where “2+3#5” occurs as a proper part of  the 
label for the judgment: ¬"(2+3#5).  But, we can observe that there are natural language 
locutions in which the modal occurs in the middle of  the proposition.  The phrasing seems 
tortured for “Two and three can’t not make five” but if  we take some other impossibility, 
such as the claim that two and three make six, we would get “Two and three can’t make six” 
as the analog.  It is less obvious that 2+3=6 is a constituent of  that sentence, but it is also 
plausible that the sentence has the same constituents as “it can’t be that two and three make 
six”.9  
Let me put this point a little bit more graphically (and also in a fashion that is suggestive 
of  the line I will argue on Hume’s behalf  for this sort of  case).  Instead of  this way of  
representing the two claims:
 2+3#5  ¬"(2+3#5)
I could easily have opted for:
 ¬(2+3=5) ¬"¬(2+3=5)
But note that the claim ¬"¬(2+3=5) need not be divided up in a way that produces, as a 
constituent, ¬(2+3=5).  That is, we could split it into the constituent 2+3=5 and the 
constituent ¬"¬.  Since ¬"¬ is equivalent to , we might identify this with the claim that it 
is necessary that two and three make five.  Thought of  this way, 2+3#5 isn’t a constituent of 
the judgment at all, because it is simply the same judgment as the judgment that two and 
three necessarily make five.10  I have not tried to argue that this is an especially plausible 
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view, but that is fine, as the aim of  the discussion is to articulate a workable view, show that it 
is available to Hume, and demonstrate that it would enable Hume to evade Reid’s objection.
However, there are some things that can be said in defense of  the identification, and, at 
the very least, provide additional reasons to think it is a natural view for Hume to adopt, so I 
will briefly discuss some of  them.  The alternative being pressed by Reid is that there are two 
beliefs, which a) are necessarily co-occurrent and b) possess necessarily equivalent contents.  
When I indicated that the major problem for identifying beliefs that have necessarily 
equivalent contents, the easy way to show why it goes wrong was to point out that there are 
beliefs I possess whose content is necessarily equivalent to the contents of  some beliefs that 
I lack.  And since I believe some obvious mathematical truths, but not many really 
complicated mathematical truths, it is pretty easy to see why we would want multiple 
mathematical beliefs, which can be possessed or not independently of  each other.
As a last point on this issue: if  we think about individuating beliefs by independence of  
occurrence, then there is no good reason (by Hume’s lights or by Reid’s) to distinguish these 
two beliefs.  If, on the other hand, we think about individuating by composition, we need to 
either have an antecedent understanding of  their respective compositions, or, barring that, 
an account of  how to recover the composition of  a mental state from the grammatical 
composition of  a phrase like “the belief  that [X]”.  For Hume at least, we know that the 
relationship between linguistic and mental composition is not one of  straightforward 
parallelism, and so, absent a specific account of  the relationship, we cannot assume the two 
states will differ compositionally.
It is important to highlight this point, as much of  the pessimism surrounding Hume’s 
views on the mind result from objections that assume a sort of  parallelism between the 
structure of  linguistic expressions or descriptions of  mental activity, and the structure of  the 
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mental activity itself.  But Hume’s system simply does not aim to capture this parallel, and 
the assumption is not explicitly argued for, when Hume is under attack.  For example, 
Hume’s denial of  an independent idea of  existence leads him to adopt a reistic/objectual 
account of  existential beliefs.  As a consequence of  this, even though assertive sentences 
expressing beliefs require a term like “exists” as a predicate, the belief  expressed need not 
have a parallel structure.  The mental state that makes an utterance of  “Fido exists” sincere 
does not feature structural complexity in which the idea of  existence is affirmed of  the idea 
of  Fido.  Similarly, the fact that a mental state is aptly described by the phrase “the belief  
that Fido exists” does not entail that that mental state has a constituent corresponding to 
Fido and a constituent corresponding to existence.   Hume has a thoroughgoing denial of  
such structural parallelisms, and as we see here, this is to his distinct advantage, give his other 
views.
Once we buck the assumption of  such a parallelism, we can see that many of  the 
objections to Hume’s theory of  the understanding are, at best, concerns about the use of  his 
theory of  mind to account for the workings of  language.  As Hume did not tell us his 
precise views on how language works, it is imperative that we separate concerns that depend 
on natural or plausible assumptions of  how to connect the psychological with the linguistic 
from genuinely problematic consequences of  Hume’s view of  the understanding.
Section 3. The Nature of  Modal Judgment For Hume
One issue that has been raised by this discussion, but not discussed, is a positive story 
about the composition of  modal judgments, and in particular, a question about what the 
modal components of  these judgments are.  In the previous section, I argued against the 
proposal that the belief  that it is impossible that 2 and 3 not equal 5 is built from the 
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conception of  impossibility and the conception of  2 and 3 not equalling 5.  My concern, 
however, was to argue that the conception of  2 and 3 not equalling 5 wasn’t a component of  
the judgment.  But, even if  we agree that the components of  the judgment are better 
reflected by describing it as the judgment that it is necessary that 2 and 3 equal 5 (as per the 
proposal above) we are still left without an account of  the modal elements of  the judgments; 
the conceptions of  necessity and of  possibility.  In this section of  the chapter, I intend to 
present and defend a Humean account of  modal contents.  First, however, I should rule out 
some views of  modal contents, which are unavailable to Hume.
Recalling the lessons drawn out in the previous chapter, the ideal way to account for 
belief  in the possibility of  some object, prima facie, would be to treat it as involving the same 
activity as ordinary belief  in that object, while differing from such a belief  in its content.  
The task then would be to extend our account of  relations among contents in a manner that 
captures the relationship among believing in o, believing in the possibility of  o, believing in 
the possibility of  the opposite of  o, etc.  The reason I qualify the preference for such an 
account as merely “prima facie” is because, before we can use the results of  the previous 
chapter to rule out accounts that treat the two states as different activities towards the same 
content, we would need to establish that the challenges for multiple-activity accounts of  
denial actually generalize to multiple activity accounts of  modality.  
Let’s begin our investigation of  Hume’s views with a now-familiar passage, in which 
Hume describes the relationship between imagining a golden mountain and believing a 
golden mountain to be possible:
‘Tis an establish’d maxim in metaphysics, That whatever the mind 
clearly conceives includes the idea of  possible existence, or in other 
words, that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. We can form 
the idea of  a golden mountain, and from thence conclude 
that such a mountain may actually exist. We can form no idea 
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of  a mountain without a valley, and therefore regard it as 
impossible.
T 1.2.2., p. 32
At one end of  the process Hume describes, there is the act of  conceiving a golden 
mountain.  At the other end, there is the act of  believing a golden mountain to be possible.  
There are four different positions one could take on the relationship between the contents of 
these two states.  Only one of  the four options — option (3) — runs afoul of  our prima facie 
preference for distinguishing the contents of  the two acts, while the other three all 
distinguish the contents:
1.  The content of  the former act is a proper part of  the content of  the 
latter (i.e. the idea of  a golden mountain is a proper part of  the idea of  
the possibility of  a golden mountain).
2.  The content of  the latter act is a proper part of  the content of  the 
former (i.e. the idea of  the possibility of  a golden mountain is a proper 
part of  the idea of  a golden mountain).  
3. The contents of  the two acts are identical (i.e. the idea of  a golden 
mountain and the idea of  its possibility are parts of  each other).
4. The contents of  the two acts are compositionally distinct, but the two 
contents are still a priori related (i.e. neither the idea of  a golden 
mountain nor the idea of  its possibility is part of  the other). 
Option (1), though appealing from a contemporary perspective, is at odds with Hume’s 
passage. Hume’s formulation of  the maxim suggests that the latter idea—the idea of  the 
possibility of  a golden mountain—is included in the former—the idea of  a golden 
mountain.  This is not to say that the statement of  the maxim requires us to go along with 
option (2), as Hume’s talk of  inclusion need not be interpreted as a straightforward 
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commitment regarding parthood.  That is to say, the problem for option (1) is not that 
Hume takes a clear stand on the parthood here, but, rather, that option (1) commits one to 
the whole being included in one of  its proper parts.  So, while option (1) is philosophically 
promising (after all, it mirrors one fairly popular contemporary approach), I am rejecting it 
as a viable interpretation of  Hume.
Option (2), on the other hand, is a natural fit with Hume’s statement of  the position, but 
presents a philosophical problem for Hume:  Let “GM” designate the idea of  a golden 
mountain, and let “"GM” designate the idea of  the possibility of  a golden mountain.  
According to option (2), "GM is a proper part of  GM, and so, GM is complex, and, 
therefore, it is constructed from "GM and some other idea X (or, perhaps, some set of  ideas 
{X1,...,Xn}).  But, there is no good answer to the question of  what idea(s) could be 
combined with "GM to produce GM.  The main aspects of  this worry that I will discuss are 
the difficulty in accounting for the origins of  some such X, and the implausibility of  there 
having been an act of  construction in which "GM and X could be combined to produce 
GM.11
The two problems are tightly connected.  On option (2), for any object o, the idea of  o 
has to be composed from the idea of  the possibility of  o, "o, and some additional idea, Xo.  
However, this would mean that for any object o, the idea of  o was constructed out of  
temporally prior ideas — "o and Xo.  This means that "o must have been acquired prior to 
the idea of  o.  But, this means that "o either is, or is constructed from, simple ideas of  
sensation.  If  it is a simple idea of  sensation, then it need not be inferred, and cannot be an 
instance of  demonstrative knowledge.  However, since, we can conclude that a golden 
mountain is possible solely from the idea of  a golden mountain, it is clear that this inference 
is demonstrative, being one that “depend[s] entirely on the ideas that we compare 
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together” (T 1.3.1, p. 69).12  However, the view is problematic even if  we regard "o as 
constructed from simple ideas of  sensation.  The problem with this route is that it would 
require us to say that "o is itself  an idea of  an object, since “any idea we please to form is the 
idea of  a being, and the idea of  a being is any idea we please to form” (T 1.2.6, p. 67).  And, 
this would mean that it includes an idea of  its possibility, meaning that our ideas of  objects 
would be infinitely divisible.  Option (2), then, would make every complex idea infinitely 
divisible, something that Hume explicitly denies (see T 1.2.1), as well as being a 
philosophically problematic infinite regress.
Option (3) identifies the idea of  an object with the idea of  the possibility of  that object, 
and, setting aside worries that such a view faces similar philosophical problems as the ones 
facing a Act-Contrary view of  denial, it is worth noting that this view is textually problematic 
as well.  First, note that there are two ways of  pursuing this view.  One way to go is to 
identify the state of  conceiving some object with the state of  believing that object to be 
possible.  The other way to go is to treat the belief  in its possibility as a distinct species of  
conceiving the object, different from both mere conception and existential belief. 
The problem facing the former option is that the process we were investigating is some 
sort of  inference.  But if  the beginning state and ending state are identical, then, the 
“process” could, at best, qualify as some sort of  degenerate case of  inference.  Note that, 
this option produces a broad class of  inferences involving only a single idea, contrary to 
Hume’s claims about the minimum number of  ideas required for inference (T 1.3.7, p. 
96-7fn).13
There is a slightly different challenge facing the latter way of  approaching option (3).  If  
the transition is from the mere conception of  the idea to a specific way of  conceiving that 
idea, then, given Hume’s limited resources for distinguishing among species of  conception, 
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the species in question will have to either be weaker or stronger than mere conception.  It 
cannot be weaker, both because judgment is marked, in general, by superior vivacity, as well 
as because it is hard to see how mere conception could require more strength than any other 
species of  conception.  However, it cannot be stronger, given the inference we are modeling.  
On the inference, we move directly from the state of  conception to the state of  judgment 
regarding possibility.  However, the mere conception of  an idea of  an object is not the sort 
of  thing that can augment its own force and vivacity.14
What’s more, both options involve retreating from the appealing division of  labor on 
which a state’s content is determined by its ideational composition and a state’s type is 
determined by its attendant force and vivacity.  
We are left, then, with option (4), according to which the idea of  the possibility of  some 
object is distinct from the idea of  that object, but some a priori relationship remains 
between them.  In pursuing this option, it will help to observe that there is a potential 
ambiguity in what inference is really going on.  The passage seems to suggest that we move 
directly from imagining an object to judging the object to be possible.  However, the stated 
maxim is that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible, which is equivalent to the claim 
that anything we imagine is possible, and which, for purposes of  argument, requires a 
premise like “we imagine o” (or, more likely for an individual person: “I imagine o”).  In 
other words, if  the maxim is invoked in the inference, we need to do more than simply 
imagine o, we need to also recognize that we imagine o.  Otherwise, we are not in a position 
to recognize the applicability of  the maxim.
Now, it is possible that this is an actual ambiguity in the text, remaining indecisive 
between i) a direct transition from a state of  conceiving o to a state of  judging that o is 
possible, and ii) a transition that, because it invokes the principle “if  o is conceivable, then o 
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is possible” (or something like it), requires some intermediate state of  judging o to be 
conceivable.  Alternately, if  judging o to be conceivable is identified either with conceiving o, 
or with judging o to be possible, we would avoid the need to posit any such ambiguity.
While the former may have some textual appeal (given some of  Hume’s remarks on our 
awareness of  our own mental lives), it runs into the problem of  permitting low-vivacity 
judgments.  The more interesting option here, is the latter: judging o to be conceivable just is 
judging o to be possible.  However, I think we can do more than an argument by elimination 
by way of  defending option (4).
Conclusion
The view in question is an implication of  other views Hume has, and so I should first 
present and defend the general argumentative strategy that I will employ in drawing out 
these implications:  Hume’s view that something is conceivable if  and only if  it is possible, 
when combined with his view that things are distinct if  and only if  they are separable in 
imagination, produces extremely strong commitments for Hume.  Specifically, for any F and 
any G, if  it is necessary that something is F if  and only if  it is G, it will follow for Hume that 
the judgment that something is F is identical to the judgment that it is G.
Here’s how this result is achieved:  suppose F and G are necessarily coextensive.  For this 
to be true, it must be the case that there is no possible circumstance in which something is F 
but not G (or vice versa), just from the definition of  necessary co-extension.  But, given that 
something is conceivable if  and only if  it is possible, this would mean that one could not 
conceive of  a situation in which something is F but not G (or vice versa).  But if  it is 
impossible to conceive of  something’s being F but not G (or vice versa), then the 
conception of  something as F and the conception of  it as G are not separable in 
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imagination.  If  they are not separable in imagination, then they are not distinct.  But if  the 
conception that something is F is not distinct from the conception that it is G, then the 
judgment that something is F is not distinct from the judgment that it is G.  So, the 
judgments are identical.15  What do these result tells us about the composition of  modal 
judgments in Hume’s system?
To begin with necessity, we know that Hume thinks we can divide relations into two 
types (outlined in T 1.3.1.1): those that  depend entirely upon the ideas under comparison, 
and those that can be changed without any change in the ideas.  All intuitable or 
demonstrable contents (and therefore all necessities) fall under the former class.  
Consequently, the judgment that something is necessary must be the same as the judgment 
that it is a relation of  ideas depending entirely on the ideas compared, since being necessary 
and being a relation of  ideas depending entirely on the ideas compared are necessarily co-
extensive.
Turning our attention to possibility, we know that it is necessarily coextensive with 
conceivability.  Since, necessarily, a content is conceivable if  and only if  it is possible, we 
know that the judgment that something is possible must be the same judgment as the 
judgment that something is conceivable.
For both of  these cases note that we have secured the identity of  the modal judgment 
(i.e. the judgment of  necessity or possibility) with a judgment about conceptions/ideas.  If  
Hume had an explicit account of  what it is to think about our ideas, this would, essentially, 
determine Hume’s account of  modal thought.
Interestingly, Hume does have an explicit account of  what it is to think about our ideas.  
Immediately after discussing the missing shade of  blue as a counterexample to the copy 
principle, Hume tells us:
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But besides this exception, it may not be amiss to remark on 
this head, that the principle of  the priority of  impressions to 
ideas must be understood with another limitation, viz. that as 
our ideas are the images of  impressions, so we can form 
secondary ideas, which are images of  the primary; as appears 
from this very reasoning concerning them.  This is not, 
properly speaking, an exception to the rule so much as an 
explanation of  it.  Ideas produce the images of  themselves in 
new ideas; but as the first ideas are supposed to be derived 
from impressions, it still remains true that all our simple ideas 
proceed either mediately or immediately, from their 
correspondent impressions.
T 1.1.1, p. 6-7 
As the underlined portion of  the passage makes clear, the fact that we can reason 
concerning ideas shows that we have ideas of  ideas.  This is consonant with Hume’s general 
guideline for the content of  thought: to conceive of  X is to possess an idea of  X.  So, to 
think about the idea of  red is to possess an idea of  the idea of  red.  And these are the ideas 
Hume is here discussing.  Crucially, Hume ends the passage by telling us that all our simple 
ideas “proceed either mediately or immediately” from impressions.  Which simple ideas are 
the ones that proceed indirectly from impressions?  Secondary ideas of  simple impressions.  
This means that some secondary ideas of  sensation (e.g. the idea of  the idea of  red) are 
simple.  Nevertheless, they bear a clear resemblance to the primary ideas that they are ideas 
of, and to the impressions that they are indirectly copied from.
Hume does not seem to ever mention secondary ideas again in the Treatise.  This is 
unfortunately limiting for us in generating a full-fledged story about higher-order thought in 
Hume.  Additionally, we are faced with interesting questions about the status of  these 
secondary ideas.  For instance, should we judge that necessarily, a golden mountain is 
possible?  It is difficult to know precisely what to say, given the paucity of  the textual 
evidence.  At the same time, it seems clear that Hume’s principles commit him to a certain 
type of  account of  modal contents, namely one involving secondary ideas.  I will not 
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endeavor to extrapolate a full account of  higher-order thought and modal judgment, as 
doing so would require us to stray far afield of  clear-cut interpretive questions for Hume’s 
system.
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CHAPTER 4 ENDNOTES
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1 This is stated most clearly in a footnote (T 1.3.7, p. 96-7fn) where Hume rejects the traditional analyses of  
conception, judgment, and reasoning—the three operations of  the understanding—claiming that “taking them 
in a proper light, they all resolve themselves into the first, and are nothing but particular ways of  conceiving 
our objects.
2 Reid’s example is ill-chosen, as Hume’s position on the status of  the theorems of  standard Euclidian 
geometry is complex.  It is clear, at least, that according to his views in the Treatise, the certainty attainable in 
geometry is distinctively inferior to that for arithmetic (T 1.3.1, p. 70-71).  However, as the use of  geometry 
(rather than arithmetic) is entirely inessential to Reid’s objection and my reply, I will simply ignore this 
complication.
3 It is worth noting that Hume’s examples in the quoted passage are presented in a reistic or objectual manner, 
rather than in a predicative or propositional manner.  At the same time, Hume also deploys the principle with 
respect to propositional constructions, so the importance of  this point should not be overstated.
4 See EIP, p. 25, 65-6 for two among many instances of  Reid’s explicit use of  “proposition” to stand for 
something linguistic.
5 I am aware of  a variety of  issues concerning the formulation of  this argument (such as the domain of  the 
quantifiers, issues of  whether or not non-existent/impossible states of  affairs can stand in relations, etc.).  I am 
skirting these issues for simplicity and clarity. 
6 This strategy is similar to one endorsed in Casullo [1979].  With one major and one minor caveat, I can say 
that I agree with Casullo’s position in that work.  The minor caveat is that there are a number of  minute 
(perhaps terminological) differences between Casullo’s view and mine regarding the objections which he takes 
to fail.  The major caveat is that Casullo thinks one of  the objections succeeds and recommends a restricted or 
weakened version of  the maxim.  It would not be fruitful to put our positions side-by-side for comparison 
here, but the major divergence is that I do not believe that any of  Reid’s objections succeed against Hume’s 
maxim.
7 For an interpretation of  Hume’s views on language that is more ambitious, while remaining textually 
grounded, see Ott [2006]. 
8 The convention chosen here—representing possibility and necessity as operators—was somewhat arbitrary, 
but nothing in the discussion turns on the decision.  The only substantive alternative to treating necessity and 
possibility as something like propositional operators would be to deny that necessity and possibility modify the 
proposition, which, as we will see, is incompatible with the reconstructed objection.
9 With the usual caveats about anachronism: the point I make here is essentially akin to linking constituency to 
something like a sentence’s deep structure or a proposition’s logical form.  The point really just requires that we 
regard as comprehensible the view that “It can’t be that o is F” and “o can’t be F” are genuinely synonymous. 
10 This view requires there not to be any cases in which someone has one belief  but lacks the other, but does 
not require the (less plausible) view that any time a pair of  beliefs have equivalent contents, they are identical.  
This is fortunate as it means we can think that one believes some, but not all, the truths of  arithmetic.  Further, 
it is clear that Hume does not endorse that principle of  belief  individuation, since he thinks beliefs are 
individuated from each other by their ideational compositions (which permits the belief  1+1=2 to differ from 
the belief  4*4=16).
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11 I will not discuss the related semantic worry, which concerns the question of  what X could possibly be an idea 
of.  This worry is an interesting parallel to one raised by David Lewis in On the Plurality of  Worlds (p. 172-4).  
There, Lewis introduces the notion of  vim as a place-holder for an account of  what distinguishes the actual 
world from merely possible ones on the pictorial ersatzer picture.  On option (2), because of  the mysterious X 
idea, Hume winds up facing ideational analogues of  the worries Lewis raises for vim.
12 Hume sometimes distinguishes the realm of  knowledge-producing reasoning into “demonstrative” and 
“intuitive”.  Since Hume does not provide a convenient label for the broader category which includes both 
demonstrative and intuitive reasoning, and since it is often a useful category to discuss, I will generally use 
“demonstrative” as a blanket term for both, and will indicate any time I intend to be talking about Hume’s 
distinction between the demonstrative and the intuitive. 
13 The context of  this footnote is that Hume, because he denies that judgment always requires two ideas, in 
turn denies that all inference requires three or more.  Strictly speaking, this objection also applies to the latter 
approach for option (3), but the point is sharper for this approach.
14 That we cannot voluntarily augment the force and vivacity of  our own ideas come through most clearly in 
the discussion of  how ideas are enlivened through habituation of  causal inference (T 1.3.6-8), and reinforced 
by the rejection of  a certain account of  belief  because of  its consequence that, on that account, we could 
believe at will (see Appendix, 623-4, 628-9)
15 I have used a case in which it the full story would also involve the theory of  abstraction, and I have not 
discussed the potential for Hume to salvage something of  the apparent distinction between the two judgments 
by appeal to distinctions of  reason.  Both topics are interesting, but somewhat tangential to our present 
investigation.
CHAPTER 5: CONCEIVABILITY AND POSSIBILITY (II)
Introduction
As we saw in the previous chapter, David Hume endorsed the thesis that conceivability 
implies possibility, and, in his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of  Man, Thomas Reid contested 
it.  Reid’s first two objections concerned linguistic understanding and judgments of  impossibility.  In 
reply to the former, I argued that the challenge only succeeds if  we attribute to Hume a 
substantive view on the nature of  linguistic understanding, one for which there is no textual 
support.  
In reply to the latter, I argued that Hume can evade the objection by denying the “mirror 
thesis”, i.e. the thesis that the grammatical constituents of  a sentence expressing (or 
describing) a given belief  straightforwardly reflect the conceptual constituents of  that belief.  
Reid has an additional pair of  worries, both of  which focus on mathematical reasoning.  The 
first of  these is the objection that adopting the maxim incorrectly legitimates the practice of  
proof  by imagination, while the latter of  these is the objection that adopting the maxim 
regards as illegitimate (and, indeed, impossible) the practice of  proof  by reductio.  
Reid maintains that these are serious problems for proponents of  the view that 
conceivability implies possibility, as i) proof  by imagination is not accepted mathematical 
practice, and ii) proof  by reductio is.  These challenges have a special force against Hume, 
who is committed to analyzing all activities of  the understanding in terms of  conception, 
and who relies heavily on the maxim of  conceivability.  In this chapter, I show how Hume 
can address these concerns and, in the process, I explicate some foundational elements of  
Hume’s account of  demonstrative/intuitive reasoning.
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Section 1. Mathematical Reasoning and Proof  By Imagination
Let’s begin by looking at Thomas Reid’s statement of  his third objection to the maxim of 
conceivability:
3.  Mathematicians have, in many cases, proved some things 
to be possible, and others to be impossible; which, without 
demonstration, would not have been believed: Yet I have 
never found, that any Mathematician has attempted to prove 
a thing to be possible, because it can be conceived; or 
impossible, because it cannot be conceived. Why is not this 
maxim applied to determine whether it is possible to square 
the circle? a point about which very eminent mathematicians 
have differed.  It is easy to conceive, that in the infinite series 
of  numbers, and intermediate fractions, some one number, 
integral or fractional, may bear the same ratio to another, as 
the side of  a square bears to its diagonal; yet, however 
conceivable this may be, it may be demonstrated to be 
impossible.
EIP, 4.3, p. 332
On one way of  reading this objection, the complaint is simply that the maxim of  
conceivability entails that certain mathematical falsehoods are true:
R1-1. We can conceive that the ratio of  the side of  a square to its diagonal is 
a rational number.
R1-2. So, if  conceivability implies possibility, then it is possible that the ratio 
of  the side of  a square to its diagonal is a rational number.
R1-3. It is not possible that the ratio of  the side of  a square to its diagonal is 
a rational number.
R1-4. So, conceivability does not imply possibility.
Understood this way, the objection appears strikingly similar to the first objection we saw 
from Reid to this principle.1  In fact, whereas the first objection used the notion of  
understanding a proposition to support the premise which claims, of  a mathematical 
impossibility, that we can conceive it, this way of  understanding the present objection 
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involves a bald assertion, about some impossibility, that we can conceive it.  Hume’s position 
would simply be to reject premise (1).  One complication arising in this particular case is 
that, in the Treatise, Hume’s stance on geometry is nuanced (a fact I have alluded to in 
previous chapters).  In short, Hume is, at times, willing to substantively challenge widely 
accepted views in geometry.  This renders things a bit less clear for an objection like the one 
we have here, but need not interfere with our investigation of  Reid’s objection.  Reid’s 
objection would work just as well with an example like conceiving that there is a greatest 
prime number.  So, rather than explore the details of  Hume’s geometric views here, we can 
simply consider the argument with an arithmetic (rather than geometric) example.  With 
examples of  clear-cut arithmetic impossibilities, Hume would simply reject the first premise.  
For Hume, to conceive that there is a greatest prime, for example, or that there is an even 
prime other than two, one must actually conceive of  a number that possesses the feature in 
question.  To conceive that there is an even prime other than two, one must conceive of  a 
prime number that is both even as well as distinct from two.  Despite Reid’s claim to possess 
such a conception, Hume doesn’t allow for it, and would thus deny (the analog of) the first 
premise.
There are two things to note here.  First, this is an unsurprising reply, insofar as one who 
wishes to maintain the maxim of  conceivability, when faced with such challenges, will 
typically claim that we are not able to conceive the impossibility under discussion.  The 
second thing to note is that, insofar as this way of  taking the argument renders it a weaker 
version of  the first objection, there is some reason to think that a better objection is 
intended than the one reproduced above.
When we consider the quote, it is apparent that the challenge is about the relationship of 
the maxim to mathematical practice, and should not be taken as simply a disagreement about 
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the possibility of  certain particular conceptions.  Understood this way, the objection runs 
something more like the following:
R1’-1. Proof  by imagination is not legitimate in mathematics.
R1’-2. If  conceivability implies possibility, then proof  by imagination would 
be legitimate in mathematics.
R1’-3. So, conceivability does not imply possibility.
Note that, as Hume talks about the maxim, it is clear that he would be committed to (2):
‘Tis an establish’d maxim in metaphysics, That whatever the mind 
clearly conceives includes the idea of  possible existence, or in other 
words, that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. We can form 
the idea of  a golden mountain, and from thence conclude 
that such a mountain may actually exist. We can form no idea 
of  a mountain without a valley, and therefore regard it as 
impossible.
T 1.2.2., p. 32
Whatever specific inferential process Hume has in mind here, it is clear that he thinks, 
somehow, our conceiving of  a golden mountain licenses us in concluding that a golden 
mountain may exist.  Or, in other words, that Hume accepts some inference rule of  the sort 
that Reid is worried about, in relation to premise (2).  This version of  the objection is much 
stronger than the previous version, particularly given that Hume clearly endorses the second 
premise.  So, if  Hume is to evade the worry, then he had better be able to deny the first 
premise.  But, it is hard to see room for Hume to argue that mathematicians actually do 
reason in that way.
One could try to wriggle out of  this position, by noting that Hume could defend the 
mathematical legitimacy of  the practice without having to defend the view that 
mathematicians do, in fact, employ it.  However, I think Hume is clearly on more solid 
ground if  he could feasibly attribute this process of  reasoning to the mathematicians.  
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Fortunately, there is good reason to think such an attribution would be feasible, despite the 
appearance of  mathematical illegitimacy.
In order to see how it could be feasible to attribute such a process to mathematicians, it 
will be helpful to examine what the practice really amounts to.  To take an especially simple 
example; suppose that I have, before my mind, a group of  20 discrete elements.  For me to 
conceive that this group is divisible by five without remainder is for me conceive of  these 
elements being apportioned into groups of  five, with no elements left over.  In doing this, I 
wind up conceiving of  four groups of  five elements each.  Thus, the bar for conceiving a 
substantive mathematical claim, such as that 20 is divisible by 5, is somewhat higher than we 
might have expected.  It requires me to imagine 20 things being divided into five-element 
groupings.  This is very much like a mental version of  a constructive mathematical proof.  
To prove that 20 is divisible by five, one must actually come up with a division of  20 things 
into four groups of  five elements each.  This helps us secure one crucial feature of  the 
procedure: it won’t license willy-nilly proofs of  the sort Reid is concerned about.  In order to 
conceive Reid’s example; that in the infinite series of  numbers, there is an integer ratio 
between the side of  a square and it’s diagonal, one would need to conceive of  a square with 
side length l, and diagonal length d, and some rational number x such that x*l = d.
There is no such rational number, however, and so, no one can imagine that rational 
number.  The pythagorean theorem guarantees that for any right triangle, the length of  the 
hypotenuse squared is equal to the sum of  the squares of  the other sides.  For the case at 
hand, this would mean that l squared plus l squared equals d squared.  This fixes an irrational 
relationship between l and d (as can be seen by considering the case where l equals 1, which 
results in d being the square root of  2).2
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This ties in to something I said above: on Hume’s view, to imagine that there is a prime 
number other than two, one needs to have a prime number other than two that is being 
imagined.  But, since there is no such number, and one cannot combine ideas to produce a 
depiction of  such a number, one cannot imagine it.  If  the relevant mathematical laws 
constrain our ability to compose ideas, then to form the idea [some number satisfying 
mathematical description D] is a legitimate proof  that description D is legitimately satisfied.
It seems as though a mathematician would permit things like mentally dividing twenty 
into four groups of  five as a sort of  proof  that twenty is divisible by five.  Reid might come 
back, however, that this is not a very common mathematical technique, and that 
mathematicians more frequently carry out their proofs with pencil and paper calculations 
than with mental manipulations of  this sort.  On this point, however, there is already an 
adequate reply in Hume’s own words:
I observe that when we mention any great number, such as a 
thousand, the mind generally has no adequate idea of  it, but 
only a power of  producing such an idea, by its adequate idea 
of  the decimals, under which the number is comprehended. 
This imperfection, however, in our ideas, is never felt in our 
reasonings ; which seems to be an instance parallel to the 
present one of  universal ideas.
T 1.1.7, p. 22
From Hume’s perspective, it is obvious that, though these sorts of  concrete arithmetic 
imaginings are the foundation of  our mathematical reasoning, the artifice of  decimal 
representation is more commonly used, given how much more convenient it is (especially 
when it comes to larger numbers that the mind would have difficulty keeping track of  and 
manipulating).
In my view, these considerations are sufficient to answer Reid’s challenge.  While it is 
true that a mathematician would not accept another mathematician’s claim to have done the 
work in their head, and to have seen the truth of  some mathematical claim at face value, this 
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is true of  any reasoning process that can be carried out within one’s own mind, whether 
axiomatic deduction, proof  by cases, etc.  Thus, the test for whether it is an acceptable 
method of  proof, for mathematicians, is simply whether such proofs are accepted when one 
‘shows their work’.  In the case of  axiomatic deduction, showing ones work involves laying 
out the deduction in numbered steps according to certain rules.  For the case of  the sort of  
proofs by imagination under discussion, showing one’s work would amount to producing the 
relevant images or diagrams which correspond to the mental images used in the relevant acts 
of  imagination.  Perhaps simply drawing twenty dots in four rows of  five would suffice.  
And, presumably, such a demonstration of  the claim that twenty is evenly divisible by five 
would be straightforwardly accepted by mathematicians.
Of  course, with Reid’s approach to thinking about conceivability, one need not form a 
mental picture of  the relevant state of  affairs in order to conceive it. And thus, the fact that 
one cannot mentally picture twenty-one units being divided into groups of  five without 
remainder would not prevent it from being the case that one can conceive of  twenty-one as 
being divisible by five without remainder.  So, we can see why Reid is unable to endorse 
proofs by conception; at the same time, there is nothing about Hume’s take on conceivability 
that would license any problematic conclusions (in mathematics) from allowing them.  So, if  
we take Hume’s principle on the terms that Hume offers it, Reid’s challenge does not present 
any problems for Hume.
Section 2. Mathematical Reasoning and Proof  By Reductio
I think that the next objection is the most significant of  Reid’s objections for Hume to 
address.  The objection is that there is an important (perhaps essential) mathematical 
practice, i.e. reasoning by reductio ad absurdum, which Hume’s theory precludes.  The objection 
is weighty in several regards.  First, such proofs are taken to be legitimate, and Hume’s 
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theory appears unable to legitimate them.  Second, such proofs are performed, legitimacy 
aside, but Hume’s theory appears unable to countenance them.  Third, Hume himself  
employs this mode of  reasoning, meaning that he tacitly acknowledges their possibility and 
legitimacy.  Here is how Reid presents the worry:
4.  Mathematicians often require us to conceive things that 
are impossible, in order to prove them to be so. This is the 
case in all their demonstrations, ad absurdum, Conceive, says 
EUCLID, a right line drawn from one point of  the 
circumference of  a circle to another, to fall without the circle; 
I conceive this, I reason from it, until I come to a 
consequence that is manifestly absurd; and from thence 
conclude that the thing which I conceived is impossible.
EIP 4.3, p. 332
Reid’s statement frames this in terms of  the first of  the three sources of  worry 
enumerated above, but nothing crucial hangs on this. Put more formally, I take Reid’s 
objection to be this:
R2-1. If  one can prove, by reductio ad absurdum, that it is impossible for a line 
connecting two points on the circumference of  a circle to fall outside 
the circle, then one can conceive that a line connecting two points on 
the circumference of  a circle falls outside the circle.
R2-2. So, if  conceivability implies possibility, then one cannot prove, by 
reductio ad absurdum, that it is impossible for a line connecting two points 
on the circumference of  a circle to fall outside the circle.
R2-3. One can prove, by reductio ad absurdum, that is is impossible for a line 
connecting two points on the circumference of  a circle to fall outside 
the circle.
R2-4. So, conceivability does not imply possibility.
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Reid regards premise (1) as a consequence of  the correct account of  proof  by reductio ad 
absurdum, and, taking “prove” as factive, we can see that premise (2) follows from premise 
(1), insofar as proving P impossible by reductio involves conceiving of  P.  Premise (3) is the 
substantive premise based on mathematical practice, and from these, the conclusion follows.  
The fact that much progress has been made in mathematics on the basis of  reductio 
arguments is ground for accepting a general principle about reductio arguments that would 
license us to accept (3).3  So, insofar as Hume has a plausible way out of  this argument, he 
would be committed to challenging Reid’s account of  what is involved in a reductio.
So, turning our attention to back to premise (1), it is worth noting that, on Reid’s 
description of  the procedure for carrying out a reductio, the first step just is to conceive the 
proposition one aims to disprove.  This is odd, however, as, normally, we think of  the first 
step in a reductio as assuming or supposing that proposition.  Thus, one might be tempted to 
deny (1), on the grounds that Reid is simply confused about the procedure for reductio 
arguments.
Despite this appearance, I do not think Reid is making this mistake here.  Later in the 
Essays, Reid explicitly reiterates this objection when discussing Hobbes, Berkeley and Hume’s 
arguments against abstract ideas, clearly acknowledging the role of  supposition in reductio 
arguments, and revealing his basis for accepting (1):
As to the principle here assumed [by those arguing for 
nominalism about universals], that nothing of  which we can 
form a clear and distinct idea is absurd or impossible, I refer 
to what was said upon it, chap. 3. Essay 4. It is evident, that in 
every mathematical demonstration, ad absurdum, of  which 
kind almost one half  of  mathematics consists, we are 
required to suppose, and consequently to conceive a thing 
that is impossible. From that supposition we reason, until we 
come to a conclusion that is not only impossible but absurd. 
From this we infer, that the proposition supposed at first is 
impossible, and therefore that its contradictory is true.
EIP 5.6, p. 401-2 
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Reid’s basis for accepting (1), then, is that the first step in the reductio is to suppose the 
proposition to be disproved, and that supposing a proposition involves conceiving it.  Reid 
takes conception (sometimes called ‘simple apprehension’) to be an ingredient in all other 
mental operations.4  But, we cannot simply charge Reid with importing his own assumptions 
about the architecture of  the mind, at least insofar as he is objecting to Hume, as Hume 
appears to go in for a relevantly analogous commitment:
What we may in general affirm concerning these three acts of 
the understanding [i.e. conception, judgment, and reasoning] is, that 
taking them in a proper light, they all resolve themselves into 
the first, and are nothing but particular ways of  conceiving 
our objects. 
T 1.3.7, 96-7fn
As we saw in the first chapter, Hume takes this commitment seriously and it plays a 
major role in determining his analysis of  judgment/belief.  So, it appears that Hume is 
committed to analyzing acts of  reasoning—such as the act of  supposing—as a way of  
conceiving.  This means that Reid’s objection can be recast to avoid some of  these worries, 
and clarify what is at stake.  The objection starts with these two commitments of  Hume’s:  
HS. For any content C, to suppose C is to conceive C in some particular 
way.
HM. For any content C, if  C is conceivable, then C is possible.
However, from HS and HM, we can derive this:
HI. For any content C, if  C is impossible, then C is not supposable.
HM clearly entails that if  C is impossible, then it is inconceivable.  And, if  C cannot be 
conceived, then C cannot be conceived in the particular way that constitutes supposition 
(whatever that is).  It may be helpful to give an illustration of  how this derivation goes in a 
126
slightly different case.  The following principles about singing seem sufficiently plausible for 
our purposes:
Sing-1. For any song S, to croon S is to sing S in some particular way.
Sing-2. For any song S, if  S can be sung, then S has lyrics.
And, it is easy to see that Sing-1 and Sing-2 entail:
Sing-3. For any song S, if  S does not have lyrics, S is not croonable.
Since HI would mean that one cannot carry out reductio ad absurdum arguments (which we 
clearly can), one ought not accept both HS and HM.  Further, it is possible to seriously 
weaken HS and still derive HI.  For instance, instead of  a reductive analysis of  supposition, 
identifying it with a particular manner of  conception, HI could be derived from necessary 
concomitance of  supposing C and conceiving C (i.e. from the principle that necessarily, 
anyone who supposes C also conceives C).
And recall that this is worrisome for Hume in multiple ways: If  the worry is well-
founded, it gives rise to the substantive problem of  a clear inadequacy in Hume’s system: 
Hume purports to offer an analysis of  mathematical reasoning.  If  his system cannot capture 
an integral component of  mathematical reasoning, it falls far short of  its aims.  It would also 
produce two methodological problems: First, setting to one side the skeptical considerations 
discussed in Treatise I.iv, Hume frequently extolls the virtues of  mathematical reasoning and 
mathematicians, describing their field as capable of  the utmost certainty and precision.  This 
is a suspect maneuver if  Hume is prepared to discard enormous portions of  well-established 
results, such as anything that had been proven by reductio.5   Perhaps more damaging is the 
fact that Hume himself  employs reductio reasoning throughout the Treatise.  Hume can hardly 
seek to establish his account of  the mind (and particularly the analysis of  reasoning), by 
employing a method of  argument that, according to the system itself, cannot occur.6  Recall, 
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it isn’t just that Hume’s system fails to legitimate reductio arguments, but that it fails to even 
permit their existence.
So, if  Hume is indeed committed to both HS and HM, his system is in serious trouble.  
Further, Hume is committed to HM, as evidenced by this passage (which we have examined 
previously):
‘Tis an establish’d maxim in metaphysics, That whatever the mind 
clearly conceives includes the idea of  possible existence, or in other 
words, that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. We can form 
the idea of  a golden mountain, and from thence conclude 
that such a mountain may actually exist. We can form no idea 
of  a mountain without a valley, and therefore regard it as 
impossible.
T 1.2.2. p. 32
While this quote may appear to leave open the possibility that Hume is simply describing 
the popularity of  the maxim, and not endorsing it himself, it is evident that he does endorse 
HM, from other passages, such as the one (quoted also by Reid in EIP 5.6), in which Hume 
concurs in Berkeley’s rejection of  Lockean abstract ideas:
[‘Tis] a principle generally receiv’d in philosophy, that every 
thing in nature is individual; and that ‘tis utterly absurd to 
suppose a triangle really existent, which has no precise 
proportion of  sides and angles. If  this, therefore, be absurd in 
fact and reality, it must also be absurd in idea; since nothing of  
which we can form a clear and distinct idea is absurd and 
impossible.
T 1.1.7, p. 19-20
Here, Hume offers an argument against abstract ideas which requires him to endorse 
HM.7  We should return our attention, then, to HS.
The basis for accepting HS was: a) Hume’s claim that all the other acts of  the 
understanding — i.e. acts of  judgment and reasoning — “resolve themselves into” 
conception and “are nothing but particular ways of  conceiving our objects” (T 1.3.7, 96-7fn) 
alongside b) the plausible categorization of  supposition as an act of  the understanding.  For 
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Hume, if  supposition is a mental act, it will either be an act of  the understanding or an act of 
the will.  Note that willful control over a mental activity does not mean that the activity itself 
is an act of  will—for instance, Hume points out “the liberty of  the imagination to transpose and 
change its ideas” (T 1.1.3, p. 10), but imagination is treated in Book 1, “Of  the 
Understanding”.8  The fact that supposition is a component of  theoretical reasoning 
suggests that is is properly classified as an act of  the understanding, and so, I will continue to 
take (b) for granted.9
Conveniently, there is a way to make good on Hume’s claim, without committing him to 
HS.  There are two crucial things to observe about the general program of  reducing other 
mental operations to conception which will allow us to see why the program does not 
require a commitment to HS: First, the reductive commitment, in and of  itself, does not 
require content-agreement between the state being reduced and the state it is being reduced 
to.  Second, the reductive commitment, in and of  itself, does not require a 1-1 
correspondence between the operations being reduced and the operations they are being 
reduced to.
To illustrate both features at once, we can consider belief-desire analyses of  intentions:  
If  one is pursuing a belief-desire analysis of  intention, it is not essential for their proposal to 
invoke any belief  or desire with the same content as the intention being reduced, nor does it 
require that each intention is identical to a particular belief  or a particular desire.  While the 
following analysis of  intention is not especially plausible (for other reasons) it certainly 
qualifies as a legitimate belief-desire analysis:  
INT. To intend to bake a cake just is to desire cake, and believe that baking a 
cake is the necessary means to acquiring cake.
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Note that neither the content of  the intention (that one bake a cake) is neither the 
content of  the belief  involved, nor the content of  the desire, on this account.  Nevertheless, 
the account’s reductivist credentials remain intact.  Similarly, multiple mental states occur in 
the analysis, but we might still say that, on such an account, intentions resolve into beliefs 
and desires.
Now turning to Hume, let’s consider a paradigm act of  reasoning: causal inference.  It 
seems pretty plausible that inferring X from Y does not require having a conception with the 
content of  “X from Y” (whatever that would even be).  Rather, it seems to permissible to 
analyze inferring X from Y as occurring whenever one’s belief  that X is properly related to 
their belief  that Y (for instance, by the belief  that X being subsequent to the belief  that Y 
and accompanied by the feeling of  the mind’s determination in so-transitioning).  Since 
beliefs are just special instances of  conceptions, this account would satisfy the requirement 
to reduce inference to ways of  conceiving things, even though there is no individual act of  
conception that corresponds to the act of  inference itself.10
That this is plausible regarding an act like inference is unsurprising.  Inferences, after all, 
are commonly understood as some sort of  transition between states, and thus, it is 
unsurprising that they would be analyzed in terms of  a pair of  properly related acts.  The 
case for employing a similar maneuver with respect to the act of  supposition is somewhat 
harder to see, but I think it can be made reasonably compelling.
It will help to make the case in general first, setting aside various details and constraints 
imposed by Hume’s account.  Let’s consider a straightforward example of  a reductio ad 
absurdum, a proof  that there cannot be an even prime number other than 2:
Suppose (for reductio) that there is some number n, such that n is even, prime, and not equal to 2.  Since 
n is even, n divides by 2 without remainder.  Since n is prime, n can be divided without remainder only by 1 
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or by itself.  So, n equals 2.  But, ex hypothesi, n does not equal 2.  So, n equals 2 and n does not equal 2.  
But this is a contradiction.  So there is no number n, such that n is even, prime, and not equal to 2.
The impossibility that we here need to suppose for our above example is the conjunction 
n is even and n is prime and n is distinct from 2.  But, we should note, the next step of  the 
reductio uses only one conjunct, the claim that n is even.  The subsequent step uses only the 
conjunct claiming that n is prime.  We then put the consequence of  n’s evenness together 
with the consequence of  n’s primeness, and conclude that n is equal to 2.  This conflicts with 
the third conjunct (the claim that n is distinct from 2), which is an evident impossibility (and 
thus, known by intuition, rather than demonstration).  So, the reductio reasoning takes 
consequences of  the individual conjuncts of  that which we supposed, puts them together, 
and eventually constructs a situation in which we know through intuition that a pair of  
consequences cannot be put together.  So, crucially, in reductio reasoning, the reason we have 
for supposing that something is F and G and H is that it puts us in a position i) to draw out 
the consequences of  its being F, its being G, and its being H, and ii) to (attempt to) put those 
consequences together in various ways, which, in cases of  a successful reductio, reveal a pair 
of  consequences that cannot be conjoined.
One way to respond to this observation would be to say that we don’t need to suppose 
the complex content, and instead, that we only need to coordinate our suppositions of  the 
simple components.  However, better for Hume, it would seem, is to offer a reductive 
account of  supposing complex contents in terms of  supposing simple contents:
Let’s say that supposing a conjunction C1&C2 is defined as supposing C1 and supposing 
C2, together with a rule to the effect that the conjunction of  any consequence of  C1 with 
any consequence of  C2 counts as a consequence of  the original supposition.  And let’s say 
that supposing a simple content C gets straightforwardly analyzed as a particular way of  
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conceiving C.  Obviously, there are a number of  ways we could tweak these rules, and 
nothing in my discussion depends on the precise way we formulate them.  The important 
element here is the idea that we coordinate our simple suppositions, and this is constitutive 
of  a complex supposition.
Doing this would give us the following reduction of  supposing that Fa&Ga&Ha: To 
suppose that Fa&Ga&Ha just is to i) suppose that Fa ii) suppose that Ga, and iii) suppose 
that Ha, while iv) counting arbitrary conjunctions of  consequences of  these individual 
suppositions as consequences of  the supposition that Fa&Ga&Ha.  
What this means is that there is no reason to treat supposition of  a complex content as 
involving a conception of  that complex content.  To see this, consider that nothing we 
needed to do in the foregoing reductio would have been hindered by writing out the three 
conjuncts individually, and having in place a rule that allowed us to freely conjoin their 
consequences.  Instead of  “n is even and n is prime and n is distinct from 2”, we’d have 
written “n is even” and “n is prime” and “n is distinct from 2”, but we’d still have been 
allowed to conclude that n can be divided into groups of  two without remainder, etc.
If  we only need to be able to conceive the contents of  our simple suppositions, we get 
an account on which it is possible to suppose some contents that we do not (and cannot) 
conceive.  What is required is that we can conceive each of  the individual conjuncts.  Since, 
for Hume, every simple content is possible, this system will allow us to reduce every 
supposition to conception, and preserve our ability to explain reductio reasoning.
Section 3. Demonstrative Contents, Reasoning and Judgment in Hume
While I hope that I was clear, in the previous section, that the view being propounded is 
intended to sit well with Hume’s overall commitments, it is important to observe that 
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Hume’s (albeit limited) pronouncements on demonstrative contents and demonstrative 
reasoning sit well with the sort of  account I have been proposing.  To this end, it will be 
helpful to say a few words about the general nature of  the demonstrative/non-demonstrative 
distinction in Hume (understood on the previously indicated use of  “demonstrative” that 
also includes the intuitive).  In the Treatise we find two ways of  characterizing the 
demonstrative:
D1: Something is demonstrable just in case its contrary is inconceivable.
D2: Something is demonstrable just in case it is a relation of  ideas which 
depends on the identity of  the ideas alone (i.e. relations of  
resemblance, of  degrees of  some quality, of  proportion in quantity/
number, or of  contrariety).
Perhaps the clearest statement supporting D1 can be found in the Abstract to the 
Treatise:
When a demonstration convinces me of  any proposition, it 
not only makes me conceive the proposition, but also makes 
me sensible that ‘tis impossible to conceive any thing 
contrary. What is demonstratively false implies a 
contradiction ; and what implies a contradiction cannot be 
conceived.  But with regard to any matter of  fact, however 
strong the proof  may be from experience, I can always 
conceive the contrary, tho’ I cannot always believe it.
T, p. 653
And, the clearest statement supporting D2 can be found in the beginning of  part three 
of  book one (“Of  Knowledge and Probability”):
It appears, therefore, that of  these seven philosophical 
relations, there remain only four, which depending solely on 
ideas, can be the objects of  knowledge and certainty. These 
four are resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, and 
proportions in quantity or number.
T,  p. 70
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Hume goes on to indicate that the first three of  those four are “discoverable at first 
sight, and fall more properly under the province of  intuition than demonstration”.
D1 and D2 combine to produce some interesting consequences.  For instance, since 
relations of  ideas are classified by Hume as complex ideas, it follows from D2 that every 
demonstrable content is complex, and thus, D2 in combination with D1 informs us that the 
only ideas whose contraries are inconceivable, are relations of  ideas.  It also follows (though 
less directly) that Hume’s system requires at least two modes of  composition among ideas.
To see this, consider two contrary ideas, i and #i (and recall that i and #i are 
compositionally distinct).  There is a specific occurrence of  the relation of  contrariety 
between i and #i, or in other words, a specific complex idea that embodies the contrariety of 
i and #i.  The complex idea in question is the specific  then there must be a mode of  
composition involving i and #i that allows them to be put into the same complex idea, 
otherwise there would be no such complex idea as the contrariety of  i and #i.  Call such a 
complex idea a comparative idea, and call the mode of  composition involved comparative 
composition.  But now consider an idea of  an extension.  According to Hume, ideas of  
extension are composed of  many ideas of  atomic sensibilia.  Call the mode of  composition 
used in this case constructive composition, and call the idea resulting from this mode of  
composition a constructive idea.  While i and #i admit of  comparative composition, they do 
not admit of  constructive composition.  For, being contrary, any constructive idea with i and 
#i as parts would be an idea of  something impossible.  But, as we have seen throughout the 
last two chapters, Hume does not think we can conceive of  impossible things, and thus, it 
cannot be that any ideas constructively combine i and #i.  Thus, while contrary ideas can be 
combined comparatively, they cannot be combined constructively.  One might be concerned 
that this does not establish the need for two modes of  composition, but rather, different 
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classes of  ideas resulting from a single mode of  composition, depending on relations among 
the ingredient ideas.  However, we can also conceive of  various relations involving multiple 
ideas of  atomic sensibilia (e.g. the resemblance of  five colored minima), without needing to 
conceive of  any extension, so it seems more plausible to think that there is a way of  
composing complex ideas that can be employed about any two ideas whatsoever, and 
another that cannot be employed to combine contrary ideas.  While I will proceed for the 
time being as though Hume posits only these two modes of  composition (comparison and 
construction), it may be that, ultimately, to adequately capture Hume’s system, each of  the 
seven types of  philosophical relation indicated by Hume will correspond to a distinct mode 
of  composition.
So, consider a simple content, the idea the object o, and its contrary idea.  As above, we 
will label these ‘i’ and ‘#i’.  The contrariety of  these two ideas is the complex idea we get by 
comparative combination of  i and #i, COMP(i,#i).  COMP(i,#i) is the particular relation of  
contrariety between o and the non-existence of  o, and thus, whatever our account of  
intuition is, it ought to be the case that this complex idea constitutes the judgment that o and 
the non-existence of  o are contrary.  Ideally, this would mean that to judge o and ~o 
contrary just is to have a lively idea of  their contrariety.  So, it must be possible for the idea 
COMP(i,#i) to be lively without this entailing that i or #i is lively.  I am forced to admit that, 
on the model we have been using up to this point, it is unclear how Hume could secure such 
a result.  Remaining quiet about modes of  composition for complex ideas is not sufficient to 
tell us how the complex idea constituted by these simple components, could be lively 
without these components being enlivened.  One place to look for help is the account of  
secondary ideas.  Perhaps the conclusion of  intuitive/demonstrative reasoning is really the 
necessity of  the contrariety of  o and ~o.  This proposal accords well with Hume’s claim that 
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intuition/demonstration make one sensible of  the impossibility of  contrary of  the 
intuitable/demonstrable claim (e.g. the claim that o and ~o aren’t contrary), but this would 
still leave us without an account of  the judgment that o and ~o are contrary.  Another way 
out would be to jettison some of  the elements of  this theory of  relations.  However, to do 
so would clearly be to revise the system of  the Treatise, and thus, is not a part of  my project. 
One possibility for avoiding the result is to deny that judgments of  necessities require 
vivacity.  Though I am wary of  the philosophical position this leaves Hume in (with a 
disjunctive account of  judgment), it does help make sense of  some repeated elements of  the 
text.  Looking again at the quote from the Abstract, we can see that Hume seems to think 
that he would not need to posit an account of  assent, if  all judgments were intuitive/
demonstrable:
When a demonstration convinces me of  any proposition, it 
not only makes me conceive the proposition, but also makes 
me sensible that ‘tis impossible to conceive any thing 
contrary. What is demonstratively false implies a 
contradiction ; and what implies a contradiction cannot be 
conceived.  But with regard to any matter of  fact, however 
strong the proof  may be from experience, I can always 
conceive the contrary, tho’ I cannot always believe it. The 
belief, therefore, makes some difference betwixt the 
conception to which we assent, and that to which we do not 
assent.
T, p. 653
Similar language is used in the body of  the Treatise, when the account of  belief  is being 
presented:
Suppose a person present with me, who advances 
propositions to which I do not assent, that Caeser dy’d in his bed, 
that silver is more fusible than lead, or mercury heavier than gold; ‘tis 
evident, that notwithstanding my incredulity, I clearly 
understand his meaning and form all the same ideas, which 
he forms.  My imagination is endow’d with the same powers 
as his ; nor is it possible for him to conceive any idea, which I 
cannot conceive ; or conjoin any, which I cannot conjoin. I 
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therefore ask, wherein consists the difference between 
believing and disbelieving any proposition? [...]
‘Twill not be a satisfactory answer to say, that a person who 
does not assent to a proposition you advance; after having 
conceived the idea in the same manner with you ; immediately 
conceives it in a different manner, and has different ideas of  
it. This answer is unsatisfactory ; not because it contains any 
falsehood, but because it discovers not all the truth.  ‘Tis 
confest, that in all cases, wherein we dissent from any person; 
we conceive both sides of  the question ; but as we can believe 
only one, it evidently follows that belief  must make some 
difference betwixt that conception to which we assent, and 
that from which we dissent.
 T, p. 95-6
We note again here that Hume contrasts the situation with demonstrable contents from 
non-demonstrable contents when motivating the view that liveliness makes the difference 
between the content believed and the content denied.  While it is possible to take the 
comparison between them to be merely epistemic or expository (i.e. by seeing the contrast, 
we can come to appreciate the work that assent is doing, though it is present in both the case 
of  demonstrative contents and the case of  non-demonstrative contents), we might also take 
them to indicate that the actual account of  judgment differs when we are talking about 
demonstrative contents versus when we are talking about non-demonstrative contents.11  If  
demonstrative judgment doesn’t require vivacity, we’d completely avoid the above puzzle.  
We would also avoid an additional puzzle, namely, the puzzle of  where the vivacity originates 
for intuitive/demonstrative judgments.12  The puzzle is relatively straightforward: in 
perceptual and memorial judgments, the vivacity of  the judgment originates with an 
impression.  In causal inference, the vivacity of  the judgment is transferred from some 
impression.  In demonstrative reasoning, there is no impression (of  sensation or reflection) 
whose vivacity could be constituting the judgment, nor would there be any such impression 
that could transfer the vivacity to the idea.  This problem is avoided on a view which regards 
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judgment as disjunctively defined, and which regards the mere conception of  a demonstrable 
content as sufficient for assent.
Conclusion
Let me first briefly recapitulate the major results I have established, before situating them 
with respect to remaining issues and directions for future research.  David Hume adopts a 
Newtonian/empiricist account of  explanation, which means that explanations are provided 
by generalizations whose truth has been observationally confirmed.  In a sense then, the 
explanations provided are shallow (they merely reflect the distribution of  features provided 
by individual concrete observations).  At the same time, this means that Hume’s method 
provides a strict limit on the depths of  inquiry/explanation.  This should tell us that any 
time Hume seems to speak as though he is positing some unobservable cause underlying an 
element of  his mental taxonomy, we should adopt the approach of  “interpretive algebra”, 
and treat the ostensibly occult notion as a technical term for some observable feature of  the 
experiences being taxonomized.  I have not sought to defend Hume’s Newtonian approach 
to explanation, but Hume’s project is clearly bound up with this approach, and so, full 
evaluation of  Hume’s views would require assessment of  his explanatory aims.
A major theme of  this work has been to draw out the ways in which undefended 
assumption of  the Mirror Thesis rests in the background of  the objections being offered.  
This is not to say that it is impossible to reframe these objections on grounds weaker than 
the Mirror Thesis, but the arguments offered against that we investigated do not generally 
contain even hints as to how to re-motivate the objection without the assumption of  the 
Mirror Thesis.  Note that one major concern which I did not engage with in this work, the 
question of  how Hume could account for predicative judgments, is tightly related to the 
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Mirror Thesis as well.  We call them predicative judgments because they are expressed in 
language with (non-existential) predication.  But the structure of  the sentence “Tom is 
human” will have to differ drastically from the structure of  the judgment that Tom is 
human, since “Tom” is grammatically simple, but the idea of  Tom is ideationally complex.  
This isn’t to say that Hume will have an easy time of  accounting for predicative judgments, 
merely that, as with almost all of  the worries assessed in this dissertation, the viability of  
Hume’s view will depend on the resources available to one who rejects the Mirror Thesis.
Importantly, there are also a host of  questions remaining which I have not addressed at 
all.  There are worries about the account of  abstraction, about the bundle theory treatment 
of  ideas of  objects, further questions concerning modal contents, the theory of  moral 
judgment, the relationship between these views and Hume’s discussion of  skepticism 
regarding reason and regarding the senses, etc.13  However, in light of  the very powerful 
worries we have examined, and the apparent success Hume has achieved in developing a 
system that can avoid or defuse those objections, I take the overarching lesson to be that 
Hume’s system is vastly more versatile than it appeared, and so, we can be optimistic that 
Hume’s system will address some or all of  these concerns.
Most importantly, though, I want to stress that I think careful study and elucidation of  
Hume’s views is exceptionally valuable even if, the very next issue we turn to address, is 
conclusively fatal to Hume’s project.  For example, if  there is no way for Hume to get 
quantificational judgments to turn out correctly, and this is the insurmountable problem for 
Hume’s theory, then we will know exactly where we have made gains when we adopt a 
predicational/propositional framework of  judgment rather than a reistic/objectual 
framework.14
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CHAPTER 5 ENDNOTES
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1 Compare Reid’s statement of  his first objection, discussed in section 1 of  chapter 4.
2 Compare this discussion with Arnauld and Descartes on the pythagorean theorem in Objections and Replies 
to the Meditations (Descartes [1988]).
3 As with almost all of  his specific examples, Reid’s choice of  a geometric example is rather unfortunate, given 
that, in the Treatise, Hume appears willing to denigrate (in some fashion or other) the status of  geometric 
demonstrations as compared to algebraic/arithmetical demonstrations.  I will continue to set this aside and 
simply adhere to Reid’s example, though the consequences of  Hume’s nuanced opinions of  geometry are 
worthy of  attention. 
4 There is some room to debate whether this includes mere sensations, but that point is orthogonal to the 
current debate.
5 These claims again need to be qualified (as above) with the note about Hume’s apparent derogation of  
geometric reasoning.  However, as reductio arguments are used also in arithmetic, and as Hume explicitly avoids 
derogating arithmetic when criticizing geometric reasoning, the point remains.
6 I suppose some Hume scholars who favor a skeptical reading of  the Treatise might not be so concerned with a 
self-undermining style of  argumentation.
7 In order to get from the explicit commitment of  the final sentence of  the passage to HM, one needs only 
recall that Hume adopts the orthodox account of  conceiving something, on which it amounts simply to the 
possession (in the understanding) of  an idea of  that thing.
8 See also Hume’s argument that the difference between conception and belief  cannot be the addition of  a 
separate idea:  Since the arrangement and combination of  ideas in the fancy is under our willful control, Hume 
observes that such an account of  belief  would predict that we can believe at will (T Appendix, p. 623-4, 629).
9 It would be interesting to explore the thought that supposition is not an act of  the understanding, however, 
such an investigation would take us too far afield at present.
10 While I tried to give an example that is at least somewhat plausible as a matter of  Hume interpretation, I do 
not here intend to be arguing that this is, in fact, Hume’s account of  inference.
11 This view is defended in Smalligan Marusic [manuscript] on slightly different grounds.  In communication with 
her, I argued very strenuously against a disjunctive reading of  judgments in Hume, but it looks like I was wrong 
after all.
12 Both Ed McCann and David Owen separately pressed me on this puzzle (in conversation) when I was 
defending a univocal account of  judgment.
13 Or, to give another example, we have not examined whether special issues arise for the disjunctive account of 
judgment which I ultimately attribute to Hume in this chapter.  I also have not shown that Hume’s system can 
capture all the reductio arguments that we want captured for mathematics (I merely showed that Hume’s 
system can, in fact, model at least one reductio argument).
14 Though, for grounds for (some) optimism on such a treatment of  quantification, see van Fraassen [1982].
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